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ABSTRACT

The general reference of this study is to the relationships
between the economics of John Maynard Keynes and received economics.
Hie term "received economics" refers to the economic theory promul
gated before Keynes. The specific problem was to place properly the
economics of Keynes in the history of economic theory with specific
reference to his more important antecedents.
Within this frame of reference, the following aspects of Keynesian
economics were examined:

(a) his general demand analysis, (b) his

theories of value, (c) his doctrine of effective demand, and (d) his
monetary theory.

The research took the form of examining the works

of those economists who have been largely responsible for the formu
lation of economic theory from the period of Mercantilism to Keynes.
Primarily, this involved the Classical School, Austrian theory, and
the thoupjit systems of some of the so called economic "heretics."
The results of the study strongly indicnte that economists may
confidently reject the hypothesis that the idea system of Keynes con
stituted a break from the past and created a new economics.

The de

mand analysis employed by Keynes had its beginning with the Austrians,
Insofar as he embraced a labor theory of value, Keynes accepted--at
least in part— the value theory of the Classicists.

His commanded

value theory was derived directly from the Austrians, and his expec
tation theory of value was virtually identical with John R. Commons'

volitional theory of value.
long and interesting history.

The doctrine of effective demand has a
With reference to this doctrine,

Boisguilbert, Lauderdale, Maithus, Sismondi, Aftalion, Hobson, and
others wore important predecessors of Keynes.
by no means original with Keynes.
in macroscopic terms.

Macro-economics was

All business cycle theories run

The consumption function has long been a

major factor in underconsumption economics.

And, of course, it was

virtually stated in Engel's Law of Consumption,

Keynes' attack on

saving and his enthusiasm for spending was n concept which has been
present in the literature of economies for at least two centuries.
Keynes was a monetary "heretic," but there were important antecedents
to his monetary theory and to his distrust of financial capitalism.
Finally, the General Theory is full of tendency concepts quite in
keeping with classical economics.
The general conclusion is that Keynes took scattered ideas
that had long been present in economic thought and formulated an
economic theory that was an intellectual response to existing eco
nomic conditions.

Tlie General Theory of Employment, Interest, and

Money marked an important milestone in the development of economic
theory; it caused all economists to re-ovaluate their fundamental
theories.

But it cannot properly be referred to as the "Keynesian

Revolution."

It wTas simply an important part in the evolution of

economic theory.
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THE PLACE OF K T i H ®

IN THE !i35 TOOT OF ECONOMIC THKOOT

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

There is a significant gap in the literature treating the idea
system of the great EngliBh economist, John Maynard Keynes.

That gap

1b present because no one has seriously attempted to view the economics
of Keynes from the perspective of the history of economic thought; that
is, place Keynes in his proper position in the development of economic
theory.

To be sure, many writers have explained that this or that

aspect of KeyneB can be found in the writings of earlier economists,'1'
but none hove searched diligently through the history of economic thought
for the precise purpose of discovering whether Keynes' so-called "New
Economics" is in fact new or whether it is a brilliant combination of
pre-existing economic theories presented at a very opportune time in
the development of the capitalistic economic system.

Economists, as a

group, have been too busy either eulogizing or criticizing the General
Theory^ to concern themselves with this issue.

This study is an

^For example see; Lawrence R. Klein, The Keynesian Revolution
(New York; The Macmillan Co., 19^7), Ch. 5; The essays in The New
Economics— Keynes • Influence on Theory and Public Policy (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, I9W ) , by Seymour Harris (Chs. 1, 3, and 6), Joseph
Schumpeter (Ch. 9), Paul Sarauelson (Ch. 13), Gottfried Haberler (Ch.
1*0, J. Tinbergen (Ch. 18), Wassily Leontief (Ch. 19), Arthur Smithies
(Ch. 39), and R. F. Harrod (Ch. 1*1).
2John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest,
and Money (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 193^). Hereafter cited as
General Theory.
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attempt to bridge this gap in the Keynesian literature.
Obviously, the whole of the history of economic thou$it cannot be
presented in u study of this type.

Fortunately, that is not necessary to

realize the objectives of the study.

Only those parts of the stream

of economic theory will be examined which clearly anticipated the major
principles contained in the General Theory.
In view of the great body of Keynesian literature, there is
no need for still another detailed analysis of the economics of Keynes,
and this study does not purport to present such an analysis. Quite
the contrary, the assumption is made throughout that the reader is
familiar with the General Theory.
Many writers have explained that the appearance of the General
Theory in 193^ was in response to the depression that was sweeping
the capitalistic world at that time.

This explanation has a great

degree of validity but it is not the complete story.

There is reason

to believe that Keynes wrote as he did for more reasons than those
prompted by the great depression, reasons which were primarily philo
sophical and pragnatic in nature.

Keynes lived during a period of

rather radical change in philosophical thought, and his own thinking
in matters of an economic nature was profoundly affected.

The ob

jective of Chapter Two is to examine the philosophical environment
which surrounded Keynes and to relate this environment to the theo
retical approach employed in the General Theory.3

^Ferdinand Zweig, Economic Ideas (New York: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1950), p. 21. "Keynes himself was, so to speak, pre-Keynesian,
Keynesian, and Post-Keynesian. What is called Keynesian doctrine
culminated in the year 1936 with the publication of the General Theory

Keynes believed that his major mission in writing the General
Theory was to refute classical economic theory, and many economists
claim that he accomplished his mission.

ll

To be sure, Keynes employs

the demand approach in his idea system, while the classicists utilized
the supply approach.

However, it was not Keynes who brought about this

great cleavage in the development of economic theory.

The Austrian

school was responsible for that change in the direction of economic
analysis.

Chapter Three is devoted to an examination of Keynes'

theory as it relates to the received economics.
Economists generally agree that the doctrine of "effective
demand" constitutes the very core of the Keynesian idea system.
this a new doctrine?

Was

Was it of such a nature- that economic theory was

pushed throu#i a revolutionary metamorphosis and emerged as a completely
new theoretical framework upon which a new economics could be constructed?
Or was it merely a blooming--under ideal weather conditions— of a kind
of century plant, the seeds of which had been planted quite early in the
history of m o d e m economic theory and nurtured carefully down throu#i
the years by repeated grafts, cuttings, and trimmings?

Chapter Four

deals with these questions.
Throu#iout the history of industrial capitalism, and in the
face of "refutations" without number at the hands of orthodox economists,

The two basic ideaB of classical theory are: (1) the theory
of capital formation, which holds that saving is a dynamic factor in
capital accumulation; and (2) J. E. Say's Law of Markets, which states
that demand can never be deficient. Keynes, with his liquiditypreference theory of interest, his concept that saving was a residual,
and his doctrine of effective demand, believed that classical economics
had been refuted. See General Theory, p. 3 end Chs. 2, 3, 7, and 13.

1+
the doctrines of monetary "heretics" have tenaciously persisted.
Their proposals for reform and their accompanying unorthodox principles
have been particularly prominent during periods of severe economic
criseB.

5

In the contemporary controversy over monetary policy and

theory, KeyneB, as perhaps the most distinguished of the monetary
radicals, occupies a focal point.

Since the publication of the

General Theory in 1936, many of the old "heresies" of general economic
thinking have been revived and have assumed prominence in academic
discussion.

From the point of view of the history of economic thought,

the Keynesian controversy represents a revival of the challenge which
economic orthodoxy has been unable to extinguish during the past one
hundred and fifty years.
Keynes expressed great admiration for Silvio Gesell in the
General Theory, and Gesell considered himself a disciple of P. J.
Proudhon.

Because of this, the assumption may be made that there

exist significant similarities among the three economists.

Gesell

and Proudhon are believed to be important predecessors of Keynesj
their thought appears to have presupposed much of Keynes' monetary
theory.

Chapter Five is a testing of this assumption.
Chapter Six presents seme conclusions of the study.

^"Monetary reform" is here used to mean, not a program which
treats only incidentally changes in the financial structure, but one
which attributes basic economic maladjustments to monetary factors,
and places primary emphasis on the altering of financial institutions
while leaving intact ownership of property and private industrial
enterprise.

CHAPTER II

SOME FitILOSOFnICAL ASPECTS OF E O K * IDEA SYSTEM

Anyone acquainted with the prop,vans of philosophical thinking
since Charles Darwin published his Origin of Species (1899) cannot
but realize the extent to which the frameworks of interpretation
into which economists pour their thinking 'nave been influenced by
philosophical thinkers.

Although it is not the purpose of thin

study to examine the evolution of philosophical thought, the attempt
to assign to Keynes his proper place in the history of economic
thought does dictute at least a brief investigation of his philo
sophical orientation.

This is .true because there in such a close

correlation between modern philosophy^' and the basic framework of
Keynes' icon system.

Thus the purpose of thin chapter is to demon

strate this correlation and to examine the Keynesian system in terms
of "logic," "opistemology," and "ethics."''
Before examining the relationship which exists between the

By "modern philosophy" the writer means that body of philo
sophical thoutyit promulgated by such philosophers as James, Whitehead,
and Bergson in contrast with the philosophy of such men as Newton,
Descartes, and Leibnitz. Keynes' philosophical outlook was clearly
based on the thought of the former three men, whereas orthodox econo
mists from Ricardo to Marshall owed their intellectual orientation to
the latter three men.

O

‘"Keynes was not in any way a specialized student of modern
philosophy, his intellectual interests having been absorbed by studies
in the fields of mathematics and economics.
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economics of Keynes and recent developments in philosophy, it is well
to present briefly those major features of m o d e m philosophical thouf^it
which have so greatly influenced, not only Keynes, but the thinking in
the social sciences in general.^

Hiese features, which characterize

twentieth century philosophy, may be termed:

(a) the significance of

the whole, (b) the emergent nature of things, and (c) the attempt to
be realistic.

It is readily seen that these new elements in philoso

phy are of a methodological nature; that is, the true significance of
m o d e m philosophy is to be found in new methods of analysis.
The philosophy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was
characterized by an atomistic attitude.

According to this method of

analysis, one must use the individual unit method of examination.

Then,

to understand the essential conditions of whatever was being investi
gated as a whole, one merely added together the component parts of the
whole.

In short, it was a method of generalizing with reference to the

whole from specific findings derived from analyzing the individual
parts.

The basic assumption, of course, was that the whole was always

equal to the sum of its parts. Hie new philosophy turns this method
of analysis upside down, and approaches an investigation with an
holistic attitude; that is, it believes the proper method of analysis
is one which emphasizes the totality of things.

Once the character

istics of the whole are known, then, an examination of the component

3lhe major source of information for this discussion of modern
philosophy is: Twentieth Century Philosophy, ed. D. D. Runes (New York:
Philosophical Library, 19*4-3)', especially the following essays: John E.
Boodin, "Philosophy of History;" Victor F. Lenzen, "Philosophy of
Science;" Alfred N. Whitehead, "Philosophy of Life;" Bertrand Russell,
"Philosophy of the 20th Century;" and Herbert Feigl, "Logical Empiricism

7
parts is proper.

Ihis view is based upon the realization that the

whole may be more or less than the sum of its parts.

Furthermore,

the new philosophy insists that the whole is basically different in
character from it3 separate parts; consequently, one can never under
stand the nature of the whole by merely inquiring into the character
istics of the component parts.

The second significant feature of m o d e m philosophical thought
is the importance it gives to the emergent nature of things.

This is

closely associated with the holistic method of analysis because the
totality of things which interests the m o d e m social scientist is the
evolving or emergent whole.

Whitehead says, "Existence is activity

ever merging into the future."

By this, Whitehead means that every

thing that exists is always in the process "of being made;" thus, the
universe, the physical world, and social systems have had a pant, do
have a present, and will have a future.

Of course this is the evo

lutionary or continuous process, and most social scientists are inter
ested in incorporating this concept of change and its consequences
into their theoretical systems of thouf^it.

Many scholars recognize

that in some circumstances the concept of the emergent nature of
things is a much more useful tool for analysis than the concept of
the mechanism itself.
M o d e m philosophical thought prides itself in its attempt
to be "realistic."

This is the third important characteristic of

twentieth century philosophy with which this study is concerned.
Tiiis realistic approach in philosophy bears a close affinity

^Whitehead, on. cit., p. lM*.

8
to the methodology of the physical sciences.

Not only has philosophy

adopted their methods, the modern philosopher attempts to formulate
his thought in such a manner that it conforms with the conclusions
reached in the physical sciences.

Whitehead and others explain that

it is unnecessary for conflict to exist between philosophical and
scientific thought.

They point out that it is not sufficient for

philosophy to be merely consistent within itself, there must be room
in the body of philosophy for the contributions of science.

The modern

philosopher is especially careful to see to it that he has made a place
within his thought system for all generally accepted scientific doc
trines.^

IhiB development in philosophical thinking haB brougit phi

losophy and science into a very close relationship during the past
half-century.

This has not been a case of a reciprocal influence.

Quite the contrary, the realism of science has caused philosophy to
be much more realistic or inductive in the sense that today's phi
losopher actually looks for support for his own views among those of
the scientists.

The m o d e m philosopher is quite willing to re-examine

his own position if his opinions differ from those of the scientists.
In most instances if a change in opinion is called for, it is the
philosopher who shifts his position, not the scientist.

It is this

willingness to take account of the discoveries of natural science
that gives a realistic flavor to much of recent philosophical thought
and which sets it off from the more speculative thought of earlier
centuries.

5
xSee Lenzen, Whitehead, and Russell, op. cit.
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Keynes Incorporated these three aspects of modern philosophy
Into the intellectual structure of his idea system.

He embraced the

totalis tic or aggregative approach to economic analysis to such an
extent that the fundamental basis of his over-all idea system is the
aggregates of employment, national income, national output, aggregate
supply, aggregate demand, total social consumption, total social in
vestment, and total social savings.

This is not to say that KeyneB

completely ignored the individual unit method of analysis; he simply
made the individual aspects of the economy— for example, prices and
values--subsidiary to the aggregate of employment, income, etc.
In adopting the holistic method of analysis from the philoso
phers, Keynes abandoned what he described as the "atomic hypothesis."^This hypothesis assumed that;

(a) the economic system was a static

organism consisting of many essentially independent parts; each eco
nomic unit functioned as a separate and distinct entity; and the man
ner in which the entire system functioned was simply the sum of the
manner in which the individual ports functioned.

This Newtonian at

titude toward economic analysis has dominated the theoretical frame
work of economics since Ricardo.^

Keynes departed (althoupfr he was

6j. M. Keynes, Essays in Biography (London;
Co., Ltd., 1933), P. 28.

Macmillan and

^Ih his discussion of the "paradox of thrift," Paul Samuelson
says, "In economics, we must always be on guard against the logical
fallacy of composition. What is good for each person separately need
not be good for all; under some circumstances, private prudence may be
social folly. Specifically, this means that the attempt of each and
every person to increase his saving may. . .result in a reduction in
actual saving by all the people in the community. Note the italicized
words ‘attempt1 and ‘actual1; between them there may be a world of
difference if people find themselves thrown out of Jobs and with

10

by no means the first to do 3 0 ) from this atomistic or Newtonian
approach to economic studies.

"We are faced at every turn," Keynes

said, "with the problems of Organic Unity, of Discreteness, of Dis
continuity --the whole is not equal to the sum of its parts, compari
sons of quality fail us, small changes produce large effects, the
assumptions of a uniform and homogeneous continuum are not satisfied."
One of Keynes * fundamental concepts was that the modern econo
my differed greatly from the economic order which Alfred Marshall
wrote about in 1379.
in function.

The economy had changed both in structure and

He was convinced that the Marshallian theory, based

upon the assumption of a small-scale competitive economy, was inade
quate to explain an economy dominated by big business. The corporate
form of business organization which resulted in separation between
ownership and management had become the rule not the exception.

Thus

lowered income payments." Paul A. Samuelson, Economics (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Co. Inc., 191^8), pp. 270, 271.
Under a sub-head "The Whole And The Part," Samuelson says,
'"Die first lesson in economics is: things are often not what they
seem. Some examples chosen at random may illustrate this:
1. If all
farmers work hard and nature cooperates in producing a
bumper crop, total farm income falls.
2. One man by great ingenuity in hunting a job or by a willingness
to work for less may thereby solve his own unemployment problem, but
all cannot solve their problems in this way.
3. Higher
prices for one industry may benefit itB members but, if
the prices
of everything bou#it and sold increased in the same pro
portion, no one would be any better off.
1*. It may pay the United States to reduce tariffs charged on goods
imported even if other countries refuse to do likewise. . .
5. What is prudent behavior for an individual or a single business
firm may at times be folly for a nation or a state." Ibid., p. 8 .
See Ibid., pp. 32k, 1*26, and 1*52 for other examples of the
"fallacy of composition."
Q
Essays in Biography, p. 20.

11
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at times "enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation."
In this new economy characterized by a dichotomy of "business"
and "Industry," the whole was frequently less than the sum of Its
parts.

As early as 1926, Keynes contended that one could not deter

mine community welfare by simply adding together Individual welfares.
The quantities were unequal, with community welfare usually less than
the sum of its individual parts.

Individual economic behavior could

create advantages for the individual but there was no assurance that
this would result in community betterment.10

It was entirely possible

for an individual to exploit others and enrich himself, but by no type
of reason or logic could one conclude that this would enrich the econo
my.

Using the individual firm method of analysis, it is entirely logi

cal to hold that a reduction in wages will result in more employment.
But when the economy is viewed in macrocosmic terms, it becomes clear
that employment cannot increase if all business firms reduce wages.
Purchasing power would fall and this would cause business to reduce
production.

Less employment and not more would result.

On the baBis of this philosophical attitude, Keynes developed
his macro-economic analysis which deals with "the economic system as
a whole and with securing the optimum employment of the system's en
tire resources."11

It was not the quantity of resources that was

important; it was the employment of them that dominated Keynes'

^General Theory, pp. 150, 159*
10J. M. Keynes, Laisaez-Falre and Communism (New York:
Republic Inc., 1926), p. 5 7 .

^ General Theory, pp. 339/ 3*+0.

New

12

thinking.

The quantity vas taken as given.

Keynes' totallstic at

titude toward economic Investigation was in keeping with recent de
velopments in philosophy and all the social sciences.

The sciences

which treat of human behavior were turning more and more toward a
more totallstic outlook during the period of Keynes' intellectual
development.^
The essence of Keynes' holistic approach to an analysis of
the economic system may be grasped by pointing out that the
older economists made the general level of economic activity
a function of the behavior of the individual firm. When the
individual firm was in equilibrium, the whole economy was
assumed to be in the same condition. In Keynes' system the
reverse is true. The behavior of the individual firm is held
to be a function of the behavior of the whole economic system.
As the economy rises and falls, it takes the individual firm
with it. Private businessmen determine their economic policies
in the li^it of their expectations or forecasts relating to the
future behavior of the entire economic system. For this reason
the behavior of the individual businessman is in large part
nothing but a reflection of the larger behavior pattern of the
whole economic community; and to understand the activities of
the private firm, one must first have an understanding of the '
way in which the entire economic system operates.
By treating the economy as an emerging process, Keynesian eco
nomics duplicated another important characteristic of modern philosophy.
Keynes was interested with the manner in which the economic systems of
western Europe and the United States wer. evolving.

His concern with

this continuum is demonstrated in nearly all of his writings.

The

English economy was plagued with heavy unemployment during the 1920's.
In attempting to find causes for this, Keynes studied the economic
history of England, and concluded that fundamental changes had occurred

^ S e e Allan G. Gruchy, "The philosophical Basis of the New
Keynesian Economics," Ethics, LVIII (July, 19^8), P. ?38.
1 ^Ibld.
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in English economic life.

In the nineteenth century certain dynamic

growth factors were present to absorb the savings of wealthy individ
uals and to maintain virtually full employment of all the productive
resources most of the time.

These factors were:

(1) a rapid increase

in population, (2 ) a heavy and constant flow of inventions and in
novations, (3 ) the settlement and exploitation of new land areas,
and (1+) frequent wars.

ll+

These forces operating within a laissez-

faire environment created Beemingly unlimited private investment
opportunities.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, however,

these growth factors which made "individualistic capitalism" function
at hi#i levels of income and employment were losing much of their
dynamic effects.

Population had begun to grow at a decreased rate,

there was a slowing down of technological progress, and there was
no longer large land areas available for exploitation.

Thus by the

close of World War I, the English economy and other industrialized
nations, which depended upon private investment for their level of
operation, had reached a stage of maturity where private investment
was not sufficient to create and maintain full employment of all
available productive resources.
Keynes explained his fundamental theBis in the following
manner:
When a country is growing in wealth somewhat rapidly, the
further progress of this happy state of affairs is liable to
be interrupted, in conditions of laissez-faire, by the in
sufficiency of the inducements to new investments. When
investments in new plant and equipment fail to materialize,
chronic stagnation and mass unemployment become persisting

lU
General Theory, p. 307.

features of economic life. Money ceases to function as a
vital factor aiding in the creation of useful material goods;
instead, it becomes merely a means of storing wealth. Idle
or unspent money means less demand for the products of farm
and factory, and hence less employment, lhrift or saving,
which was regarded as a private virtue by the orthodox econo
mists, now becomes a public or communal vice since it leads
to business stagnation and low levels of employment end na
tional income.^5
Thus, "Keynes' fundamental thesis, stripped of all its technicalities,
was that wo had arrived at a stage in our economic evolution where
the tendency to save on the part of the middle and upper classes
outstrips the ability of businessmen to absorb private savings through
the investment process."^

The fact that Keynes does not inquire very

far into the past or the future of capitalistic society does not deny
the essentially emergent nature of his. economic analysis.

As early as

1920 he said, "Very few of us realize with conviction the intensely
unusual, unstable, complicated, unreliable, temporary nature of the
economic organization by which Western Europe has lived for'the last
half century.

We assume some of the most peculiar and temporary of

our late advantages as natural, permanent, and to be depended on, and
we lay our plans accordingly."^
Much of Keynes' analysis is of the short-run variety and a
great deal of his energy was directed toward solving immediate eco
nomic problems.

Nevertheless, he never lost sifgit of the importance

of historical economic forces and the manner in which they had shaped
the m o d e m capitalistic economy.

^ Ibid., p. 335 .
17

York:

For Keynes, all industrialized

^Gruchy, op. cit., p. 239.

J. M. Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (New
Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1920), p. 3.

15

capitalistic countries could correctly hold that "an age is over."

18

The third way in which the economics of Keynes duplicated
m o d e m philosophical thought was in its claim to be more realistic
than the inherited or received economics.

Throughout his writings

KeyneB emphasized the fact that he was dealing with the "complex
real world."

What concerned him were the "actual practices and in

stitutions of the contemporary world" and "the problems of the real
world."^

Keynes "had no special concern with any simplified pro

paedeutic of his science.

He strongly protests against any attempt

on the part of economists to reduce their science to an oversimplified
model or scheme of general relations which has little connection with
the actual world of hard-and-fast facts."

PO

Keynes was especially critical of the tendency to make eco
nomics less a social and more a mathematical science.

"Too large a

proportion of recent mathematical economics," he said, "are mere con
coctions, as imprecise as the initial assumptions they rest on, which
allow the author to lose sight of the complexities and interdependencies
of the real world in a maze of pretentions and unhelpful symbols.

21

Thus Keynes' idea system reflected the new philosophy of the
twentieth century.

His analysis emphasized the emergent, the total-

istic, and the realistic nature of things.

Despite the fact that he

never completely abandoned eighteenth-century British empiricism, his
intellectual orientation was clearly post-Darwinion rather than

^ Ibld., p. 4.

^ G e n e r a l

20Gruchy, 0£. cit., p. 2^1.

theory, pp. 26k, 266, 293.
S1General Theory, p. 298.
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Newtonian.
Attention may now be turned to the logic, eplstemology, and
ethics of Keynes' Idea system for a closer insist into the philo
sophical aspects of his system of thought,

A.

Logic
What Is now generally classified as modern philosophy had Its

beginning with Bacon.

The primary distinguishing characteristic of

this type of philosophy Is its disregard for the metaphysical search
for the "truth" and the "real."
cerned with two questions;
finding truth?"

M o d e m philosophy Is primarily con

"How do we know?" and "How do we go about

In short, m o d e m philosophy has wrou#it a change In

methodology, not merely a shift In emphasis.

The'concern here, however,

Is not with philosophical methodology per so; rather the Interest lies
in the Influence which this new method of philosophical examination
has had on the study of logic.

Everyone will agree that the advance

in logic during the last four or five decades has been remarkable, and
Keynes, throughout his life, was close tothis new development in philoso
phy.

During his years at Cambridge Keynes was a close friend and as

sociate of such great philosophers as Ludwig Wittgenstein, Alfred
Whitehead, Betrand Russell, and Frank Ramsey.

These men were primarily

responsible for the formulation of the new philosophy.

Moreover,

Keynes had the training and the background to understand what was
occurring In this basic discipline.

His father had made significant

contributions both to mathematical logic and to methodology In the
social sciences.

Keynes was a trained mathematician.

However, his

interest lay, not In pure mathematics, but rather in "the borderland

17

between mathematics and philosophical problems."
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Helen Phillips

points out that Keynes "was familiar with Principia Mathematlca from
the time of its publication, remarking in Mjr Early Beliefs that it
was a companion volume to Moore's Ethics in that it provided a sci
entific method capable of analyzing the ethical problems raised by
Moore."2^
Keynes was never greatly concerned with formal logic and con
tributed nothing to the new movement in philosophy.

He much preferred

the informal analysis of Russell to the more formal logic of Wittgenstein,
and his attitude toward logic is to be found only in the area of nonformal logic.

Biis, of course, is what one should expect since Keynes,

although he was interested in philosophy, was not engrossed in that
discipline.

Keynes demonstrated quite clearly his naminalistic position

with reference to the problem of universals in his Introduction to
Ramsey's The Foundation of Mathematics.

In a subsequent essay he

once more revealed his position by quoting several passages from
Ramsey's book.

Ihe material he selected to quote leaves no doubt

but that he was basically concerned with the principle that all science
must deal with the problem of meaning.
We are driven to philosophise because we do not know clearly
what we mean; the question is always "What do I mean by X?"
And only very occasionally can we settle this without re
flecting on meaning. But it is not only an obstacle, this
necessity of dealing with meaning; it is doubtless an es
sential clue to the truth.

22E. A. G. Robinson, "Lord Keynes, 1883-19^6," Economic
Journal, LVII (March, 19*+7), p. 1.
2% e l e n Phillips, J. M. Keynes, Vision and Technique (Stanford,
California: Stanford University Press, 1951), P* 13•
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. . .we cannot get clear about these terms and sentences
without getting clear about meaning, and we seem to get
into the situation that we cannot understand, e.g. what
we say about time and the external world without first
understanding certainly time and probably the external
world which are involved in it. So we have to take our .
problems as a whole and jump to a simultaneous solution.
Keynes was convinced that human language conventions were not as
precise as the older logic implied or as people generally believed.
His conviction was based upon his belief that human beings "feel"
that they understand a word, but are unable to define it in precise
terras.
. . .1 feel we may get into the absurd position of the
child in the following dialogue: "Say breakfast." "Can't."
"What can't you soy?" "Can't say breakfast."
I used to worry myself about' the nature of philosophy
through excessive scholasticism. I could not see how we
could understand a word and not be able to recognise
whether a proposed definition of it was or was not correct.
I did not realise the vagueness of the whole idea of
understanding. . .
It seems to me that in the process of clarifying
our thouf£it we come to terms and sentences which we
cannot elucidate in the obvious manner by defining their
moaning. For instance, theoretical terras we cannot define,
but we can explain the way in which they are used. . .25
Keynes believed that words should be considered

as useful tools of

thought, and he did not accept the idea that there should exist a
rigid relationship between word and thing.

In short, words were

merely "tags" which ouf^vt to be used as a means of describing and
manipulating the human environment.
I don't think it is necessary to say with Moore that
definitions explain what we have hitherto meant by our

^ Essays in Biography, pp. 305 , 306.
2 5prank Ramsey, The Foundations of Mathematics, in Ibid.,
pp. 30^, 306 .
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propositions, but rather that they show how we intend
to use them in the future. Moore would say they were
the same, that philosophy does not change what anyone
meant by "This is a table." It seems to me that it might;
for meaning is mainly potential.2”
The meaning of a sentence is to be defined by reference
to the actions to which asserting it would lead, or, more
vaguely still, by its possible causes and effects.27
But he remained silent with reference to the word-making ac
tivity and to the status of the entities to which words refer.

There

was a metaphysics in his nominalism, but it was of the type which
emphasized the creative role of mental activity for reality.

However,

this does not justify a general statement to the effect that Keynes
was a realist.

The truth is that there is not enoui^i evidence in

the Keynesian literature to warrant classfying him either as an ideal
ist or as a realist,

perhaps this is of no great importance.

What

is significant is that he was firmly convinced that mein had the power
to define words- to suit his purpose.
Not only did Keynes believe this, he also practiced it.
Hie bearing of this view on the task of integrating psycho
logical, ethical, and experiential material into a body of
knowledge usable for economics is obvious. Here we find the
first trace, the first general principle he employed. Quickly,
surely, and successfully, he brought together ideas and facts
which were later appreciated as belonging together. Fearless
in combining ideas which to others seemed quite unrelated,
he was unhampered by conventional terminology and traditional
concepts. He used well his conviction that meaning is to
some extent within our power to c h a n g e . 28

2&Tw o Memoirs by John Maynard Keynes: Dr. Melcholr, a Defeated
Enemy, and My Early Beliefs (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 19^9X
p. 28. Hereafter cited as Mg Early Beliefs.
2 ^Ramsey, quoted in Essays in Biography, p. 299.
28phillips, o£. cjt., p. 1 5 .
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B.

Epistemology
One is probably never completely justified In classifying a

scholar either as an empiricist or as a rationalist.

In most Instances

it Is Impossible to do so for the simple reason that most scholars demon
strate both empirical and rational tendencies.

It follows, then, that

the most scientific classification is one based on this dichotomy.
the empiricist and the rationalist search for truth.

Both

But the difference

between these two epistemologies does not rest in the objective; rather,
it lies in the method or the procedure of ascertaining truth.
rationalist, the truths of reason are all important.

For the

He is primarily

concerned with formal, conceptual knowledge; his thought ideal is modeled
after the type of knowledge found in mathematics.
his tool of analysis.

Deductive logic is

Hie empiricist, on the other hand, is one who

places emphasis on the truths of fact, who wants to find out the re
lationships between observed matters of fact.

Inductive logic is the

basic tool of analysis for the empiricist.
Keynes' idea system lies somewhere between the two poles of
empiricism and rationalism, but closer to the empirical than the
rationalistic.

His fondness for the empirical is shown clearly in

his conception of the proper business of the economist.

Certainly

he was thinking in empirical terms when he formulated the methods
by which his social goals could be achieved.

A policy or program

of action designed to influence practical affairs must, by its very
nature, flow from an empirical attitude.

For Keynes, the major func

tion of the economist was to promulgate policy based upon empirical
data.

In the Keynesian idea system, the economist makes value judg-

«

ments.

«

Thus Keynes returned to the nineteenth century conception of
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what was the proper business of the economist.

It was to describe

the economy, predict future economic events, and formulate basic
principles of economic policy.

Robinson says that Keynes "never

devised an economic tool purely for its own sake rather than to solve
an immediate practical problem in the application to government of the
methods of economic analysis; his absorbing interest in politics and
government made Keynes, in the very best sense of those words, a popo
litical economist," ^

Robinson contends that in Keynes' work in the

India Office, he acquired a basic sympathy with the problems of the
public administrator who needs economic analysis in order to make
decisions concerning policy.
He learned there a great deal about the way the machinery
of government operated, and in particular to see the prob
lems of economics from the angle of the administrator, who
must make the decisions, as well as from that of the aca
demic, who must discuss the principles that underlie the
decisions.30
Thus Keynes believed that the political economist must devote a largo
share of his time to advising those who formulate economic policy for
this was the goal and beacon li#vt of analysis.

In other words,

Keynes designed his program of public policy, which was based upon
quite realistic observations and then promulgated his body of theory
to justify his program of action.
Further evidence of Keynes' empiricism was the position he
took on the Malthus-Ricardo controversy.

By supporting Malthus, he

renounced all faith in the excessive deductive logic which character
ized the Ricardian brand of economics.

2 9Robinson, og. cit., p. 10.

Keynes' own statements make

^°Ibld., pp. 13, 1^.
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this quite clear:
Malthus is dealing with the monetary economy in which
we happen to live; Ricardo with the abstraction of a
neutral money economy. . .If only Malthus, instead of
Ricardo, had been the parent stem from which nineteenthcentury economics proceeded, what a much wiser and richer
place the world would be to-day.' We have laboriously
to re-discover and force through the obscuring envelopes
of our misguided education what should never have ceased
to be obvious.31
For Malthus had said:
I certainly am disposed to refer frequently to things
as they are, as the only way of making one's writings
practically useful to society, and I think also the
only way of being secure from falling into the errors
of the taylors of Laputa, and by a sligit mistake at
the outset arrive at conclusions the most distant
from the truth. . .A writer may, to be sure, make any
hypothesis he pleases; but if ho supposes what is not
at all true practically, he precludes himself from
drawing any practical inferences frcm his hypotheses.^2
Both Malthus and Keynes gave the empiricist's emphasis to thought
and its material usefulness.

No one Bhould be greatly surprised to

discover that Keynes held Malthus in very hi#i esteem.

Their atti

tudes and economic views were virtually identical.
Keynes demonstrated a keen interest in David Hume and this is
still further evidence of his attitude toward empiricism.

He shows in

his Introduction to Hume's Abstract an appreciation for Hume's work
that could only have come from thorough study:
It remains as good a brief introduction to the essence
and original genius of the Treatise as can be found.
Hume has pointed with infallible finger to thoBe passages
which, in the eyes of posterity as well as in those of
the author, "shake off the yoke of authority, accustom
men to think for themselves, give new hints, which men

31Essays in Biography, pp. 138, lW+.
^Malthus to Ricardo, January 26, 1817, in Ibid., pp. 139> l^O.
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of genius may carry further, and by the very opposition,
illustrate points, wherein no one before Buspected any
difficulty." . . .of the various passages in the Treatise
tracing the origin of belief from custom none is more Humian
than the following from the Abstract; "Tis not therefore
reason which is the guide of life, but custom. That alone
determines the mind, in all instances, to suppose the
future conformable to the past. However easy this step
may seem, reason would never, to all eternity, be able to
make it."33
Not only had Keynes studied Hume, but there is evidence to support the
conclusion that he was influenced by the writings of the great philoso
pher.

The fact that Keynes accepted Ramsey's nominalism and utilized

it in his theorizing about economic data, and his statement that
"Ramsey reminds one of Hume more than of anyone else"J

show that he

viewed Hume's analysis of causation and the role of reason in science
with a great deal of admiration and sympathy.
The empiricism that Keynes embraced was not in a pure form;
that is to say, he allowed at least two modifications and these are
very important to his idea system.

First, he included in his empiri

cism the concepts of social change.

The contemporary concept of the

emergent nature of things— that is, the evolutionary process— perhaps
had its intellectual beginning with Darwin and received great impetus
by the philosophies of Bergson and Whitehead.

The emphasis on evolu

tion was simply a new theory of change which treated change as a

^Keynes and Piero Sraffa, "introduction" to David Hume; An
Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature (Cambridge; Cambridge University
Press, 193&), pp. xxix-xxx" (Emphasis mine).
3^Essaya in Biography, p. 301. Because Schumpeter, on p. 8 l
(note 11) of The New Economics, took Keynes' essay on Ramsey to be
indicative of Keynes' philosophy as well as of Ramsey's, I have cited
both what Keynes said about Ramsey and what he quotes of him as ex
pressing Keynes' own views.
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process by which new, unique forms appeared.

This differed from the

older concept of change which thou^it of change as the realization
of forms already inherent in the nature of things.

Now, on the basis

of the new theory the jhilosophers and physical scientists viewed the
physical world as being constantly in the process of being made.

Keynes

applied the same reasoning to the social system; that is, the social
system was a dynamism constantly creating new institutions.

Whitehead

and Keynes were both making use of the new concept of change when
Whitehead said that "Existence is activity ever merging into the fu
ture," and Keynes said that "We have to invent new wisdom for a new
oge."^

Keynes believed that change and its consequences must always

be an important aspect of economic analysis.

In the area of public

policy, for example, he said "There can be no unique policy which the
monetary authority will adopt in the long run."

Thus Keynes regarded

the flow of events as being more important and fundamental than sepa
rate or individual happenings, not only for a better interpretation of
history, but also as a basis for political economic action.
In my opinion there is now no place. . .for those whose
hearts are set on old-fashioned individualism and laissezfaire in all their rigour--greatly though these contributed
to the success of the nineteenth century. I Bay this, not
because I think that these doctrines were wrong in the con
ditions which gave birth to them. . .but because they have
ceased to be applicable to m o d e m conditions.
I criticise doctrinaire State Socialism, not because it
seeks to engage men's altruistic impulses in the service
of Society, or because it departs from laissez-faire, or
because it takes away from man's natural liberty to make

^ J . M. Keynes, Essays in Persuasion (New York:
Brace and Co., 1932), p. 337.

Harcourt,

36 0he Times (London, November 15, 1932), from a lecture given
at Cambridge the previous day.
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a million, or because it has courage for bold experiments.
All these things I applaud. I criticise it because it
misses the significance of vhat is actually happening.3 '
The second modification of Keynes' empiricism was his emphasis
cxi the point that there was a basic difference between the whole and
the part.

He insisted that the very nature of the whole was essen

tially different from that of the parts which comprised the whole.
•Die importance of this attitude lies in the analytical approach;
that is to say, one must examine the whole; that is to say, gener
alize about the whole rather than investigate its parts.

By the

time of Keynes, the atomism of the British empirical tradition, ac
cording to which the whole was merely the sum of the parts, had been
recognized to be largely superficial and faulty, chiefly by the German
idealists.

To be sure, Lord Lauderdale had refuted this doctrine in
■30

a very satisfactory manner at a much earlier date,

but he, like

Malthus, was engulfed in the Ricardian tidal-wave.

As was pointed

out earlier in this chapter, Keynes adopted this "holistic" point of
view in insisting that the proper method of economic analysis was the
"aggregate" or "macro" approach.

In short, just aB one cannot add

the happiness of each individual and arrive at the total happiness
of the nation, Keynes believed that one could not add the supply
curve for each firm in the economy and get an aggregate supply curve
for the economy.

Keynes' concept of the relationship of the whole

to the part permeates all of his mature economic thought.

One com

mentator even considered this "aggregate" approach as being "the sum

^ Essays in Persuasion, pp. 329, 330.
38See Infra., p. 82 for a discussion of this.
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and substance of Keynes' heresy.
It would be an error to classify Keynes as a pure empiricist.
He had rather strong tendencies toward the rationalistic point of
view.

First, despite his acceptance and use of the empirical method,

he never adopted the irrationalism which is inherent in empiricism.
His attitude toward viewing the econany as an emerging process is a
case in point.

This point of view did not cause him to neglect ex

amining and commenting upon what was occurring in the economy at a
given time.

Second, Keynes always believed that reason, as well as

observation, must be used in economic analysis.

Schumpeter saw this

in Keynes when he remarked that Keynes' "intellectual affinity with
Ricardo merits notice."

Uo

Schumpeter was referring, of course, to the

fact that Keynes did employ deductive logic in the manner of Ricardo,
perhaps Schumpeter overstated the similarity in the methods of Keynes
and Ricardo; nevertheless, there is much rationalism Implicit in the
economics of Keynes despite his many explicit statements supporting
the empirical method.

Finally, Keynes was a theorist; and perhaps

it is not assuming too much to say that Keynes would have admitted
that all theory depends for its construction upon the use of reason
as well-as observation.

Certainly, reason and observation were used

in his idea system.
Perhaps the best evidence that can be found in the works of
Keynes to demonstrate his position on the empiricist-rationalist

39paul A. Samuelson, "The General Theory" in The New Economics,
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 19**8), p. 151.
^Schumpeter, in Ibid., p. 9^, (note 30).
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tigvtrope 1b the following:
It is a great fault of symbolic pseudo-mathematical methods
of formalising a system of economic analysis. . .that they
expressly assume strict independence between the factors in
volved and lose all their cogency and authority if this hy
pothesis is disallowed; whereas, in ordinary discourse, where
we are not blindly manipulating but know all the time what
we are doing and what the words mean, we can keep "at the
back of our heads" the necessary reserves and qualifications
and the adjustments which we shall have to make later on, in
a way in which we cannot keep complicated partial differen
tials "at the back" of several pages of algebra which assume
that they all vanish.
Here is found the rationalist's concern for method, but it plays a
secondary role to the empiricist's concern for the difficulty of ex
pressing satisfactorily the complexity of experience.
Nor did Keynes minimize the importance of statistical method
for the interpretation of economic data.

So highly did he regard

the contribution of statistics, that he formulated his theories in
such a way that the possibility of applying statistics to the results
of deduction was substantially Increased; he gave great impetus to the
statistical approach to economics.
This examination of Keynes" episteraology shows that he de
veloped his idea system within a definite framework of methodological
principles.

The basic principle was empiricism, but it was of such

a nature that it contained the now idea of change and the new attitude
toward the relationship of the whole to the part.

And the principle

was broad enoug$i to be friendly to a certain amount of rationalism.
Having acquired all of this from the new philosophy, Keynes never
wavered in his belief that it was the proper method for political

^^General Theory, pp. 297, 29 8 .
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C,

Ethics
In presenting his fundamental ethical principles, Keynes re

vealed quite clearly his philosophy of life and thought. With refer
ence to his concept of human nature and of ri#it and wrong, his writing
indicates that he was basically pre-Freudian and pre-Marxian.

The

ethical principles of Freud and Marx failed utterly to impress Keynes,
although the modern world has yet to recover completely from the shock
of those principles.

Keynes, who was ultramodern in his economic views,

held tenaciously to the ethical beliefs of an older period.

Or better

yet, perhaps, in attempting to enrich and modify the old beliefs, he
succeeded only in reaffirming them.
Keynes attempted to explain in M£ Early Beliefs why he and some
of his friends had "preserved the faith," why they had not succumbed to
the wave of irrationalism, uncertainty, and pessimism which followed
the Victorian period.

This essay was read a few months before his

death to the members of the club at Cambridge which had been in ex
istence since his undergraduate days.

And its content shows that he

did not embrace the irrationalism of Freud and Marx.

He said:

I see no reason to shift from the fundamental intuitions
of the Principle Ethica; thou#i they are much too few and
too narrow to fit actual experience, which provides a
richer and more various content. . .the ways in which
states of mind can be valuable are more various and also
much richer than we allowed for.
. . .There was a thinness, a superficiality, both of
Judgement and of feelings. . .we ignored certain powerful
and valuable springs of feeling. . .It seems to me looking
back that this religion of ours was a very good one to
grow up under. It remains nearer the truth than any other
I know, with less irrelevant, extraneous matter and nothing
to be ashamed of. . .It was a purer, sweeter air by far
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than Freud cum Marx.
surface.^2

It is still my religion under the

It is true, as Keynes stated, that no one today reads Moore.

His

Principle has joined that great body of literature which is read,
and then only upon occasion, by the savant lost in the paths of
serendipity.

Moore's work, while it impressed the world of philoso

phy to some degree at the time of its production, is hardly appli
cable to any world but that of the late Edwardian and Victorian
cultures.
Preaching a lucid brand of philosophical and moral anarchy,
Moore's philosophy held the usual views of the anarchist:

that men

were, in and of themselves, of such a nature that they naturally
behave as rational, moral, beauty-seeking individuals.

The action

of the individual, and the individual alone, was extolled by Moore.
Ihe hipest action to which individuals could aspire was the conko
templation of beauty. J
To those souls most capable of seeing beauty, the greatest
good could and should accrue.

To those lesser mortals, to whan beau

ty was dimmed for whatever cause, the superior individual should act
in such a way as to reveal beauty.

Diis one duty, to behave accord

ing to a general Utilitarian rule-of-beauty-contemplation, Moore
discussed in one chapter.
purest form of anarchy:

lhe rest of the book is a plea for the
the individual contemplation of states of

^gMy Early Beliefs, pp. 91, 92.
^George Edward Moore, Principle Ethica (Cambridge*.
University Press, 1903), pp. 5-33, 183-19^
'
^ Ibid., pp. 1U2-178.
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beauty.

This action was definitionally "good," and the only "good"

which Moore's philosophy admits.

This was Keynes’ religion.

Keynes' attitude toward life was primarily anthropomorphic.
Where I seem to differ from some of my friends is In
attaching little importance to physical size. I don't
feel the least humble before the vastness of the heavens.
The 8tars may be large, but they cannot think or love;
and these are qualities which impress me far more than
size does. . .My picture of the world is drawn in per
spective and not like a model to scale. The foreground
is occupied by human beings and the stars are all as small
as threepenny bits. . .Humanity, which fills the foreground
of my picture, I find interesting and on the whole- admira
ble.^
Here is found clear evidence for what was perhaps his most basic ethi
cal assumption:

human problems are important and demand attention.

Keynes was concerned with man and man's problems; he was concerned
with nature only so far as it aided in satisfying human needs.
The Keynesian group believed that man wa3 essentially rational
and good.

In discussing the group, Keynes said:

We were the last upholders of the eighteenth-century
heresy of progress. . .by virtue of which the human
race already consists of reliable, rational, decent
people, influenced by truth and objective standards,
who can be released from outward restraints of con
vention and traditional standards and left to their
own sensible devices, pure motives, and reliable in
tuitions of the good.ko
This identification of virtue with knowledge was one of Keynes' guid
ing limits.

His faith was never shaken in the belief that all men

had the capacity of acquiring knowledge and thus to be virtuous.

It

^Ramsey, quoted in Essays in Biography, pp. 310, 311. See
note 3k, above, for justification of this statement as indicative of
Keynes' own views.
Early Beliefs, p. 8 9 .
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was modified only when he felt obligated to explain social injustice
as being a result of the failure of the rational faculty to develop
properly because of the blindness of the wealthy and the unequal eco
nomic opportunity afforded the poor.
Keynes ' club had found in Moore a prophet and savior, They
adopted his ethical intuition, according to which states of mind

are

the only entities relevant to ethics, with great enthusiasm.
The goodness of states of mind was known by direct
inspection, about which it was useless and impos
sible to argue. Disagreement might arise. . .the
two parties migvt not be talking about the same
thing, not bringing their intuition to bear on pre
cisely the same object, and by virtue of the prin
ciple of organic unity, a very small difference
in the object might make a large difference in the
result. . .or it might be that some people had an
acuter sense of judgement, just as some people can
judge a vintage port and others cannot. . .Broadly
speaking, thougi, we all knew for certain what were
good states of mind. . .they consisted in communion
with objects of love, beauty, and truth. Our appre
hension of good was exactly the same as our apprehen
sion of green and we purported to handle it with the
same logical and analytical technique which was ap
propriate to the latter.^7
The third trace of Keynes’ basic philosophy is found in the
ethical principles in the 11 git of which he surveyed the contemporary
scene.

The bases of his judgnent of social and individual behavior

were his belief in the supreme importance of man in the scheme of
things, his belief in the essential goodness of man's states of mind,
and his belief in man's individuality and uniqueness.

Because he had

faith in reason as the helper of knowledge and because he believed
•in the capacity of men to be guided by rational formulation, he

^7Ibld.t p. 86.
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emphasized the importance of the role of ideas in history:
. . .the ideas of economists and political philoso
phers, both when they are ri$vt and when they are
wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood.
Indeed the world ia ruled by little else. Practical
men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from
any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves
of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who
hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy
from some academic scribbler of a few years back. I
am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly
exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment
of ideas. . .soon or late, it is ideas, not vested
interests, which are dangerous for good or e v i l . ^8
Keynes insisted that unemployment and the sharp division between rich
and poor were the chief social evils of the time:
Many of the greatest economic evils of our time are
the fruits of risk, uncertainty, and ignorance. It
is because particular individuals, fortunate in situa
tion or in abilities, are able to take advantage of
uncertainty and ignorance, and also because for the
same reason big business is often a lottery, that
great inequalities of wealth come about; and these
same factors are also the cause of the Unemployment of
Labour, or the disappointment of reasonable business
expectations, end of the impairment of efficiency and
production.^9
.Because he believed the ends of life were spiritual and not material,
he loathed the overcalculation of utilitarianism and m o d e m capitalism:
I do now regard the Benthamite tradition as the worm
which has been gnawing at the insides of m o d e m civi
lisation and is responsible for the present moral
decay.5°
. . .modem capitalism is absolutely irreligious, with
out internal union, without much public spirit. . .51

^ General Theory, pp. 383 , 38^.
^^Essays in Persuasion, pp. 317, 318.
Early Beliefs, p. 72.

^ Essays in Persuasion, p. 306 .

33
Perhaps above all, he hated the Puritan ethics of rejecting present
enjoyment for the sake of a never-realized greater future enjoyment:
If mankind solves its economic problem, for the first
time since his creation man will be faced with his
real, his permanent problem— how to use his freedom
from pressing economic cares, how to occupy the leisure
which science and compound Interest will have won for
him, to live wisely and agreeably and well.
The strenuous purposeful money-makers may carry all
of us along with them into the lap of economic abun
dance. But it will be those peoples, who can. . .
cultivate Into a fuller perfection, the art of life
Itself and do not sell themselves for the means of
life, who will be able to enjoy the abundance when
It comes. . .we hove been trained too long to strive
and not to enjoy. . .The love of money as a posses
sion— as distinguished from the .love of money as a
means to the enjoyments and realities of life--will
be recognized for what it Is, a somewhat disgusting
morbidity, one of those semi-criminal, semi-pathological
propensities which one hands over with a shudder to the
specialists In mental disease. All kinds of social cus
toms and economic practices, affecting the distribution
of wealth and of economic rewards and penalties, which
we now maintain at all costs, however distasteful and
unjust they may be in themselves, because they are tre
mendously useful In promoting the accumulation of capi
tal, we shall then be free, at last, to discard.
I see us free, therefore, to return to some of the
most sure and certain principles of religion and tra
ditional virtue--that avarice is a vice, that the ex
action of usury is a misdemeanor, and the love of money
is detestable, that those walk most truly in the paths
of virtue and sane wisdom who take least thought for
the morrow. We shall once more value ends above means
and prefer the good to the useful. We shall honour
those who can teach us how to pluck the hour and the
day virtuously and well, the delightful people who are
capable of taking direct enjoyment in things, the lilies
of the field who toil not, neither do they spin.52
This was the goal, and Keynes believed it would be achieved.

For

he said, "I still hope and believe that the day is not far off when
the Economic Problem will take the back seat where it belongs, and

5gEsaays in Persuasion, pp. 367-372.

that the arena of the heart and head will be occupied, or re-occupied,
by our real problems— the problems of life and of human relations, of
creation and behavior and religion.

53jbid., p. vii.
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CHAPTER III

KEYNES AND THE RECEIVED ECONOMICS

Since the time of Adam Smith there has been but one great
cleavage In the fundamental method of economic analysis.

That

"break" with received economics was accomplished by the architects
of the Austrian School of economics, Carl Menger, Friedrich von
Wieser, and Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk.'1' Indeed, the cleavage was so
wide and so deep that it is quite proper to refer to the Austrian
school as the "New Economics."
By the time of Keynes, the two most important systems of
economic analysis were the "Classical," as developea primarily by
Adam Smith and David Ricardo and the "Austrian," as promulgated by
the economists named above.
economic thought.

Keynes "received" theBe two bodies of

John R. Commons was also an important anticipator

of one of Keynes' value theories.

2

The most important economic problem at the beginning of the
nineteenth century was one of production or how to make available

■^According to Lewis H. Haney, "The members of this school,
for better or for worse, were deeply influenced by German economic
literature, and that literature was rich in criticism of objective
exchange value theories and in psychological analysis." Lewis H.
Haney, History of Economic Thou git (New York: The Macmillan Co.,
Revised ed., 1933); p. 5^3.
2There are three theories of value in Keynes' works.
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a larger supply of goods.

In short, the problem was one of economic

scarcity.

And this formed the basis for the classical method of

analysis.

To support this contention one needs only to recall Adam

Smith's great concern with production, J. B. Say's Law of Markets,
the Malthusian theory of population, and David Ricardo's rent theory.
The Classicists assumed demand to be given and formulated their analy
ses around the issue of supply.^
Later classical economics, especially In Its central and
most controversial features, was an attempt to solve the problem
of distribution, from the point of view of production,

lhis analysis

led to generalizations of great practical usefulness for a certain
period.

But as time went on the peculiar conditions, the specific

proportion of economic factors that perhaps Justified the classical
analysis, were passing away.

Ricardian economics declined from the

position of authority It had held for nearly half a century.

The

successors of the classical economists following J. S. Mill abandoned
the wages fund theory.

The labor value theory of Ricardo was adopted

by Karl Marx In support of radical socialism.

A destructive attack

was made on English classical economics by the German historical school.
Shortly after the age of Ricardo the rent of English farms declined.
After 1870, with the opening up of the agricultural lands In the
Mississippi
lower.

Valley and In Canada the rent of English farms fell still

The birth-rate In the more advanced countries of the west

3
For Malthus, this applies only to his theory, of population.
His principles of economics were formulated In terms of demand analy
sis. This is discussed at length in Ch. IV.
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steadily declined.

Population in France became stationary.

it actually decreased.

In Ireland

Thus Ricardo's law of industrial progress as

a universally valid formula was proved to be false.

Wages rose and

labor organizations grew in power in spite of the demonstrations of
their futility by the classical economists.

Bi the latter part of the

nineteenth century English prosperity began to decline, even under a
period of free trade.

Large-scale industry began to develop in Germany

and the United States.

English industrialists began to feel the force

of foreign competition.

Production began to catch up with the world's

demand for manufacture; and competition developed for foreign markets.
The English manufacturers could no longer look forward to on unsatis
fied demand for their products.

With the rise of capitalism in other

countries there developed a supply of capital from the United States,
Germany, and France, so that capital accumulation on the part of the
English enterpriser could no longer be assumed as inevitably an in
hibitory factor.

So there was a need for a new economic theory.

The Austrian economics was the answer to this obvious need
for a reorientation of economic theory.

The members of this school

approached the subject of value and distribution from the point of
view of consumption, of wants and feeling rather than from the point
of view of the cost of production.

In Bhort, the emphasis in economic

analysis shifted from "supply" to "demand."

Their subjective theory of

value was really the first complete break away from the objective valuation theory of the classicists.

According to Haney, "The 'Austrian

k
See Haney, op. cit., pp. 528-530 for a rather long list of
anticipators of the Austrian School.
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School 1 so analyzes utility as to base a comprehensive theory of economic values upon subjective elements
For the classical economists, cost of production determined
value, with labor cost predominating in the total cost of producing
a commodity.

A commodity sold in the market at a price based on the

costs incurred in producing it.

The utility of a commodity to the-

user was recognized but it was taken for granted.

Thus it is per

fectly clear that the problem of valuation was approached from the
supply side of the exchange transaction.

The demand side of the

equation was always considered to be sufficient and, therefore, de
mand was also taken for granted.

All of this, of course, was in

keeping with the great emphasis which the early classical economists
placed upon the problem of supply or scarcity, and also, it was in
accordance with Say's Law of Markets,
For the Austrians, however, human wants or needs are the ori
gin of economic value.

These wants or needs are in the human mind;

they are subjective judgnents of individuals.

Value arises when

people attach importance to limited quantities of things.

Value

comes at the margin--the utility to people of a little more or a
little less.

That is the central core of the Austrian marginal

utility analysis.

Value is measured by the least Important use of

any one unit.
Wieser’s emphasis on maldistribution of wealth and income as
a powerful factor causing a misdirected employment of productive
resources is of great importance to the student of economic theory

5Ibid.,

p.

5 ^3 .
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and its h i s t o r y T h i s alcne sets the Austrian school completely
apart from Ricardian economics.

It fits most snugly into that stream

of economic thought that Includes the commanded value theory of
Malthus, the underconsumption theory from Lauderdale to H. Gordon
Hayes, the institutional economics of Veblen and Commons, and par
ticularly, the economics of Keynes.

It was in Wieser that the

Austrian school reached its apex in the new demand approach to eco
nomic analysis.

Demand, particularly as it relates to value and pro

duction, has ever since been the focal point of economics.
It is true that the Austrians did not make a complete "break"
with received economics.
tion in Beveral ways.

The Austrians followed the classical tradi

Their methodology included deductive reasoning.

There was little attempt at statistical verification or critical analy
sis of postulates.

The basic assumptions of classical economics were

largely accepted by the Austrians— static conditions, freedom of Industry,
great mobility of capital and labor, a laissez-faire individualistic
order, profit motivation, gain through adjusting production to a mar
ket price, hedonistic human nature, and the entrepreneur as the
pivotal factor in industry and the class chiefly responsible for
7

industrial progress.'

Austrian economics thus developed into a static analysis of
the problem of value and distribution.

The assumption that the

‘ T'riedrich von Wieser, Natural Value (New York: G. E. Stechert
and Co., 1930 reprint), pp. 56 -59 . English translation by Christian A.
Malloch and edited by William Smart.
^See Harvey W. Peck, Economic Thought and its Institutional
Background (New York; Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1935)> P* 196.
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entrepreneurial function was the moat expansible factor was one In
which the Austrians were In agreement with the later classicists.
Dlls Implied several other assumptions, which seem to have been the
actual conditions of the time— an Individual economy, capital accumu
lation based on Individual savings, Invention proceeding faster than
the accumulation of loanable funds, and production In the field of
manufactures not yet adequate to the world demand for manufactured
products.

Ihls again Implied— that which was actually existent—

vast unexplolted natural resources, such as those of North and South
America, South Africa, Australia, and Siberia; a growing world popu
lation or mass of labor to be organized (the population of the world
doubled during the nineteenth centuiy); and finally, an expansible or
buoyant market for machinery or producer's capital.
The chief point of departure from classicism was the attempt
of the Austrians to explain value by states of feeling or conscious
ness rather than from the point of view of objective physical com
modities.

They approached the dubject of value and distribution

from the point of view of consumption, of wants and feeling rather
than from the point of view of the cost of production.

But it was

a fundamental departure and quite sufficient to form a new economics.
In what broad and general ways Is the economics of Keynes
related to the Classical and Austrian Idea systems?
intent on the part of the writer to labor this point.

There Is no
Consequently

many of the apparent similarities between what Is referred to in
this chapter as "received" economics and the economics of Keynes
will not be discussed.

The concern Is with only those broad contours

of thought which are Important to the systems under examination, and

which, to a large extent, have either been ignored or denied by many
writers in the area of economic theory and its history.

The few

writers who have concerned themselves with this subject have invari
ably used terns such as "orthodox" or "traditional" to classify all
economic thought before Keynes.

That is to say, in their attempts

to show what parts of the received economics influenced Keynes, they
simply refer to orthodox or traditional economics.

Using the terms

in this fashion, it is impossible to know to what they have reference,
Ih short, it is a grave error to refer to all economics from Smith to
Keynes as orthodox or traditional economics.

To "lump" together

Classical, Austrian, and the later Marginal Utility economics is to
misconceive the developnent of economic theory.

Hence, in this attempt

to assign to Keynes his proper position in the history of economic
theory, care is taken to indicate throughout the discussion just what
part of the received economics is under analysis.
Did Keynes make a major break with received economics when
he refused to assume that the automatic functioning of the economy
would result in full employment?

As is well known, one of the more

Important lessons to be learned from the General Theory is that under
employment equilibrium is not only possible but characteristic of the
capitalistic economy.

It has generally been held that received eco

nomics assumed full employment, allowing only for frictional unemploy
ment.
Schumpeter says, ". . .1 repeat that the arguments that Keynes
set forth against what he conceived to be the classical theory (in his
Bense) are entirely irrelevant against any correct statement of the
full-employment equilibrium theory and that his indictment that the
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classical theory knows no unemployment except a frictional one Is true
only If the term frictional Is defined so widely as to rob the IndictQ
ment of all significance."
Many reflections have been made on the "classical assumption"
of full employment.

In the most recent statements of this view, no ,

quotation or reference is given in support of it; it has become a con
ventional remark, which gives to the Keynesian "New Economics" the
advantage of another supposed contrast with the past.

Keynes* view

Is strengthened when it is shown to be a fuller perception of ideas
which were growing into their maturity, rather than when it is required
to depend on the dangerous appeal to a new revelation.

For example,

the statement that "the point of departure (in the economics of Keynes)
is that the level of employment can be effectively raised by changes in
9

taxation, in the spending power of the government, or by other means,"
should not be contrasted with, but related to, Mill's proposition that
"governments can create additional industry by laying on taxes and em
ploying the amount productively," and that "public loans are justified
if otherwise capital would not have been saved or would have been used
wastefully."10

There is, however, a longer hiBtory than that of the

antecedents out of which the doctrine of full employment haB grown.
Much of what is said in Chapter Five concerning the evolution of the

Q
°Joseph Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (New York:
Oxford University Press, 195*0", p. 1177.
Economics of Full Employment, (Oxford Institute of Statistics,
19^), P. 59.
10J. S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy, I (London:
W. Parker and Son, 1852), p. 547.

John

hi
doctrine of effective demand is relevant here also, but more special
references have to be made at this point.
More justice should be done to Sir J. Steuart, a writer who
came between the Physiocrats and Smith.

He is not usually Included

among the classical economists, although Say quoted him several times,
and Marshall believed that.he made Important additions to economic
theory.'1'1

Chapter Five indicates hew Steuart anticipated Malthus with

respect to the principle of effective demand.
Steuart was perhaps the first among modern writers in the field
of economics to regard the provision of full employment as a duty of
the State.

While Smith gave only subsistence and public revenue as the
Ip

right objects of
Steuart

political economy,

as the "scienceof a statesman,"

had held that the object of an economy was
to provide for the nourishment, the other wants, and the em
ployment of every individual. That number of inhabitants is
best which is compatible with the full employment of every one
of them. Of what consequence is it to know how many people
are in a country when the employment of them does notenter
into the inquiry? A free and perfect society implies full
employment for reciprocal and proportioned services between
all who compose it. Whenever therefore anyone is found upon
whom nobody depends, and who depends upon every one, as is the
case with him who is willing to work for his bread, but who
can find no employment, that is a breach of the social con
tract and an a b u s e . ^3
Steuart then moved quickly to a program of action.

He said:

■^Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics, 8 th ed. (New York:
The Macmillan Co., 19^9)> P« 757.
■^Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Cannan ed. (New York;
Random House, 1937), Bk. 4-.
13Sir James Steuart, An Inquiry into the Principles of
Political Economy (1767 ), p. 10.
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. . .There is a vibration of work and demand; either may
fail to support the other, lhe case may arise when work
augnents, and no more demand can be procured; it may then
be expedient to diminish hands, by making soldiers of them,
by employing them an public works or by emigration. When
ever the competition stands too long upon either side, the
statesman must endeavour to load the limiter scale. That
is to say, he must act either on demand for goods, or on
provision of work. Fran this principle flows the authority
vested in all governments to load the country with taxes in
order to advance the prosperity of the State, and this ob
ject can be nowise better obtained than by applying the
amount of them to the keeping of an even balance between
work and demand, that is by the imposition of taxes and
the right employment of them to retard or promote the
consumption of every branch of industry. Under a frugal
reign, numbers will diminish if the statesman does not
open every channel which may carry off the superfluous
products of Industry. Here is the reason; a diminution
of expense at home is a diminution of employment. I1*
It goes without saying that Malthus is not among the classi
cists who can be charged with an assumption of full employment, and
the long final chapter of his Principles is referred to by Keynes.

There is nothing on the subject, between Steuart and Mill, which bears
on this question.

There is a good deal of reference to the fact of

unemployment in Smith, Senior, Lloyd, and Merrivale, but the observa
tions are casual.

At that time, it was population and production,

not employment, which was the prior concern.

There is no argument,

in this period, of a relation of wage-rates to full employment.
based the wealth of a nation on capital accumulation.

Smith

There are pas

sages in Smith which may be interpreted to mean that he did not believe
that the accumulation of capital was automatic.

If capital did not in

fact accumulate at a proper rate, unemployment would result.^

111Ibid., p. 1^.

!5por an analysis of the classical concepts of capital accumu
lation, see Erskine McKinley, "Hie Problem of 'Underdevelopment' in the
English Classical School," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, IXIX
(May, 1955) PP. 235-252.

Thus, we come to Mill.
often called Say's Law.

It is a quotation from Mill which is

In his Principles, Mill stated a general

proposition that the means of payment for commodities is other com
modities, and that "all sellers are inevitably and ex vi termini buy
ers."

If production were doubled "everybody would be able to buy

twice as much because everyone would have twice as much to offer in
exchange."

16

He applied his limitation of this general case to the

question of full employment in another place where he made it plain
that the general rule can fail because of the division of labor.
^Periods of brisk demand," he said, "are alBO the periods of greatest
production; the national capital is never called into full employment
but at these periods.

The annual produce of a country is never any

thing approaching in magnitude to what it migit be if all the capital
were in full employment.

This perpetual non-employment of a large

proportion of Capital is the price we pay for the division of labour."
There is another line of thou git in Mill, when he says that
"it would be possible for the State to guarantee employment at ample
wages to all who are b o m , " but only if it could control the birthrate.

1ft

Otherwise, he

believed, the individual product may, by sheer

force

of

numbers, fallbelow the necessary subsistence wage,

would

be

unemployment.Here again full employment falls for an es

sential reason, the lavs of population and diminishing returns.

and there

But

Ifoill, op. cit., p. 558.
^ J . S. Mill, Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of political
Economy (London; John W. Parker and Son, 18^0, P* 12.
l8Mill, Principles, p. 562 .
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even if population could be controlled, the possibility of full em
ployment vas made to depend by Mill on an action of the State vhich
could create "additional industry" by laying on taxes and employing
the amount of money secured in a productive

m a n n e r . ^

It is therefore impossible to ascribe to Mill the opinion
that full employment was a result of the free operation of the eco
nomic system.

It is not unusual, in any analysis, to indicate the

limiting case, where conditions are ideal, and to introduce qualifi
cations .

The ideal must also be allowed for in the Keynesian analy

sis j there, full employment will result from the government's policy
only if its proposals work Ideally, if all the estimates of invest
ment are correct, all the statistics faultless, and there are no dis
turbances or Interferences.
Surely no one can read the statements written by Wieser con
cerning dldtrlbutlon of wealth and maintain that the Austrlans assumed
full employment.

Wieser said:

. . .Production is ordered not only according to simple want,
but also according to wealth. Histead of things which would
have the greatest utility, those things are produced for
which the most will be paid. The greater the differences in
wealth, the more striking will be the anomalies of production.
It will furnish luxuries for the wanton and the glutton, while
it is deaf to the wants of the miserable and the poor. It Is
therefore the distribution of wealth which decides how pro
duction is set to work, and Induces consumption of the most
uneconomic kind: a consumption which wastes upon unnecessary
and culpable enjoyment what mipfrt have served to heal the
wounds of poverty.20
Anyone concerned with healing "the wounds of poverty" could not assume
full employment.

^Ibld.

20Wieser, og. cit., p. 5 8 .

Thus, professional economic thought since before Smith has
not supported a policy of public Inaction regarding unemployment
nor has It assumed full employment.

But the Keynesian analysis gains

rather than loses authority If It recognizes, Instead of depreciating,
the growth of Its ideas In the work of earlier writers.
Smith's contention that capital accumulation determined the
wealth of a nation may be viewed in a different matrix.

Throughout

the history of capitalism, capital (goods) has been formed and ac
cumulated by and through the Investment process; that is, the expendi
ture of capital (funds) for the purpose of creating goods other than
consumption goods.

Thus, what Smith was In effect saying was that the

welfare of the economy depended upon investment.

And Keynes, in mak

ing Investment, along with the consumption function, the determinant
of effective demand, came to exactly the same conclusion as did Smith.
For Keynes, employment could not increase unless Investment Increased.
For Smith, the wealth of a nation could not increase; production could
not increase; employment could not increase unless the quantity of
capital goods Increased.
Many writers contend that Keynes embraced a labor theory of
value.

The writer agrees, with the qualification that Keynes also

had an "expectation" theory of value, which is discussed later in
the present chapter, and a "commanded" theory of value, which is
examined in Chapter Five.

Ae to Keynes' labor theory of value:

It is much preferable to speak of capital as having a
yield over the course of its life in excess of its original
cost, than as being productive. For the only reason why an
asset offers a prospect of yielding during its life services
having an aggregate value greater than its initial supply
price is because it is scarce; and it is kept scarce because
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of the competition of the rate of interest on money. If
capital becomes less scarce, the excess yield vill diminish,
without its having become less productive— at least in the
physical sense.
I sympathise, therefore, with the pre-classlcal doctrine
that everything is produced by labour, aided by what used to
be called art and is now called technique, by natural re
sources which are free or cost a rent according to their
scarcity or abundance, and by the results of past labour,
embodied in assets, which alBo command a price according to
their scarcity or abundance. It is preferable to regard
labour, including, of course, the personal services of the
entrepreneur and his assistants, as the jsole factor of pro
duction, operating in a given environment of technique,
natural resources, capital equipment and effective demand.
Hiis partly explains why we have been able to take the unit
of labour as the sole physical unit which we require in our
economic system, apart from units of money and of time.^1
One migvfc view this as a revolutionary doctrine were it not for the
fact that Adam Smith and Bicardo and practically all their contempo
raries looked at the economic process in much the same manner.
Hie elimination

of the scarcity of capital assets along with

the advocacy of socialized

investment led in quite logical fashion

to Keynes' conclusion that labor was the sole factor of production.
Keynes' labor theory of value had something in common with Marx's
value theory as well as with the value theories of Smith and Bicardo.
But this is more or less irrelevant for the purpose of this study.
Hie significant factor is to recognize that Keynes did not "break new
ground" when he embraced the labor theory of value.

This is but another

way in which the economics of Keynes is related to the classical tra
dition.
Ihis acceptance
cause

of a labor theory of value did not, however,

Keynes— as it had the classicists— to employ a "supply" approach

^^General Hieory, pp. 213, 21^.

(Italics by Keynes).
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to economics.

His Idea system throughout embraces and uses the "de

mand" approach formulated so well by the Austrlans.

Even his emphasis

on Investment Is a demand and not a supply concept.

Consumption, human

want, and human need were not taken for granted by Keynes Just as they
had not been assumed by the Austrlans.

Quite the contrary, It vas the

supply function that was taken as given by Keynes; then, he formulated
his entire analysis around the demand function.

As all economists know,

even the marginal concepts--marginal efficiency of capital and marginal
propensity to consume— are quite In keeping with the Austrian marginal
utility concept.
Thus, with reference to assigning Keynes to his proper position
in the history of economic theory, his Idea system flows frfim the
Austrian method of analysis and not the classical.

This was Keynes'

"break" from classical economics, but the "break" was effected more
than half-a-century before the appearance of the General Theory.

John R. Commons' Theory of Value and Keynes
The final task of this chapter Is to show the relationship
between the "volitional" theory of value of John R. Commons and the
"expectation" theory of value of Keynes.

pp

For the classical economists, value had Its origin In labor,
Its time was In the past, and Its source was supply.

For the Austrlans,

value had Its origin In Hie mind, Its time was the present, and Its

^ Three "good" suramarlzatlanB of Commons appear In A. G. Gruchy,
Modern Economic Thought (19^7); Joseph Dorftaan, The Economic Mind In
American Civilization, H I , Ch. 13; and Sellg Pearlman, "John Rogers
Commons," In the American Economic Review, XXXV, No. U (September,
19>*5), PP. 782-785^

source was demand.

For the Volitional Theory of John R. Commons,

value had its origin in the transaction, its time was the future,
and its source was also the transaction.
Commons' theory of value was similar to the Austrians but it
was not Hedonistic.
Hedonic theory.
action.

Evaluation was an individual phenomenon in the

But for Commons, evaluation involved collective

He believed that the objective of economic study was the

collective behavior of man-made institutions as they functioned around
the institution of private property, codified laws, and court decisions.
The very first sentence in his, Institutional Economics reads, "My
point of view is based on my participation in collective activities,
from which I here derive a theory of the part played by collective
action in control of individual action."

23

The problem of economic

study was "not to create a different kind of economics--'institutional'
economics— divorced from preceding schools, but how to give to col
lective action, in all its varieties, its due place throughout economic
theory.

In my Judgnent this collective control of individual transactions

is the contribution of institutional economics to the whole of a roundedp ]1

out theory of Political Economy."c
Commons was critical of the value theory of classical economics
because it failed to recognize the importance of collective action as
determinants of value and price.

Neither did the theory see and under

stand the importance of private property or the impact of courts of

2 3John R. Commons, Institutional Economics (New York:

Macmillan Co., 193*0 > P. 1.

The
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law as enforcing agencies of collective action.
in received value theory with which he grappled.

It was these faults
And the result was

a new theory of value.
For Commons, transactions took place in an institutional
environment.

Institutional conditions such as the open shop, labor

unions, the closed shop, monopoly, etc. prevailed in the real world,
and Commons refused to Ignore these in the formulation of his value
theory.

He was a pragnatist, a realist; he believed that it was hi#i

time for economists to stop being so "pure" and start being more
"functional."

All of this is reflected in his theory of value.

Basic

ally, Commons was concerned with "reasonable value;" that is, how could
reasonable value be.arrived at througi the transaction process.

By

this type of value, he meant a value that would be fair and equitable
to everyone concerned in the transaction.
It will be recalled that Smith's niggardliness of nature,
Ricardo's diminishing returns and rent theory, and Maithus' theory
of population made scarcity the most important problem in economics.
This, of course, evolved Into Say's Law of Markets.

According to the

classical thougvt, anyone who attempted to create scarcity, primarily
by monopoly, should be eliminated.

3h the united States, this way of

thinking led to the passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and other
anti-trust legislation.
Commons would have none of this type of thinking in relation
to valuation problems.

He believed that since transactions occurred

between collective groups, those groups should have about equal bar
gaining strength.

If they did not, then, some institutional force

must make it so or more nearly so.

If the strength of the bargaining

groups were about the same, the result would be Just about as it should
that is, reasonable value for all concerned would be realized.

For

Commons, the government should be the institutional force making for
this equality of bargaining power or strength.

Die government must

formulate the rules governing the transactions and then act as umpire
in the exchange process to see to it that the rules were followed.
Commons was not Interested in equilibrium price because that price
could be an exploitative one; that is, not a reasonable price.
Commons recognized that there were people who attempted to
gain riches by increasing supply, but there were others who strived
to enrich themselves by creating scarcity.

It was the latter group

that concerned Commons because scarcity, Itself, created value; and
the transaction was largely between those who controlled the supply,
that is, the scarcity.

It was this recognition of the real world

that caused Commons to insist that, if necessary, the government
muBt act to equalize bargaining power.

Governmental legislative

and umpiring activities were Commons' program of action to protect
the weak in the bargaining processes.

This is what he meant by in

dividual control by collective action.

Thus, Commons would not at

tack the problem of unequal bargaining power, monopoly, and scarcity
with anti-trust legislation.

He would not destroy the groups that

tried to obtain wealth by creating scarcity, but he would try to
equalize the bargaining processes.

This would be his working rules

of social action.
However, once the rules are established, reasonable value
may still not be realized because of the slope of the demand curve.
Suppose the demand curve is a highly elastic one but production is

In the nature of a monopoly.
by 10 per cent.

Nov assume that prices are Increased

Demand would fall sharply as consumers shifted their

expenditure to substitutes.

Thus, there la no need to worry a great

deal about consumers If the demand Is hlgily elastic and there are
substitutes for the commodity available.
demand.

Now assume hlgji Inelastic

Under this condition, sellers tend to raise prices higher

and higher.

Demand would not change much.

It was under these cir

cumstances that Commons Insisted on some new rules which would insure
reasonable value.

Perhaps these prices should be set as are the prices

charged by public utilities.

This demonstrates quite clearly that

Commons' theory of value and his Ideas concerning economic policy
were Inseparable.
McCracken sums up Commons' theory of value very neatly In the
following words;

“For Commons, man was not a hedonistic creature ar

riving at vital conclusions with respect to value on the monetary
sensations of pleasure and pain.

But rather, man was a rational,

calculating being, forcing himself by a volitional act of the will
to make appraisals and evaluations, yet appraisals and evaluations
desired to discover the present worth of future expectations.

Value
I
Is a mental appraisal In the present of expected future uses or in-

comes."

25

These appear to be the basic principles around which Commons

constructed his idea system, particularly his theory of value.

Thus,

Commons' "futuristic"-"transactions" theory of value was a "break"
of great importance with received economics.

25h . L. McCracken, "Economic Contradictions," In The Southern
Economic Journal (XIII, No. 4, April, 19*+7)> P. 3^6.
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It has been shown that by the very nature of his analysis,
Keynes embraced a labor theory of value.

But perhaps his idea system

vas too broad and general, after the fashion of the Wealth of Nations,
to be contained in only one value theory.

3h any event, as was indi

cated earlier, Keynes had three theories of value.

In his Chapter,

"Expectation as Determining Output and Employment," Keynes expressed
the same concept of value that Commons had formulated some fifteen
years earlier.

It was the "futuristic" idea; Keynes referred to it

as "expectations."
All production is for the purpose of ultimately satis
fying a consumer. Time usually elapses, however— and some
times much time— between the incurring of costs by the
producer (with the consumer in view) and the purchase of
the output by the ultimate consumer. Meanwhile the entre
preneur (including both the producer and the investor in
this description) has to form the best expectations he can
as to what the consumers will be prepared to pay when he is
ready to supply them (directly or indirectly) after the
elapse of what may be a lengthy period; and he has no choice
but to be guided by these expectations, if he is to produce
at all by processes which occupy time.
Biese expectations upon which business decisions depend,
fall into two groups, certain individuals or firms being
specialised in the business of framing the first type of
expectation and others in the business of framing the second.
Hie first type is concerned with the price which a manufacturer
can expect to gat for his "finished" output at the time when
he commits himself to starting the process which will pro
duce it; output being "finished" (from the point of view of
the manufacturer) when it 1b ready to be vised or to be sold
to a second party. The second type is concerned with what
the entrepreneur can hope to earn in the shape of future
returns if he purchases (or, perhaps, manufactures) "finished"
output as an addition to his capital equipment. We may call
the former short-run expectation and the latter long-term
expectation.
H ius the behaviour of each individual firm in deciding its
daily output will be determined by its short-term expectations -expectations as to the cost of output an various possible scales
and expectations as to the sale-proceeds of this output; though,
in the case of additions to capital equipment and even of sales
to distributors, these short-term expectations will largely
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depend on the long-term (or medium-term) expectations of
other parties.26
Thus, for Keynes, the expectations of the enterprisers deter
mine value, not only for consumers1 goods but for capital goods as well.
It falls again to McCracken to neatly sum up Keynes' expectation theory
of value.
According to him (Keynes), the present value of anything
is the discounted present worth of all expected future annui
ties . It matters not whether one Is thinking of a 3 per cent
government bond maturing In 20 years, or an office building
In a metropolitan area. It matters not what historical costs
may have been according to an accounting statement or what the
Incomes have been In previous years— except to the extent that
past Incomes may supply a rational basis for future expecta
tions. Any basic change In technology or permanent shift In
demand automatically divorces future expectations from past
experience and present values are adjusted accordingly.27
Then, McCracken says, "Many young economists have given Keynes
credit for this novel and m o d e m idea.

However, It was my privilege

to be exposed to this Idea as long ago as 1921 while pursuing graduate
work at the university of Wisconsin In the 'value and valuation'
Beminar of John R. Ccmmons.

At that time he was working out a system

of economic thought which he chose to call the 'volitional theory of
value.'"2®

^ General Theory, pp. k6, U7 .
2 7McCracken, Economic Contradictions, pp. 3^5> 3^6.
Theory, Ch. 5.

2®Ibld., p. '3^6.

See General

CHAPTER IV
EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE OF EFFECTIVE DEMAND

The doctrine of effective demand Is not a "new-comer" In the
history of economic theory.

Quite the contrary Is true.

This prin

ciple that demand cannot he assumed or taken as given, and that a
deficiency of demand can and does lead to terrible economic conse
quences has been present In the stream of economic theory since at
least the very beginning of the eighteenth century.
The purpose of this chapter Is to examine this doctrine that
has characterized the social thought of the economic "underworld"
for more than two hundred and fifty years from the perspective of
Its historical development.

The names most closely associated with

the doctrine of effective demand during this period are:

Bolsgullbert,

Mandevllle, Steuart, Lauderdale, Malthus, Slsmondl, Aftallon, Hobson,
and Foster and Catchlngs.

These are the men we shall examine.

These

are the men who nurtured the doctrine for more than two centuries
until a "KeyneB" appeared and caused It to burst Into full bloom.
Keynes, of course, recognized that the principle of effective
demand had long been a part of economic theory.

He expressed this

when he wrote, "It Is no new thing, however, to ascribe the evils
of unemployment to the Insufficiency of the propensity to consume.
But this explanation of the economic evils of the day. . .played a
small part In sixteenth and seventeenth-century thinking and has
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only gathered force in comparatively recent t i m e s . H e then pointed
out that Laffemas, Petty, von Schrotter, Barbon, and Cary had emphasized
consumption, or effective demand, as early as the seventeenth century.

p

He also paid tribute to Mandevllle, Hobson, and of course, Malthus.
Keynes' treatment of these three men Is presented In connection with
the discussion of them.

Pierre le Pesant de Bolsgullbert
The study of the evolution of the doctrine of effective demand
may properly begin with Pierre le Pesant de Bolsgullbert, a writer who
has been largely Ignored by historians of economic thou^it.^

Those

writers who have not completely neglected Bolsgullbert have associated
him with antl-mercantlllsm, free trade, and agricultural primacy.
There Is no mention of Bolsgullbert In the General Theory, althou^i,
In Chapter 23, Keynes mentions Laffemas, Petty, von Schrotter, Barbon,
Cary, and Mandevllle as men who made consumption or "effective demand"
an Important part of their Idea systems.

Bolsgullbert appeared between

Cary and Mandevllle, and anyone who has studied his writings must con
clude that he emphasized mass consumption as the fundamental source of
national economic well-being to a far greater degree than did any of
the writers mentioned by Keynes.

In fact, one authority on Bolsgullbert

wrote, "No modern writer adhering to the belief that economic Ills spring

•kjensral Theory, p. 358.
2See Ibid., pp. 358 , 359
men as quoted by Keynes.

a brief statement by each of these

^The reader's attention Is directed to Stephen L. McDonald,
"Bolsgullbert: A Neglected Precursor of Aggregate Demand Theorists,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, IXVIII (August, 195^) PP. kOl-Ulh.
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in large part from underconsumption has put the case more strongly
than Boisguilbert.',1+
As has been true with so many economists, the economics of
Boisguilbert reflected the great economic and social problems present
in France during the latter quarter of the seventeenth century.

Hie

major economic problem in France during this period was what would now
be referred to as secular stagnation.

From roughly 1665 to 1700, the

economy of France had grown progressively weaker.
had declined greatly.

Commerce and trade

Agriculture had become more and more depressed;

population had declined until the rural areas were almost deserted and
many villages abandoned; and people were starving to death, not only b e 
cause they did not have sufficient purchasing power but also because there
was an absolute shortage of food.

France was nothing more than a great

poorhouse, desolate and without provision.^

Vauban estimated in 1707

that one-tenth of the French population actually begged, while fivetenths were "reduced almost to that unhappy condition."

6

Between 1695 and 1707, Boisguilbert published five short books
and treatises, each of which was an attempt to explain to the public
this terrible economic wretchedness that had befallen France.

In

addition, his writings contained programs, of action designed to cure

^Ihis statement is quoted by McDonald, op. cit., p. 401, and
he cites "Hazel V. Roberts, Boisguilbert, Economist of the Heign of
Louis XIV, p. 287."
5see Felix Cadet, Pierre de Boisguilbert, precurseur des
economistes; 16U6-171U (Paris: Libraire Guillaumin, 1870 ), pp. 17, 18.
^Sebastien le Prestre Vauban, Projet d'une dime royale, reprinted
in Eugene Daire, Ec onartistes financiers du 18 e sjgcle (Paris: Chez
Guillaumin et Cle., Libraries, 1851), p. 36T
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the basic economic ills of the nation.^
Like most great theoretical economists, Boisguilbert was con
cerned with the wealth of the nation and the forces which determined
it.

He refused, as Adam Smith was to do nearly a century later, to

accept the mercantilists idea that bullion was wealth.

For

g
Boisguilbert, wealth was economic goods such as, "food and clothing"
and "bread, wine, meat, or other commodities."
his definition of true wealth.

He was very clear in

It consisted of ". . .a complete en

joyment, not only of the needs of life, but even of all the super
fluities and of all that can give pleasure to the sensuality, con
cerning which the corruption of the heart invents and refines for
ever."^

But mere quantity of goods and productive powers could not

measure true national wealth.

The important factors were the utili

zation of a nation's powers of production and, even more important,
the consumption of the goods.

It was not enough that a nation have

a large quantity of all of the means of production.
wbb the key to the creation of wealth.

Consumption

Consumption set the means

of production into motion and determined their employment.

"All

the most exquisite fruits of the earth and the most precious commodities

?See McDonald, og. cit., p. U03, for a very brief summary of the
books and treatises. These five works are reprinted in Daire, og. cit.,
and all references to Boisguilbert's writings in this dissertation are
to this edition.
^Boisguilbert, Dissertation sur la mature des richesses, d e ,
1'argent et des tribute, p. 373 . Hereafter cited as Dissertation.
^Boisguilbert, Supplement au Detail de la France, p. 2^7.
Hereafter cited as Supplement.

•dissertation, p. 383.
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are only manure when they are not consumed.

Bolsgullbert took an

equally positive position with reference to money.

It was only a

medium of exchange.
Gold and silver are not and never have been wealth In
themselves, having value only relatively, and Insofar
as they can procure the necessary things of life, with
regard to which they serve only as a pledge and a measure.
It Is a matter of Indifference whether there Is more or
less (of money), provided It can produce the same results.
Concerning wealth, money is only the means and the method,
while the commodities useful to life are the end and the
aim. ^
Boisguilbert argued that the quantity of money presented no
problem.

Its velocity of circulation was important but this was a

function of the demand for goods.

This functional relationship created

an effective elasticity to the supply of money.

If the demand for goods

increased, the increase in the velocity of circulation of the medium
of exchange would create purchasing power despite the scarcity of
gold or silver.

Here again, he stressed consumption.

Money is uniquely the slave of consumption, following step
by step its destiny, and moving or stopping with it, cm
ecu passing a hundred times in a day, when there are many
sales and resales, and remaining for entire months in a
single place when consumption is ruined.
And,
It is consumption which leads the march; money stops,

^Boisguilbert, Factum de la France, p. 271.
as Factum.

Hereafter cited

^Boisguilbert, I« Detail de la France, p. 170.
cited as Detail.
13Ibid., p. 198 .
lU

Factum, p. 320.

Hereafter
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dislodges, and runs along with consumption. Thus when there
is very much consumption, a little silver, on account of its
frequent appearances, passes for a great quantity of specie;
consumption diminishing, silver stops immediately and causes
it to be said that there is no more of it.^5
Even if the velocity of circulation of the medium of exchange were
insufficient to facilitate trade and commerce, there was no reason
for great concern.

There was always the bill of exchange to supple

ment and/or replace coin.

According to Borsguilbert, much of the

trading that occurred in a market was carried on with bills of ex
change.^
It is not a question of there being much silver, but that
it should march and circulate always, and of what this
celerity consists, and what causes It. When this speed
of movement of silver does not suffice for the number of
masters it is obliged to serve, it produces an infinity of
children, whom it clothes with all its authority. These
are bills of exchange, or paper money, that is to say,
inexhaustible matter provided there be enough workmen
to coin it. These workmen are the merchants or courtiers
of consumption.^
Thus it appears clear that Boisguilbert's concept of money
and wealth wbb not merely an attempt to refute the mercantilistlc
theory of wealth as so many writers have concluded.

More important

was the relationship between this concept and Boisguilbert's major
argument that only by a program designed to create and maintain mass
purchasing power at high levels could the people of France enjoy a
higher standard of living.

The basic theme which runs through all of

^Letter to Chamillart of July 1, 17<&, cited by Roberts, op.
cit., p. 212,
^ Dissertation, p. 377.
^Letter to Chamillart of July 19, XJCk, quoted by Roberts,
op. cit., pp. 1+7, U8. (Roberts' translation).
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his works was that effective demand, and not money nor its quantity,
was the key to national and individual economic welfare.

Economic

stagnation and poverty resulted from a deficiency of effective demand.
If effective demand failed, any supply of money would be totally in
effective in preventing economic depression.
Having defined wealth as he did, Boisguilbert was quick to
see a relationship between wealth and total demand.
expenditure determined the income of a nation.

Aggregate money

Or better still,

total consumption expenditure determined the wealth of a nation.

xs

"It may be established as a principle," he said, "that consumption
and income are one and the same thing; and that the ruin of consumptlon is the ruin of income."

19

Boisguilbert placed great emphasis upon the distribution of
income; in fact, it was this that determined the level of consumption.
He argued that the "little" people must have purchasing power to
create a level of income comparable to full employment.

These people

spent their money and thereby created Income and employment.

On the

other hand, much of the money which flowed into the pockets of the
rich was hoarded.

There was no necessity for them to spend all of

it to satisfy their needs and desires.

Boisguilbert expressed the

"Keynesian" concepts of the "propensity to consume" and the "propensity
to save" in the following maimer:

^Boisguilbert did not always explain what he meant by the
word "expenditure." In general, however, he used it to mean consumer
spending. The French word "conscmmation," which he used, may be trans
lated literally as "consumption" or "expenditure."

19petail, p. 183.
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An ecu with a poor man or a very small merchant has a hundred
times more effect, or rather, causes more income, than with
a rich man, because of the continual dally turnover that this
modest sum experiences with the forner. This does not happen
with regard to the other, in the coffers of which considerably
greater quantities of money remain for months and entire
years idle, and consequently useless, whether due to corruption
of heart blinded by avarice, or to the waiting for a better
market.
But, frcm thissaving, the king and the body of the nation
obtain no utility, and this amounts to so much theft frcm both.
But this sum, such as a thousand ecus, distributed among a
thousand people of small means, would pass one hundred thousand
hands in less time than it occupied the coffers of this rich
person, which would not be able to happen without consequently
causing one hundred thousand ecus of consumption expenditures.20
Bolsgullbert understood that Investment spending created in
come and employment.

But he also realized that all saving did not flow

immediately into investment.

With reference to saving and not invest

ing during a period of deflation, he said:
And what is said of the merchant is equally true of all persons
who live on their (property) incomes, should it be from landed
estates or invested funds.' Receiving their returns, they are
not able to reinvest them for lack of security, because the
most ordinary affectations being over the lands, the product
of them diminishes every day before our eyes, due to the
destruction of consumption. Also, they would rather lose
the interest than risk the capital, retrenching to incur less
expense, which is an Increase of disaster for the body of the
republic.21
Even during better times, the rich, "dealing only in large affairs,
wait long periods of time for their sum to be furnished. . .before
sending forth their money, which is always prejudicial to the state,
. . .All of which shows what an interest a country has that its in
habitants should not be in an obligation to spend less money than they

2 0 Plssertatlon, pp. Uoi, Uce,
21 Petall, p. 199 ,
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receive
In this manner, Boisguilbert promulgated a theory of income
determination in terms of money flows.

And thus in the broad contours

of the developnent of the history of economic thought, he anticipated
Keynes in great detail with reference to the doctrine of effective
demand.
For Boisguilbert, both recurring crises and secular stagnation,
which hod plagued France for so long, were the result of a failure of
consumption.

His explanation of the business cycle was not only unique

but also ingenious at the time it was formulated.

Bie theory appears

in his Traite' des grains and briefly runs as follows:
The farmer, because of strong competitive price forces, must
sell his wheat on the market at whatever price it would demand.

In

years of good crops, the price would be low because of the great sup
ply.

It was common for the price to be so low that the ordinary costB

of production; that is, the costs of maintaining his family and paying
his rent, could not be covered.
losses for the farmer.

This, of course, resulted in definite

The immediate effect of this was a reduction

in consumption on the part of the farm family.

But that was not all.

His expenditures for such items as seed, fertilizer, and labor would
decline.
him.

Under these conditions the farmer had two avenues open to

First, he could leave the farm and seek employment elsewhere.

Second, he could try to get his landlord to postpone the rent payments
or to waive them entirely.
is more or less immaterial.

g2Ibld., p. 20e.

Which course the farmer selects to follow
The significant factor is that the landlord

experiences a decrease in his lhccrae regardless of what course the
farmer takes.

This causes the landlord to reduce his demand for

goods of all types.
decline first.

However/ his expenditures for luxury items will

The effect of this is to reduce the income of the

men who produce these goods.

Then, they buy less of everything,

particularly consumer goods.

The final effect is that all those

engaged in supplying consumer goods will suffer a decline in money
income and this will be reflected by a drop in demand all around
the p l a c e . T h e r e is a general reduction in purchasing power through
out the economy.

Of course, the decline in consumption has an adverse

effect on investment.

And this further reduces national income.

Thus,- frcm low grain prices there Btems "the ruin of the farmers
of the lands, which entrainB that of their masters and of their credi
tors, by a gradation that extends infinitely, and which owes all its
principle to the cessation of consumption."
as an agricultural-underconsumption theory.

2b

This may be classified

The crisis originates in

agriculture and spreads throughout the economy through the factor of
consumption.
The depression continues until grain prices start rising.
This inflation of farm prices resultBfrom a diminished supply.

Be

cause of the depressed prices of gjrain farmers abandon the land in
large numbers.

Furthermore, those who remain on the land are forced

to use poor cultivation methods such as eliminating manure and tillage.
Finally, supply will fall below demand at current prices, particularly

^^Boisguilbert, Tralte des grainB, pp. 333, 33^.
^^Detail, p. 191-
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if a drought or plant disease causes output to be far below normal.
The rising prices will encourage reentry Into farming and Improved
cultivation methods.

Thus the cycle starts over again,

25

Bolsgullbert had a positive program which he believed would
eliminate the business cycle.
prices must be stabilized.

His basic contention was that grain

To accomplish this, he designed a pro- .

gram which called for the abolition of the mercantlllstlc policy of
prohibiting the export of grains.

He was convinced that grain prices

and production could be partly stabilized by following a policy of
free export of grainB.

And this stabilization would cause an Increase

In the production of grains and a better distribution of Income,

nils

second effect would Increase mass consumption.

But he did not place

complete reliance upon the free export policy.

His program also called

for government price supports on grains, "to sustain the price which
grain has once contracted."

26

But Boisguilbert*s major reform was directed at secular stag
nation.

Ab we should now expect, he found the cause of the secular

decline In national income to be the result of a deficiency in ef
fective (consumer) demand.

This failure of demand resulted directly

from the French tax system.

Certain types of taxes prohibited con

sumption, while others made consumption Impossible.
Consumption has ceased because It has beccme absolutely
prohibited and absolutely Impossible. It Is prohibited
by the uncertainty of the Tallle, which, being entirely
arbitrary, has no more certain Incidence than to be paid

^ Traite des grains, pp. 3 ^6 , 3^7 .
26 Ibid., p. 369 .
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hi^ier the more one is poor, and the more value is assigned
to property owned hy defenseless persons. . .Finally, con
sumption has become impossible by reason of the Aides and
the Douanes on the exports and internal movements of the
kingdom, which have put all the commodities at a point that
not only are they transported outside no more than a quarter
of what they were before, but they perish in the very places
where they are produced, while in other places quite nearby
they are valued at an exorbitant price.2?
Boisguilbert’s program called for a tax system that would not
seriously reduce the nation's power to consume.

He believed that

taxes should be certain and not arbitrary and that they should be
pQ
easy to collect.
He also argued that taxes should be universal and
levied in proportion to ability to pay .29
He argued that no person should be left off the tax rolls for
any reason.

Nobles, clergy, officials, and other influential people

must pay their share of the tax burden.

"And when God commanded to

pay tributes to the princes," he said, "He pretended to speak to
everyone, and not to the wretched and defenseless only, who would be
unable to exempt themselves from them."

30

Moreover, taxes should be

levied on the principle of ability to pay.

"For tributes, like all

sorts of debts, draw their quality of excessiveness or moderateness,
not from the absolute amount of the sums demanded, but frcm the value
of the property frcm which they are exacted."31
Boisguilbert did not diBcuss taxation in terms of progressive
rates, but he certainly did imply that progressive taxation would aid
in the economic welfare of France.

For example, he said, "It is

27 Petall, p. 172 .
28 Ibid.t p. 21 2 .

2 9Ibjd., p. 208 .

3lSupplement, p. 2^6 .

3 °Ibid.
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certain that an Individual who pays 100 francs of Taille on a farm of
1,000 llvres, would he far less charged In paying 200 , If the farm

could return 2,000 livres."

He also pointed out that, "If then the

rich understood their interests, they would entirely discharge the
wretched of their taxes, which would form Immediately so many opulent
people; and this, being Impossible without a great increase in con
sumption, which spreads over all the mass of a state, would repay the
rich three times their first advances."33
These were the general principles of Boisguilbert's reform pro
gram.

He hoped to prevent recurring crises by stabilizing grain prices

and he believed that the secular decline in the national income of
France could be halted by abolishing certain sections of the tax sys
tem and reforming others.

Underlying the entire program was hie firm

conviction that the purchasing power of the "little" people of France
had to be protected in the interest of national economic welfare.
For BoiBguilbert, just as it was to be for Keynes over two
hundred yearB later, effective demand was the dynamic factor in de
termining the level of national income and employment.

Bernard Mandevllle
Bernard Mandevllle, a Dutch immigrant to England, was neither
an economist nor a philosopher but a doctor with considerable phil
osophical talent.

There seems to be no exact certainty about the

date of his birth, but most writers estimate it to have been In 1670 ;

32Petail, p. 206 .

^Dissertation, p. U02.
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he died in 1731.
Many writers in the area of economic theory and its history
refer to Mandeville as a precursor of Adam Smith.

They point out

that the Fable of the Bees, published in 1711*, has pointed suggestions
regarding self-interest and division of labor.

It is true that

Mandeville did clearly express the concept of division of labor and
Illustrated the idea by showing how watches and clocks were produced.
According to Haney, Mandeville was perhaps the first to use the words
"divided" and "division" in this connection.31*
But the concern with Mandeville here is not in relation to
Smith.

He is examined in terms of his contribution to the doc

trine of effective demand.

Mandeville's work at first consisted of

a poem of U00 lines entitled "The Grumbling Hive:
Honest," which was published as a pamphlet in 1705.

or Knaves Turn'd
Ih 171^ the

poem was reprinted and accompanying it was a much greater amount of
prose than appeared in the first edition.
The Fable of the Bees;

The 17lU product was called

or Private Vices, Public Benefits; with an

Essay an Charity and Charity Schools and a Search into the Nature of
Society. Finally in 1729, Mandeville added a second part, nearly as
large as the first, which consisted of a dialogue on the subject.

The

"grumbling hive," which was in reality a characterization of a human
society, was described in the poem as prospering greatly so long as it
was full of vice:
The worst of all the multitude

3^Lewis H. Haney, History of Economic Thought, Revised ed.
(New York:’ The Macmillan Co., 19337, p. 19^.
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Did something for the common good.
This was the state's craft, that maintain'd
The whole, of which each part complain'd:
This, as In muslck harmony,
Made jarrlngs In the main agree;
Parties directly opposite,
Assist each oth'r, as 'twere for spight;
And temp'ranee with sobriety
Serve drunkenness and gluttony.
The root of evil, avarice,
That damn'd ill-natur'd baneful vice,
Was slave prodigality,
That noble sin; whilst luxury
Bnploy'd a million of the poor,
And odious pride a million more:
Envy itself and vanity
Were ministers of industry;
Their darling folly, fickleness
In diet, furniture, and dress,
That strange rldic'lous vice, was made
The very wheel that turn'd the trade.
Their laws and cloathe were equally
Objects of mutability;
For what was well done for a time,
In half a year became a crime;
Yet whilst they altered thus their laws,
Still finding and correcting flaws,
They mended by inconstancy
Faults which no prudence could forsee.
Thus vice nursed Ingenuity,
Which join'd with time and industry,
Had carry'd life's conveniencies,
It's real pleasures, comforts, ease,
To such a height, the very poor
Lived better than the rich before;
And nothing could be added m o r e . 35
The bees, however, were not happy living under these conditions
and grumbled so much that Jove abolished fraud from the hive.
community became honest, frugal, and virtuous.

The bee

The result was a great

reduction in expenditure which ruined trade and commerce.

In his

"search Into the Nature of Society," Mandeville concluded:

^Quoted in Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations (New York: Random
House, 1937), Editors Jhtroduction, pp. lii, liii, cited from Fable
of the Bees, pp. 11, 13 in the ed. of 1705.
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After this I flatter myself to have demonstrated that
neither the friendly qualities and kind affections that
are natural to man, nor the real virtues he Is capable of
acquiring by reason and self-denial, are the foundation of
society: but that what we call evil In the world, moral
as well as natural, Is the grand principle that makes us
sociable creatures, the solid basis, the life and support
of all trades and employments without exception: that there
we must look for the true origin of all arts and sciences,
and that the moment evil ceases the society must be spoiled,
If not totally dissolved.36
In a letter dated August 10, 1723, to the London Journal, Mandeville
said,

"That on the multiplicity of those wants depended all those

mutual services which the Individual members of a society pay to
each other:

and that consequently, the greater variety there was of

wants, the larger number of Individuals raieJvt find their private In
terest in labouring for the good of others, and united together, com37
pose one body.”
In this one statement one finds expressed the prin
ciples of aggregate demand, self-interest, division of labor, and the
idea that one person's spending Is another person's Income.
Keynes believed that it was Mandeville's work more than any
other that popularized the Idea that spending was a virtue and fru
gality was a vice.

He refers to the Fable of the Bees as a work

"which stands out In the history of the moral sciences for its scan
dalous reputation,” and mentions the fact that the book was "convicted
as a nuisance by the grand jury of Middlesex In 1723.'
According to Keynes, "The text of the Fable of the Bees is an

Q u o t e d In Ibid., p. 1111, cited from Ibid., pp. 1*27, 1*28 in
2nd ed., 1723.
37Quoted In Ibid., pp. 1111, liv, cited frcm Ibid., p. 1*65 in
ed. of 172k.

^ General Theory, p. 359.
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allegorical poem--'The Grumbling Hive, or Knaves turned honest,' in
vhich is set forth the appalling plight of a prosperous community in
which all the citizens suddenly take it into their heads to abandon
luxurious living, and the State to cut down armaments, in the interests
of Saving."39

Then he quoted the following parts of the poem:
No Honour now could be content,
To live and owe for what was spent,
Liv'ries in Broker's shops are hung;
They part with Coaches for a song;
Sell stately Horses by whole sets;
• And Country-Houses to pay debts.
Vain cost is shunn'd as moral Fraud;
They have no Forces kept Abroad;
Laugh at t h 1 Esteem of Foreigners,
And empty Glory got by Wars;
They fight, but for their Country's sake,
When Right or Liberty's at Stake.

"The haughty Chloe"
Contracts th' expensive Bill of Fare,
And wears her strong Suit a whole Year.
"And what is the result?— "
Now mind the glorious Hive, and see
How Honesty and Trade agree:
The Shew is gone, it thine apace;
And looks with quite another Face,
For 'twas not only they that went,
By wham vast sums were yearly spent;
But Multitudes that lived on them,
Were daily forc'd to do the same.
In vain to other Trades they'd fly;
All were o'er-stocked accordingly.
The price of Land and Houses falls;
Mirac'lous Palaces whose Walls,
Like those of Thebes, were rais'd by Play
Are to be let. . .
The Building Trade is quite destroy'd
Artificers are not employ'd;
No limner for his Art is fam'd,
Stone-cutters, Carvers are not nam'd.

39Ibid., p. 360.

73
"So 'The Moral' Is;"
Bare Virtue can't make Nations live
In Splendour. Ihey that would revive
A Golden Age, must be as free,
For Acorns as for Honesty. **0
In Keynes' view, "Two extracts from the commentary which
follows the allegory will show that the above was not without a
1*1

theoretical basis:"

He quotes from Mandeville:

As this prudent economy, which some people call Saving,
Is In private families the most certain method to Increase
an estate, so seme imagine that, whether a country be barren
or fruitful, the same method If generally pursued (which
they think practicable) will have the same effect upon a
whole nation, and that, for example, the English mlffrt be
much richer than they are, If .they would be as frugal, as
some of their neighbors. Bils, I think, is an error. 2
"On the contrary, Mandeville concludes:"
Ihe great art to make a nation happy, and what we call
flourishing, consists in giving everybody an opportunity
of being employed; which to compass, let a Government's
first care be to promote as great a variety of Manufactures,
Arts and Handicrafts as human wit can invent; and the second
to encourage Agriculture and Fishery In all their branches,
that the whole Earth may be forced to exert Itself as well
as Man. It is from this Policy and not from the trifling
regulations of LavlshneBS .and Frugality that the greatness
and felicity of Nations must be expected; for let the value
of Gold and Sliver rise or fall, the enjoyment of all So
cieties will ever depend upon the Fruits of the Earth and
the Labour of the People; both which joined together aro
a more certain, a more inexhaustible and a more real Treasure
than the Gold of Brazil or the Silver of Potosl. 3
One could probably pursue the whole of economic literature
frcm Mandeville to the present and not find a more exact expression of
Keynes' theory of spending and his concept of the role the government
should play in maintaining full employment.

^°Ibld., pp. 360 , 361 .
^Ibid., pp. 361 , 3.6 2 .

^ I b l d ., p. 361.

^ Ibid.
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After paying tribute to the several vriters who had concerned
themselves with the problem of effective demand, Keynes said;
No wander that such wicked sentiments called down the
opprobrium of two centuries of moralists and economists
who felt much more virtuous In possession of their austere
doctrine that no sound remedy was discoverable except In
the utmost of thrift and economy both by the Individual
and by the state. Petty's "entertainments, magnificent
shews, triumphal arches, etc." gave place to the pennywlsdom of Gladstonian finance and to a state system which
"could not afford" hospitals, open spaces, noble buildings,
even the preservation of its ancient monuments, far less
the splendours of music and the drama, all of which were
consigned to the private charity or magnanimity of Im
provident individuals.^
According to Keynes, "the doctrine did not reappear in respectable
circles for another century, until in the later phase of Malthus
the notion of the insufficiency of effective demand takes a definite
place as a scientific explanation of unemployment."^ Keynes did
not mention Sir James Steuart or Lord Lauderdale.

Sir James Steuart
The relationship of the economics of Keynes to the Mercantilistic thought of the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries Is well
known.

Keynes himself pointed to it. ° He said much in praise and in

defense of mercantilistic theory and policy and against arguments pre
sented by its classical critics.
However, it would not advance the purpose of this study to
investigate in detail the relationship between the Mercantilistic-

^ Ibid., p. 362 .

Ibid.

^ Ibid., p. 333 ff. For Keynes' formulation of the main con
clusion of the Mercantilists, see Ibid., pp. 336, 338 , 3^0. Keynes
seemed to assume that Mercantilism can be used to support his ideas,
especially regarding the stimulation of business activity.
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Keynesian theories of employment.

h7 But

it is necessary to show that

the theory of Mercantilism--at least in the writing of one who em
braced that doctrine--contained the concept of effective demand.
Sir James Steuart (1712-1780) is generally regarded as the
"last of the mercantilists." He was not only the last but possibly
the ablest of the eighteenth century writers before Smith. .His twovolume work, An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy,
published in 1767 , was a systematic study, but it attracted little
attention.

Although the book appeared only nine years before the

Wealth of Nations, Smith ignored it.
Steuart clearly anticipated Malthus in the significance as
well as in the statement of effective demand.

His thought is con

tained in the following statements:
It is the effectual demand, as I may call it, which
makes the husbandman labour for the sake of the equiva
lent. Hie demander must have an equivalent to give; it
is this equivalent which is the spring of the whole ma
chine. Every transition of money from hand to hand for
a valuable consideration Implies some service done, some
thing wrought by man, or some consumption of something
produced by his labour. The quicker, therefore, the cir
culation of money is in any country, the more strongly
may it be inferred that its inhabitants are laborious.
This doctrine of the equivalent was the central theme in his Inquiry.
My principal point in view is, to find out a method for
enabling those to buy who at present cannot, because
they can give no equivalent. **9

^7por a discussion of the relationship between John Law and
Keynes with reference to "easy-maney", Bee Albert Hahn, The Economics
of Illusion (New York: Squier Publishing Co., 19^9), PP. 108-114.
^®Steuart, oj>. cit., I, p. 21*-.

^Ibid., p. 8 .
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And he held it to he the duty of the statesman to maintain the cir
culation of money If It appeared liable to stagnate, when the "pro
pensity of the rich to consume" was not In proportion to the "dis
position of the poor to be Industrious."5° ftiese were his only direct
statements concerning effective demand.

However, he treated the sub

ject matter of the five books which made up his Inquiry— Population
and Agriculture; Trade and Industry; Money and Coin; Credits and Debts;
and Taxes— in terms of the Importance of maintaining effective demand.
Since Steuart *8 public policy has already been discussed,

51

it

is sufficient to simply mention here that he endorced the traditional
mercantilistlc policy that the government should develop a grand scheme
of economic mobilization and frame the necessary laws and regulations
to compel the citlzons of the country to do those things which the
government believed to be conducive to national economic prosperity.
There Is little, If any, difference between Steuart'a program of action
and Keynes' program of socialized Investment and public manipulation
of the interest rate.

They both would involve a tremendous amount of

governmental Interference In the economy.

Lord Lauderdale
Lord Lauderdale (1759-1838) has been recognized by many authors
as having been one of the great minds In the history of economic theory.
For example, Haney says, "Lauderdale's emphasis of consumption and de
mand, and his shrewd observations on the effects of varying distribution

5°Ibld., p. 301.
5-*See Supra, pp. 4 3 ,
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of wealth, are remarkable.
in these matters.

He was far in advance of his contemporaries

In his discussion of accumulation and consumption,

he may be dubbed the father of the overproduction idea ."^2
Althou^it the emphasis in this chapter is upon the doctrine
of effective demand and how it has developed, it would be doing
Lauderdale a great injustice if his theory of the nature and origin
of public wealth were not examined in sane detail.

Primarily, this

involves a presentation of his value theory which so clearly antici
pated the commanded theory of Malthus, the Austrians, and Keynes.

In

other words, the commanded theory of value is an integral part of the
doctrine of effective demand.
Lauderdale treats the subject of value and its measurement in
Chapter One of his book.
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He begins by simply stating a refutation of

Smith’s embodied labor theory of value.^ "The term Value," he said,
"whatever might have been its original sense, as it is used in common
language, does not express a quality inherent in any commodity.

There

is nothing which possesses a real, intrinsic, or invariable value.

The

possession of no quality, however important to the welfare of man, can
confer value; for water, the' most necessary of all things, seldom pos
sesses i t . T h u s ,

for Lauderdale, no embodied concept could explain

5%aney, o£. cit., p. 350 .
53lord Lauderdale, An Inquiry into the Nature and Origin of
Public Wealth, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: Archibald Constable and Co., 1819).
^Since the first edition of his bode appeared in 180 *1, which
antedated the works of Ricardo and Mill, Lauderdale aimed his criti
cisms directly at Smith. Of course, Lauderdale’s argument may be used
equally as well against Ricardo and Mill.
^Lauderdale, op. cit., pp. 10 , 1 1 .
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value.
For an item to have value, It must be "demanded" and It must
be "scarce" relative to the demand.

In Lauderdale's words, "To confer

value, therefore, two things appear requisite:

1. That the commodity,

as being useful or dell$itful to man, should be an object of his de
sire; 2. That It should exist In a degree of scarcity."-^
Concerning the manner by which the value of goods could vary,
Lauderdale said:
With respect to the variations In value, of which every
thing valuable Is susceptible, If we could for a moment
suppose that any substance possessed Intrinsic and fixed
value, so as to render an assumed quantity of it constantly,
under all circumstances, of equal value; then the degree of
value of all things, ascertained by such a fixed standard,
would vary according to the proportion betwixt the quantity
of them andthe demand for them, and every commodity would,
of course, be subject to a variation lri Its value from four
different circumstances.
1. It would be subject to an increase of Its value, from a
diminution of its quantity.
2. To a diminution of its value, from an augmentation of Its
quantity.
3. It mi#it suffer an augmentation In Its value, from the
circumstances of an Increased demand.
Its value ml&it be diminished, by a failure of demand.
But for Lauderdale, no good could possess fixed and intrinsic value;
hence,

there was no commodity that could be used to measure the value

of economic goods.

Thus, not only is value determined by demand and

supply, but also Its measurement Is calculated in the same manner.
The four circumstances Involving increases and decreases in demand
and supply express and measure the value of any given commodity.

58

U m s he said;
The value of every thing is so completely dependent upon

56Ibld., p. 11.

57Ibld., PP. 11, 12*

58Ibid., p. 13.
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the proportion betwixt the demand for it and the quantity of
it, that the possession of no quality, whatever excellence
it migjit add to a canmodity, could produce any material al
teration in its value, if it did not affect either the de
mand for it, or the quantity of it.59
And after giving several illustrations of this thesis;
Thus we may perceive, that the existence of value is
perfectly independent of any inherent characteristic in the
commodity itself; that there is no such thing as intrinsic
value; and that alterations in the degrees of value are not
dependent upon any change of quality, but always on seme
change of proportion betwixt the quantity and the demand for
a commodity;— a sure proof of which is, that we cannot ex
press value, or a variation of value, without a comparison
of two commodities; and every variation in the expression
of value, must depend upon some alteration in the propor
tion betwixt the quantity of and demand for, m e or other
of the commodities compared.
For example, if the price of grain is to be expressed
in silver, it migjit vary, in consequence of the circumstance
of the alteration of the proportion betwixt the quantity of
the grain and the demand for it; it might also alter, in'con
sequence of the variation betwixt the proportion of silver
and the demand for it. It may happen, too, that alterations
might take place in both those proportions; which must like
wise generally produce a variation in the expression of
value. For though it is possible that there should exist
alterations in both, and that the relative proportion be
twixt the quantity and demand for each should still be pre
served, yet it is higity improbable, that, under such cir
cumstances, this equilibrium should be maintained.
Lauderdale made a direct attack on Smith's labor theory of
value.

He believed that Smith had "struggled most" to formulate

the concept that labor was the source of value.

According to

Lauderdale, Smith made the mistake of believing that labor was a
constant value and hence could be used to measure the value of all
commodities.

But, for Lauderdale, nothing had a constant value, least

of all labor.

59lbid., pp. 15 , 1 6 .

^°Ibld., pp. 19> 2 0 .
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To those who understand any thing of the nature of value,
or on what its variations depend, the existence of a perfect
measure of value must at once appear Impossible: for as noth
ing can be a real measure of magnitude and quantity, which is
subject to variations in its own dimensions, so nothing can be
a real measure of the value of other commodities, which is con
stantly varying in its own value. But as there is nothing
which is not subject to variations, both in its quantity and
in the demand for it, there can be nothing which is not sub
ject to alteration in value. *■
Lauderdale accused Smith of not using "reasoning" with reference to
Smith's statement that labor was the only commodity that did not vary
in value, and considered this as being "extraordinary because labour
is the thing most subject to variation in its valuo, and is, of course,
of all others that could have been selected, the worst calculated to
perform that duty."
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In support of this statement, Lauderdale used

Smith's own arguments concerning the variation in the value of labor.
Lauderdale argued that Smith demonstrated that labor was not only sub
ject to all the forces causing a good to vary in value, but also that
labor was the only commodity which possessed the "characteristic of
varying (in value) at the same time find place."
great length from Smith
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Then he quotes at

to show that Smith had held that the value of

labor could vary during the same year, during periods longer than a year,
in different countries, and in different parts of the same country.
But Lauderdale was not throu^i.

He said:

It is, indeed, most extraordinary, that the author of
the Wealth of Nations should ever have considered labour
as an accurate measure of value; for in Book II. Chap. iii.
of his work, he treats of productive and unproductive labour,
and therein announces an opinion, which forms one of the

6lIbidt, pp. 2 k , 2 5 .

6gIbld., p. 25.

^ I b i d ., see pp. 27-33 and 3 5 .

63Ibld., p. 27.
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most striking features of his theory, that a great portion
or description of labour is totally unproductive: yet it is
evident, that a proposition, holding forth a mathematical
point as a measure of dimension, would not be more absurd
,
than proposing any thing unproductive as a measure of value. *
And he concluded this chapter of his book with the following remarks:
Great, therefore, as the authorities are who have regarded
labour as a measure of value, and who by so doing have contra
dicted that view of the nature of value which has been here
given, it does not appear that labour forms any exception to
the general rule, that nothing possesses real, fixed or in
trinsic value; or that there is any solid reason for doubting
the two general principles we have endeavoured to establish: —
1. That things are alone valuable in consequence of their
uniting qualities, which make them the objects of man's de
sire, with the circumstance of existing in a certain degree
of scarcity.
2. That the degree of value which every commodity possesses,
depends upon the proportion betwixt the quantity of it and
the demand for it.°°
This was the beginning of the true commanded theory of value.

Malthus

was to make it the core of his Principles. According to McCracken,
", . .Malthus and Lauderdale stood quite together on the problem of
effective demand, because they thought in terms of commanded value
instead of embodied value and feared the short-run evils which might
67
come from maladjusted production and consumption." '
Lauderdale protested most vigorously against the received doc
trine of his day that wealth and money were synonymous and that the
wealth of a nation was the sum total of the wealth of the individuals
in the nation.

He said:

The terns we use, in talking of the wealth of a nation,
or of the riches of individuals, are in all languages ex
actly the same. They denote, that private riches are

65 Ibid., pp. 33, 3^.

66 Ibld., pp. 35, 3 6 .

6 ?H. L. McCracken, Value Theory and Business Cycles, 2nd ed,
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936), p. 128.
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universally considered in no other ligvt than as a portion
of national wealth. The sum total of the riches of those
who form the community, is thus regarded as necessarily
conveying an accurate statement of the wealth of a nation;
and this idea has become so universally prevalent, that,
even by philosophers, exchangeable value has been announced
as the basis of wealth .°8
Biat public wealth, however, ought not to be considered as
merely representing the sum of individual riches, is undoubted;
and that much of obscurity, and even of error, has existed in
economical reasoning from confounding them, will be made ap
parent.^9
0
Later he says, "it is, however, impossible to subscribe to the idea,
that the sum-total of individual riches forms an accurate statement
of public wealth.

Biougi the opinion has been universally prevalent,

it must be deemed false and unfounded by every man who considers the
subject, after having formed, and familiarized himself to, an accurate
and distinct opinion of the nature of value.
Lauderdale made a distinction between public wealth and private.
riches.

The former he defined as "to consist of all that man desires,

as useful or delightful to him,

and individual riches "to consist

of all that man desires as useful or delightful to him; which exists
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in a degree of scarcity."'

Thus, scarcity was the factor which

created a distinction between the two types of wealth.

Scarcity

was a fundamental characteristic of private wealth and essential
to value, which was the measure of private wealth.
He contended that private wealth or riches changed as their
demand and supply relationships changed, but public wealth was

^Lauderdale, og, cit., p. 6 .

^QIbld., p. In.
^Ibid., p. 58 .

^ I b i d ., pp. 7 , 8 .

See also pp. kl-52.

Ibid., p# 57 .
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dependent solely on its supply.

And the relationship between public

and private wealth was Inverse:

"In proportion as the riches of

Individuals are Increased by an augnentation of the value of any
commodity, the wealth of the society is generally diminished; and
In proportion as the mass of Individual riches is diminished, by
the diminution of the value of any commodity, its opulence is generally increased."78
Lauderdale was utterly convinced that Smith had made a grave
error in assuming that parsimony or individual savings was the chief
714means of increasing the wealth of a nation . 1 Biis, for Lauderdale,
was a fallacy which, "if persisted in, must infallibly ruin the
country that adopts or preserves it."7-* Quite the contrary, "a sud
den demand for any consumable commodity, by increasing its value,
encourages an augnented production, and tends, therefore, to increase wealth. . ."

He contended that parsimony "does not augnent

opulence; it only changes the direction in which the labor of a com77
munity is exerted."' But, parsimony in reality meant that a forgoing
of consumption by the consumer, in turn, had its bad effects on so
ciety.

Dius, "the wealth of a society never can be increased by a

system of continual parsimony, this abstinence from expenditure in
consumable commodities, and consequent accumulation, may evidently
be higxly injurious to its progress."7®

73Ibid., p. 1*9 .

7USee Wealth of Nations, pp. 321, 322, 32**, 578, 632 .
75Lauderdale, op. cit., p. 201.

77Ibld., p. 210.

7®Ibid., p. 213.

78Ibid., p. 215.
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Lauderdale was firm In his argument that the needs of the
country should dictate the supply of capital.

His main argument

against parsimony was not against saving per se; It was against too
much saving, because that would lead to an overproduction of capital.
He held that labor and capital supplemented one another in the pro
ductive process, and the real problem was to find new uses for both
labor and capital which would result in the production of wealth.
The concept of too much saving has been a major principle in the
underconsumption theory since Lauderdale.

Furthermore, Lauderdale

saw no logic in the argument that saving would result in more con
sumption in the future by virtue of an increase in the quantity of
capital.

He was primarily concerned with the short-run and said:

. . .If the abstraction from expenditure of a sum equal
to what is added to the capital of the community, causes a
diminution of production to that extent; parsimony must be
considered as a means of creating capital, at the expense
of sacrificing a revenue as great as the capital created;
and it does not appear, that a more ruinous operation in all
its bearings can be devised, than that of disposing of an
annual income, (for example, of a million,) for the purpose
of acquiring a capital to the same amount.
If, indeed, the mercantile system of political economy
has justly been deemed objectionable, and is now universally
exploded, because it exclusively regarded money as wealth,
the system that holds parsimony to be the great means of
increasing wealth, seems equally objectionable, because it
exclusively considers capital as wealth. The former system
could alone be maintained by its followers teaching mankind,
in estimating Ihe benefit derived from trade, to overlook,
as a matter of indifference, the goods sacrificed to obtain
money; whilst the latter can alone be maintained by its ad
herents habituating mankind to show a similar indifference
for revenue, by disregarding that diminution in the production
of consumable commodities, which parsimony must inevitably
create.79
Here Lauderdale expresses Keynes' concept that investment and

79Ibld., pp. 217, 218.

See also pp. 3^-3^9.
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consumption are complementary activities and not in opposition with
each other.
Finally, Lauderdale was quite aware of the relationship which
existed between the distribution and the production of goods.
. . .The distribution of wealth in all societies must
ultimately regenerate the formation of wealth. . .The distri
bution of wealth not only regulates and decides the channels
in which the industry of every country is embarked, and, of
course, the articles of production of which it excels; but
a proper distribution of wealth insures the increase of opu
lence, by sustaining a regular progressive demand in the
home market, and still more effectually, by affording to
those whose habits are likely to create a desire of sup
planting labour, the power of executing it .80
With reference to the function of the government in relation to the
wealth of the country, Lauderdale believed that the surest way to
increase national wealth was to make public expenditures, and the
quickest way to decrease it was to accumulate a large sinking fund.

01

Urns, Lauderdale had the overproduction-underconsumption
theory in every detail.

Since capital accumulated, consumption hod

to be maintained, else there would be an overproduction because of
underconsumption.

This called for the maintenance of a proper balance
go

between saving and consumption.
One cannot fail to wonder what the course of economic theory
and economic history would have been had the teachings of Lauderdale
been followed.

But, as is so well known, he, along with Malthus, was

buried underneath the Ricardian avalanche.

8 oIbld. pp. 311*, 31*9 , 350 .

Die commanded theory of

8 lIbid.

See pp. 235-268.

®2For an excellent treatment Bee F. A. Fetter, "Lauderdale's
Oversaving Theory," American Economic Review, XXXV, No. 3 (June, 19*1-5)•
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value with its emphasis on demand lay virtually dormant until the
Austrlans breathed new life Into It.

Thomas Malthus
Thomas Malthus (I766-I83U) was one of the first to challenge
the doctrine that production automatically financed consumption; that
with adequate supply, demand would care for Itself.

Again, as with

Lauderdale, the treatment of Malthus Is confined to his theory of
value and his concepts relating to the doctrine of effective demand.
Since the discussion to follow Is In some respects a com
parison between Malthus and Ricardo, It perhaps is Important to note
one general and major difference between the theories of these two
economists.

Ricardo centered his attention primarily on long-run

trends and long-run phenomena.

Malthus, on the other hand, concen

trated his analysis on the short-run period.

By the short run Malthus

meant a time period approximately the length of an ordinary business
cycle.

Malthus did not deny the existence of long-run trends, but

he minimized their significance.

He was of the opinion that what

was likely to occur In the long run was of no particular significance
because that time never arrived.

In short, Malthus' position was

that man lived in these short-run periods.

It is Interesting to note

that Keynes, a century later, expressed the same Idea when he said,
“this long run Is a misleading guide to current affairs.
run we are all dead.

In the long

Economists set for themselves too easy, too

useless a task If In tempestuous seasons they can only tell us that
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when the storm is long past the ocean Is flat again."83
Of course the great difference between Malthus and Ricardo and
Smith with which we are primarily concerned was Malthus' substitution
of the demand and supply principles for the cost (primarily labor)
principles both in the analysis of value determination and in the
explanation of the distributive shares.

Ricardo and Smith dis

tinguished between market and natural price, with market price de
termined by the forces of supply and demand, and natural price
determined by costs of production, primarily labor cost.

In general,

that was also true of their explanation of the distributive shares.
As a consequence, Ricardo, particularly, gave very little attention
to demand.

Malthus, on the other hand, held that costs of production

affected value only as they affected supply and that demand was an
equally active factor with supply in determining prices.

Malthus

always expressed the relationship between demand, supply, and price
in very clear terms.

For example, "When prices are said to be de

termined by demand and supply, it is not meant that they are determined
either by the demand alone, or by the supply alone, but by their relatlon to each other."

And

terms demand and supply

in more emphatic terms, he said, "If the

be understood. . .there is no case of price,

whether temporary or permanent, which they will not determinej and
in every instance of bargain and sale, it will be perfectly correct
to say, that the prices

of commodities will depend upon the relation

83j. M. Keynes,A Tract on Monetary
Macmillan Company, 1923)7 P* 8o.

Reform (New York:

The

8**Thcmas Robert Malthus, Principles of Political Economy,
1st. ed. (London: J. Murray, 1920), p. 65.
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of the demand to the supply; or will vary as the demand (that Is,
85
the money ready to be offered) directly, and the supply Inversely." J
In analyzing the way in which cost of production affected value in
regulating the supply of commodities, he recognized that labor cost
had an effect upon price, yot at the time that exchange actually oc
curred "no circumstance affects it but the relation of the supply to
the demand."

Since "all objects of human desire are obtained by the

instrumentality of human exertion" it was necessary that labor be so
remunerated in the value of objects given in exchange that the sup
ply of the goods would be adequate, that goods would be supplied
continually, and that there must be adequate materials as well as
food .for the .laborer.

These conditions must be met by every society

in order that the greater number of its wants may be satisfied.

The

price of the commodities entering into exchange is therefore made up
of "that which pays the labourer employed in its production; that
which pays the profits of capital, . .and that which pays the rent of
land, . .the price of each of these component parts being determined
exactly by the same causes as those which determine the price of the
whole."
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Adam Smith called this the "natural price," but Malthus

chose to call it the "necessary price" because it more nearly expressed
the importance of supply.

He added, "It will be the price necessary,

in the actual circumstances of society, to bring the commodity regularly to the market."

flv

This, of course, was very similar to Alfred

Marshall's "supply price" concept.

85lbid., p. 70.

86Ibid., p. 83.

87Ibid.
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Ricardo defined demand in such a way that it could not have
an effect on the equilibrium level of prices.

For Ricardo, demand was

the quantity of a commodity purchased with no reference to price.

Thus,

demand increased as a greater quantity of a ccmmodity was offered for
sale irrespective of price.

Malthus, on the other hand, defined demand

in terms of the intensity of demand.

By this he meant the will of the

purchasers to purchase plus their ability .to purchase.

His definition

of demand corresponds quite closely with most definitions found in
elementary texbooks today.

After presenting his concept of demand,

Malthus compares Ricardo's definition with his own;
Demand in this sense is obviously quite different from the
sense in which Mr. Ricardo had before used the term. The
one (Ricardo) is a demand in regard to extent, the increase
of which implies a greater quantity of the ccmmodity pur
chased; the other (Malthus) is demand in regard to inten
sity, the increase of which implies the will and power to
make a greater sacrifice in order to obtain the object
wanted. It is in the latter sense, I think that the term
is most frequently applied; at any rate, it is in this latter
Bense alone that demand raises prices.®®
In a footnote to this statement Malthus pointed out that, "Of course
it must often happen that an increased intensity of demand, and an
increased extent of demand go together.

In fact, an increased in

tensity of demand, when not occasioned by an increased difficulty of
production, is the greatest encouragement to an increase of produce
89
and consumption.'' ^ Thus for Malthus, an increase in demand meant an
increase in the intensity of demand and would be evidenced by an

®®Thomas Robert Malthus, Principles of Political Economy; 2nd.
ed. 1836 (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, Inc., 1951), p7 557
®^Ibid. All future references are to this edition unless
otherwise indicated.
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Increased quantity demanded at the same price.

Ricardo would say that

demand had increased when the quantity demanded had increased.
would say, however, that demand had remained
demand

the same.

Malthus

An increase in

for Malthus would be represented by a complete shift in thede

mand curve.

And such an increase in demand would raise the price.

As to the determinants of the supply, Malthus held that supply
was determined by the entrepreneur's costs of production.

He in

cluded

all costs of production plus a normal return on investment.

Price,

then, was determined by the forces of demand and supply at

the point of equilibrium.
In summary form, then, according to Malthus, the determinants
of demand were:

(1 ) the number of demanders, and (2 ) the number of

wants they had plus purchasing power.
mined supply,

Costs of production deter

The forces of demand and supply determined both market

and natural price.

There must be a change in the relation of the

demand to the supply to bring about a change in price, either natural
or market price.
Malthus 1 theory avoided all the pitfalls that Ricardo en
countered in his labor cost theory.

For example, Malthus

wbb

able to

explain the value of all commodities with only one theory, whereas
Ricardo was forced to distinguish between two different types of com
modities.

More important perhaps was the fact that Malthus' theory

eliminated the problem of the varying organic composition of capital
with which Ricardo grappled without much success.

Furthermore, his

theory enabled Malthus to give a much more realistic explanation of

90lbld., see pp. 70-73.
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profits, and the distributive shares in general, than Ricardo was able
to accomplish with his embodied labor theory of value.
It may be stated once more that for Ricardo, the value of a
good was derived from the labor required to produce it.

'thus, if

more labor were used to produce a commodity its value would increase,
but riches would not.

An increase in value generally meant a de

crease in riches, i.e., if more and more labor were required to pro
duce a commodity its value increased, but the riches produced by the
labor remained the same.

In short, Ricardo concluded that in general

value and riches varied inversely.

Malthus contended that the wealth

of a nation consisted of the want-satisfying powers of its production;
that is, the use values of the commodities produced in the country.
Thus, Malthus differed from Ricardo's analysis of value and riches
for two reasons.

First, Malthus had a different concept of use

value; and second, he had a different theory of value determination
and value measurement.
With reference to use value, Malthus anticipated later theories
because he had a psychological concept of utility; that is, the utility
(use value) arose out of a relationship between the goods and human
wants.

And he had the concept of diminishing utility.

The use value

of a commodity per unit becomes less as its quantity increases.

There

fore, for Malthus, if wealth consisted of the want-satisfying powers
of the production of the nation, value could not increase in proportion
to the increase in physical output but in less than proportion.
carried the analysis further.

Malthus

He pointed out that if goods should be

produced in such quantities as to satisfy all wants for them, then,
they would cease to have use value.

Hence, Malthus disagreed with
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Ricardo that an increase in the physical quantity of goods was
synonomous with an increase in use value.
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Malthus also disagreed with Ricardo as to the measure of
value.

For Ricardo, value was measured by the quantity of embodied

labor in the product.

For Malthus, value was measured by the quanti

ty of labor the ccmmodity could command in exchange.

"The labour

which a commodity will command is not the cause of its value, but
it will appear in the next chapter to be the measure of it."^2 Hence,
the value of a commodity increased if it commanded a greater quantity
of labor in exchange irrespective of the quantity of labor required
to produce it.

How much labor a good would command in exchange de

pended upon the wages of labor.

Taking the standard-of-living theory

of wages, any given quantity of wage goods would always command in
exchange the same quantity of labor and hence would have the same
value.

That meant that an increased quantity would command in ex

change more labor and would have as a consequence more exchange and
use value.

Thus, Malthus concluded that in fact use and exchange

value generally varied directly rather than inversely as Ricardo
maintained.
Ricardo contended that wealth increased if the quantity of
goods were increased,

Malthus pointed out that it was Impossible

to determine when this occurred or to measure by how much wealth
had increased in terms of output itself because the goods were

^ Ibid. See pp. 299-308 for Malthus' distinction between
value and wealth.
^ Ibld., p. 83 note.

incommensurable in physical terms.

For Malthus, the goods in a

country at a given time vere of such an infinite variety that sum
ming them up was an Impossibility.

He believed the only way one

could measure the wealth of a nation was by reducing all of the com
modities to a common denominator.

Thus, Malthus used the labor com

mand theory of value as a common denominator as a means of wealth
measurement.

He maintained that there was a very close connection

between value and wealth because it was value alone that stimulated
the production of wealth.

The existence of wealth was absolutely

dependent upon the existence of value in the commodities that con
stituted wealth.

Thus, if one asserted that the wealth of a nation

had increased, one could only mean that the value of the commodities
that constituted the wealth had increased.
With this discussion of Malthus' theory of value as a basis,
attention may now be directed to his ideas directly related to the
doctrine of effective demand.

This primarily takes the form of

Malthus' criticism of the classical theory of capital formation.
All the classical economists prior to Malthus had made eco
nomic progress depend exclusively upon capital accumulation.

Smith had

written that the nature and cause of a nation's wealth depended upon
capital accumulation and the rate of the increase of wealth to depend
upon the rate of accumulation.

Althou^i he did not state it aB ex

plicitly, Ricardo reached the same conclusion.

This meant that the

level of output and the level of real income depended upon the pro
ductive capacity of the nation; that is upon conditions of supply.
Productive capacity, in turn,

bb

Smith noted, depended upon the num

ber in and the efficiency of the labor force; hence upon population

vhich itself depended upon the quantity of capital accumulated because
it was capital that set labor in motion, and natural resources.

Any

increase in the quantity or efficiency of any one of these factors
would result in an increase in output, an increase in total absolute
real income, and an increase in the nation's wealth.

But since natural

resources were given, economic progress depended fundamentally upon
capital accumulation.

An increase in employment could result only

from an increase in capital; hence, economic progress had depended
upon an increase in the quantity and/or the efficiency of the factors
of production and ultimately upon the capital accumulated; that is to
say, upon conditions of supply, not upon the extent of the market for
output and not upon the extent of demand.
For Ricardo, as for the other classical economists, there
could never be a deficiency of markets in which output could be sold
at profitable prices.
markets.

This, of course, followed from Say's Law of

Hence, markets expanded along with supply; in fact, the

expansion of markets was dependent upon an increase in the supply.
Demand was dependent upon and was determined by supply.
It was precisely this principle that Malthus attacked in Book
II of his Principles. He raised exactly the same question that had
concerned Smith.

What were the causes of the wealth of a nation?

But he arrived at a different answer from that of Smith and Ricardo.
He labeled the book "On the Progress of Wealth" and opened Chapter
One, "There is scarcely any inquiry more curious, or, from its im
portance, more worthy of attention, than that which traces the causes
which practically check the progress of wealth in different countries,
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and stop it, or make it proceed very slowly, while the power of pro
duction remains comparatively undiminished, or at least would furnish
go
the means of a great and abundant increase of produce and population."^
In this statement he made quite clear that he did not agree that the
wealth of a nation depended on supply, on production.

He considered,

one after the other, the various causes of the wealth of a nation which
his predecessors had listed.
Malthus raised the question:

Does on increase in population

in itself cause an increase in the wealth of a nation?

He said,

"Many writers have been of the opinion that an increase of population
is the sole stimulus necessary to the increase of wealth, because
population, being the great source of consumption, must in their
opinion necessarily keep up the demand for an increase of produce,
oli

which will naturally be followed by a continued increase of supply.' ^
To this position, Malthus countered:

That a continued increase of population is a powerful and
necessary element of increasing demand, will be most readily
allowed; but that the increase of population alone, or, more
properly speaking, the pressure of the population hard against
the limits of subsistence, does not furnish an effective
stimulus to the continued increase of wealth, is not only
evident in theory, but is confirmed by universal experi
ence. . .
But those who are acquainted with the nature of effec
tual demand, will be fully aware that, where the rigxt of
private property is established, and the wants of society
are supplied by industry and barter, the deBire of any
individual to possess the necessaries, conveniences and
luxuries of life, however intense, will avail nothing
towards their production, if there be no where a recipro
cal demand for something which he possesses. A man whose
only possession is his labour has, or has not, an effective
demand for produce according as his labour is, or is not.
in demand by those who have the disposal of produce. . .95

93ibid., p. 309.

^ Ibid., p. 311.

95ibid., pp. 311, 312.
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And then:
To suppose a great and continued Increase of population
Is to beg the question. We may as veil suppose at once an
Increase of vealth; because such an Increase of population
cannot take place without a proportionate or nearly pro
portionate Increase of wealth. The question really Is,
whether encouragements to population, or even the natural
tendency of population to Increase beyond the funds des
tined for Its maintenance, will, or will not, alone furnish
an adequate stimulus to the Increase of wealth. And this
question, Spain, Portugal, Poland, Hungary, Turkey, and
many other countries In Europe, together with nearly the
whole of Asia and Africa, and the greatest part of America,
distinctly answer In the negative.96
Malthus believed that the wealth of a nation depended upon effective
demand.
power.

One must not only have the will to consume but also the
Entrepreneurs were Induced to produce not because people

wanted goods but because they were able to pay for them.

People

were not b o m with purchasing power.
Having disposed of the concept that population was responsible
for the wealth of a nation, Malthus turned his attention to an Investi
gation of the relationship between saving and capital accumulation with
reference to Increasing the wealth of the nation.

Because he always

kept uppermost in his mind the issue of effective demand, Malthus
wondered how all goods could be sold If production exceeded consumption
and the difference was saved.

For Malthus, this situation would In

fact be a failure of demand, commodities would fall In value compared
with labor, profits would decline, production would be reduced, and
the result would be a general glut of the market.

Malthus explained;

It has been thought by some very able writers, that
although there may easily be a glut of particular

^ Ibld., pp. 313, 31^.
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commodities, there cannot possibly be a glut of commodities
in general; because, according to their view of the subject,
commodities being always exchanged for commodities one half
will furnish a market for the other half, and production
being thus the sole source of demand, an excess in the supply
of one article merely proves a deficiency in the supply of
some other, and a general excess is Impossible. 97
Malthus denied the validity of this view;
This doctrine, however, as generally applied, appears
to me to be utterly unfounded, and completely to contradict
the great principles which regulate supply and demand.
It is by no means true, as a matter of fact, that com
modities are always exchanged for commodities. An immense
mass of commodities is exchanged directly, either for pro
ductive labour, or personal services: and it is quite ob
vious, that this mass of commodities, compared with the
labour with which it is to be exchanged, may fall in value
from a glut Just as any one commodity falls in value from ^
an excess of supply, compared either with labour or money.
Malthus believed that Say, Ricardo, and Mill, in formulating
the principle that "supply created itB own demand," had made three
fundamental errors.

"In the first place," Malthus said, "they have

considered commodities as if they were so many mathematical figures,
or arithmetical characters, the relations of which were to be com
pared, instead of articles of consumption, which must of course be
referred to the numbers and wants of the

c onsum e r s .

"99 For Malthus,

this was neither logical nor realistic.

He contended that:

If commodities were only to be compared and exchanged
with each other, then indeed it would be true that, if
they were all increased in their proper proportions to any
extent, they would continue to bear among themselves the same
relative value; but, if we compare them, as we certainly
ougjvt to do, with the means of producing them, and with the
numbers and wants of the consumers, then a great increase
of produce with comparatively stationary numbers or with
wants diminished by parsimony, must necessarily occasion
a great fall of value estimated in labour, so that the same

97Ibid., p. 315.

" ibid., pp. 315, 316.

" ibid., pp. 316, 317.
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produce, though it might have coBt the same quantity of
labour as before, would no longer command the same quantity;
and both the power of accumulation and the motive to accumu
late would be strongly checked.10°
As a general principle, Ricardo held that it was Impossible for capital
to be redundant.

He allowed only one exception--and that a temporary

one--to this principle.

He admitted the possibility of general over

production in one paragraph in his chapter cm the effects of accumu
lation of capital on profits.

If every capitalist should decide that

there was no reason why he should live any better (consume more) than
the laborer, and if all capitalists should reduce their consumption to
the level of the laboring class, then, demand would bo so narrowly re
stricted that the output could not be purchased.
result.

A general glut would

"If men ceased to consume, they would cease to produce.

This

admission does not impugn the general principle."'1,0'1' Malthus quoted
thiB paragraph from Ricardo and replied rather sharply:
It appears to me moat completely to Impuf^i the general
principle. Even if we suppose with Mr. Ricardo, what is not
true, than an increase of population would certainly remedy
the evil; yet as from the nature of a population, an increase
of labourers cannot be brought into the market, in consequence
of a particular demand, till after the lapse of sixteen or
eighteen years, and the conversion of revenue into capital
by saving, may take place much more rapidly; a country is
always liable to an increase in the quantity of the funds
for the maintenance of labour faster than the increase of
population. But if, whenever this occurs, there may be an
universal glut of commodities, how can it be maintained, as
a general position, that capital is never redundant; and
that because commodities may retain the same relative values,

lOOlbid., p. 317.
101 Ibld., p. 319. David Ricardo, Die Principles of Political
Economy and Taxation, Everyman's Library ed. (New York: E. P. Dutton
and Co. Inc., 19^8), pp. 19^> 195*
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a glut can only be partial, not general?

102

lhe central core of his argument here seems to be that whether the
supply of a commodity creates the demand for another commodity de
pended on whether or not the consumer wanted the good.
not wanted

If it is

the mere production of it would not create a demand for

any other good.
Ihe principle that supply creates its own demand involved
the assumption that no one withholds goods or money from the market.
On this point, Malthus held that the process of saving reduced the
demand for consumer goods; it reduced the ability of a given quantity
of consumer goods to command other goods in exchange.

If the income

that has been saved were invested it was indeed a demand for capital
goods, but the increased quantity of capital goods further increased
the supply of consumer goods.

Ihus, increased productive capacity

as a result of capital accumulation may make it Impossible to use that
capacity in production because the demand for the goods produced by
that capacity may not be large enough to clear the markets.

He also

was of the opinion that Say's law was weak because people could hoard
money.

Money had functions other than its ability to serve as a medium

of exchange.

Since it could be hoarded, it was also a store of value.

If individuals sought to make provision for future contingencies,
there was no way to accomplish this more effectively than to hold
money.

In this, Malthus was stating what Keynes was to later call

the "precautionary motive for liquidity."
Die second error Malthus found in the theory of Say, Ricardo,

^O^Malthus, op. cit., pp. 319* 320 .
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and Mill was their assumption that human wants were insatiable.

Uiey

did not take "into consideration the influence of so general and important a principle in human nature, as indolence or love of ease."
Malthus contended that human wants were quite limited.
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J

Individuals

would generally prefer more leisure than more goods beyond a certain
level.

Thus, beyond that level of consumption there would be no

further demand for goods.

This, of course, was a crude statement of

the law of diminishing utility, and also it was an anticipation of the
movement of the propensity to consume with changing levels of income.
Demand, then, could be deficient for lack of desires.

Malthus said:

It has. . .been said, that there is never an indisposition
to consume, that the indisposition is to produce. Yet, what
is the disposition of those’master manufacturers, and mer
chants who produce very largely and consume sparingly? Is
their will to purchase commodities for their consumption
proportioned to their power? Does not the use which they
make of their capital clearly show that their will is to
produce, not to consume?!0*4The third error in the doctrine of capital accumulation, ac
cording to Malthus, was the assumption that all of that part of income
that was saved would be invested; that is, saving was automatically
followed by investment.

Malthus contended that this was a pointless

and hence an impossible procedure, for in order that it be true,
capitalists would have to be willing to invest at zero profits, or
that the demand for output caning fran the laborers who were employed
in the process of investment would have to be sufficient to induce the
investment to be made, and this would require that their wages be suf
ficient to enable them to buy the output that was produced by the

103Ibid., p. 320.

10^Ibld., p. 322.
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investment.

Ibis, of course, was impossible.

If they received the

total value of the output there would be no profits.

Malthus believed

this to be "practically the most important of the three"^0^ errors.
In hiswords the error "consists

in supposing that accumulation en

sures demand; or that the consumption of the labourers employed by
those whose object is to save, will create such an effectual demand
for commodities

bb

to encourage a continued increase of produce."

106

He explained:
If, in the process of saving, all that was lost by the
capitalist was gained by the labourer, the check to the pro
gress of wealth would be but temporary, as stated by Mr.
Ricardo; and the consequences need not be apprehended.
But if the conversion of revenue into capital pushed beyond
a certain point must, by diminishing the effectual demand
for produce, throw the labouring classes out of employment,
it is obvious that the adoption of parsimonious habits b e 
yond a certain point, may be accompanied by the most dis
tressing effects at first, and by a marked depression of
wealth and population afterwards.107
He went on to state:
What is wanted. . ., prior to the increase of capital
and population, is an effectual demand for commodities, that
is, a demand by those who are able and willing to pay an ade
quate price for them. . .1 °®
And he concluded;
Ihou$i it may be allowed therefore that the laws which
regulate the increase of capital are not quite so distinct
as those which regulate the increase of population, yet they
are certainly Just of the same kind; and it is equally vain,
with a view to the permanent increase of wealth, to continue
converting revenue into capital, when there is no adequate
demand for the products of such capital, as to continue en
couraging marriage and the birth of children without a demand
for labour and an increase of the funds for its maintenance.109

1°5Ibid.

lo6 Ibld.

l°9lbld., p. 330.

107 Ibid., p. 326 .

lo8 Ibid., p. 328 .
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In brief, then, Malthus refuted the classical theory of capital
accumulation by demonstrating the invalidity of Say's Law of Markets,
and by destroying the classical assumptions that human wants were in
satiable and that savings were automatically invested.
Malthus1 exact concept of the role of saving and hew it could'
be accomplished without causing a reduction in value and wealth has
been considered by many economists— particularly since Keynes--as
a major contribution to economic theory.

Malthus, as Keynes was to

write a century later, held that savings must derive from an increase
in production if the nation were to avoid a decline in value and
wealth.

It was perhaps at this point that Malthus reached the apex

of his general aggregative approach in his analysis, and it was his
concept of saving as related to capital formation that will forever
link his economics to the idea system of Keynes.

To be sure, there

are other important similarities between the two idea systems, but
the same concept of saving held by both economists is perhaps the
most dramatic because it is so contrary to general economic orthodoxy.
For Malthus, saving almost always occurred:
. . .in consequence of a previous increase in the value of
the national revenue, in which case a saving may be effected,
not only without any diminution of demand and consumption,
but under an actual increase of demand, consumption and value
during every part of the process. And it is in fact this
previous increase in the value of the national revenue which
both gives the great stimulus to accumulation,end makes that
accumulation effective in the continued production of wealth.
And,
The fortune of a country, though necessarily made more slow,

13-°Malthus, o£. cit., pp. 365 ) 366.
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is made in the same vay as the fortunes of individuals in
trade are generally made,--by savings, certainly; but by
savings which are furnished from increased gains, and by
no means involve a diminished expenditure on objects of
luxury and enjoyment.111
In these statements, one finds perfectly expressed Keynes' concept
that saving was a residual; that is, a function of the national in
come and that it is production that creates savings rather than vice
versa.
It is necessary now to consider what Malthus believed to be
the real causes of economic progress.

Of course, supply was a basic

prerequisite for wealth, and "the three great causes most favourable
to production are, accumulation of capital, fertility of soil, and
inventions to save labour."

1TP

When Malthus• view on accumulation of capital was examined
it was learned that effective demand was the pivot upon which capital
formation turned.
ment was identical.

With reference to fertility of the soil, his argu
The fertility of the soil created a potential for

an increase in wealth, but whether or not that potentiality would be
used depended upon the existence of adequate demand.

Malthus* argu

ment throughout was that mere productive capacity did not insure that
the capacity would be used.
effective demand.
demand.

Whether or not it would be depended upon

Productivity itself did not increase the effective

Here, of course, is Keynes' "under-employment" equilibrium

concept developed to a very high degree.

For Keynes, it was character

istic of capitalism that the economy functioned at a level below full
employment because of a deficiency of effective demand.

111Ibid., p. 367.

112Ibid., p. 360.

According to

Malthus

"Diou$i the land might he rich, it might not suit the pro

duction of the materials most wanted." ^ 3 jje examined the conditions
of poverty In Ireland and New Spain, despite the great fertility of
the soil in those countries, and concluded the section on fertility
of the soil with the following observations:
. . .the power of employing labour on the part of land
holders may often exist to a much greater extent than the
will;
. . .the necessity on the part of labourers of employing
only a small portion of time in producing food does not
always occasion the employment of a greater portion of
time in procuring conveniences and luxuries;
. . .the deficiency of wealth in a fertile country may
be more owing to want of demand than to want of capital;
. . .in general,. . .the fertility of the soil alone
is not an adequate stimulus to the permanent increase of
wealth.
In his discussion of inventions or technological progress,
Malthus held firmly to his idea of effective demand.

To be sure, he

had the greatest respect for inventions of new machinery, but he said:
In the actual state of things. . .there are great advantages
to be looked forward to, and little reason to apprehend any
permanent evil frcm the increase of machinery. Die presunption
always is, that it will lead to a great extension both of
wealth and value. But still we must allow that the pre
eminent advantages derived fran the substitution of machinery
for manual labour, depended upon the extension of the market
for the commodities produced, and the increased stimulus
given to consumption; and that, without this extension of
market and increase of consumption, they must be in' a con
siderable degree diminished. Like the fertility of land,
the invention of good machinery confers a prodigious power
of production. But neither of these great powers can be
called fully into action, if the situation and circumstances,
or the habits and tastes of the society prevent the opening
of a sufficient market, and an adequate increase of con
sumption. 115
Diere were two points, however, in his analysis of inventions with

105

reference to wealth creation, that deserve

mention.

Malthus1 ex

planation of technological improvements In relation to production
contained the concepts of elastic and Inelastic demand.

To the

knowledge of the writer, Malthus was the first to use the concept
of elasticity.

The effect a technological improvement would have

depended upon the elasticity of the demand for the product.

Malthus

pointed out that the effect on aggregate employment and wealth de
pended upon whether the demand for the commodity was elastic or in
elastic.

If the demand were elastic; that is, if the quantity

demanded increased more than proportionately to the decrease in
price, then it would be true that after the introduction of the im
provement the aggregate value of the output would be greater.

This,

for Malthus, would be an increase in wealth and the volume of em
ployment may be greater than it was before.
industry as an illustration.

He used the cotton

Technological improvements brought

about a great reduction in the price of cotton products, and since
the demand for tho products was elastic, the aggregate employment
and the aggregate value of the products increased.

This would not

occur, however, in the case of a product for which the demand was
inelastic.

The improvement would reduce its cost and its price, but

the price would fall more than proportionately to the increase in
the quantity demanded so that the aggregate value of the output would
be less than it was before.
For Malthus, these three forces of production "all act in the
same direction; and as they all tend to facilitate supply, without

ll6Ibid.

See pp. 352-355.
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references to demand, it is not probable that they should either
separately or conjointly afford an adequate stimulus to the contin
ued increase of wealth."117

Wag necessary that there be "a union

of the powers of production with the means of distribution in order
lift
to ensure a continued increase of w e a l t h . M a l t h u s said:
We have seen that the powers of production, to whatever
extent they may exist, are not alone sufficient to secure
the creation of a proportionate degree of wealth. Some
thing else seems to be necessary in order to call these
powers fully into action. This is an effectual and unchecked
demand for all that is produced. And what appears to con
tribute most to the attainment of this object, is, such a
distribution of produce, and such an adaptation of this pro
duce to the wants of those who are to consume it, as con
stantly to increase the exchangeable value of the whole
mass.
In individual cases, the power of producing particular
commodities is called into action, in proportion' to the in
tensity of effectual demand for them; and the greatest stim
ulus to their increase, independent of improved facilities
of production, is a hi#i market price, or an increase of
their exchangeable value, before a greater value of capital
has been employed upon them.
In the same manner, the greatest stimulus to the con
tinued production of commodities, taken altogether, is an
increase in the exchangeable value of,the whole mass, before
a greater value of capital has been employed upon them.11^
Always and everywhere, for Malthus, "General wealth, like particular
portions of it, will. . .follow effectual demand,"120
What precisely did Malthus mean by distribution?

He said,

"It is that which effects the best adaptation of the supplies of
produce, both in quantity and quality, to the actual tastes and wants
of the consumers, and creates new tastes and wants by means of greater
facilities of intercourse .',XCJ- Malthus concerned himself with three

^ Tlbid., p. 360 .

ll8 Ibid., p. 361 .

lg0 Ibid., p. 363 .

lglIbjd., p. 371.

ll9Ibid.
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distributive factors:

(1) Division of landed property, (2) Internal

and external commerce, and (3 ) The maintenance of unproductive consumers.
These vere the factors, vhich in connection vith the factors of pro
duction, determined the wealth of a nation.
Production and distribution are the two grand elements of
wealth, which, combined in their due proportions, are capa
ble of carrying the riches and population of the earth in
no great length of time to the utmost limits of its possible
resources; but which taken separately, or combined in undue
proportions, produce only, after the lapse of many thousand
years, the scanty riches and scanty population, which are at
present scattered over the face of the g l o b e . 122
Let us examine briefly Malthus' three distributive factors.
Malthus 1 belief that a hi#i concentration of ownership of land was
deterrent to the wealth of a nation was based directly on his con
cept of effective demand.

He noted that the consuming power of the

landed gentry in England was restricted somewhat because of the rela
tively hi$i degree of concentration of land ownership, and he care
fully pointed out that a wider distribution of landed property would
increase the consuming power of the class of landed proprietors.
According to Malthus, "A very large proprietor, surrounded by very
poor peasants, presents a distribution of property most unfavourable
to effectual demand.

Thirty or forty proprietors, with incomes

answering to between one thousand and five thousand a year, would
create a much more effectual demand for the necessaries, conveniences,
and luxuries of life, than a single proprietor possessing a hundred
12-3

thousand a year."

And he continued this underconsumption thesis by

saying, "Practically it has always been found that the excessive wealth

^

Ibid.

lg3xbid., pp. 373, 37^.
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of the few is in no respect equivalent, with regard to effectual demand,
to the more moderate wealth of the many."

12b

In the final analysis, however, economic progress waB a matter
of proportions.

"It will be found, I believe, true that all the great

results in political economy, respecting wealth, depend upon propor
tions .

He explained this in the following statements:
But thou$i it be true that the division of landed property,
and the diffusion of manufacturing and mercantile capital to a
certain extent, are of the utmost importance to the increase
of wealth; yet it is equally true that, beyond a certain ex
tent, they would impede the progress of wealth as much as they
had before accelerated it. Hiere is a certain elevation at
which the projectile will go the farthest: but if it be di
rected either hi$ier or lower, it will fall short. With a
comparatively small proportion of rich proprietors, who would
prefer menial servants, retainers and territorial influence
to an excessive quantity of manufactured and mercantile pro
ducts, the power among capitalists of supplying the results
of productive labour would be much greater than the will to
consume them, and the progress of wealth would be chocked by
the want of effectual demand. With an excessive proportion
of small proprietors both of land and of capital, all great
Improvements on the land, all great enterprlzes in commerce
and manufactures, and most of the wonders described by Adam
Smith, as resulting from the division of labour, would be
at an end; and the progress of wealth would be checked by a
failure in the powers of supply.
. . .there is no part of the whole subject, (political
economy) where the efficacy of proportions in the production
of wealth is so strikingly exemplified, as in the division
of landed and other property; and where it is so very obvious
that a division to a certain extent must be beneficial, and
beyond a certain extent prejudicial to the increase of wealth.
The second method of maintaining effective demand in relation

to supply and thereby causing value and wealth to increase was through
the extension of both internal and external commerce.

Malthus' argu

ment here was based upon his idea or assumption that human wants were

lgl|Ibid., p. 375.

^Ibld ., p. 376.

lg6Ibld., pp. 375, 376.

~

109

satiable.

For Malthus, commerce or trade always increased value be

cause that good received in exchange must have greater value than the
good surrendered in the exchange.

If this were not true; that is, if

both parties to an exchange did not gain, no trade would occur.

Here

again Malthus had a utility concept.
In the case of external commerce, he explained that if a nation
did not secure from abroad certain goods, they would not be produced
internally because the costs of production would be too great.

Thus,

less would be spent on consumption because of the satiation of human
wants if a nation's population was entirely dependent on home pro
duction.
With reference to his utility concept, Malthus said:
Every exchange which takes place in a country, effects
a distribution of its produce better adapted to the wants
of the society. It is with regard to both parties con
cerned, an exchange of what is wanted less for what is
wanted more, and must therefore raise the value of both
the products.
If indeed it did not tend to increase the value of the
national produce, it would not be carried on. It is out of
this increase that the merchants concerned are paid; and if
some London goods are not more valued in Glasgow than in
London, and sane Glasgow goods more valued in London than
in Glasgow, the merchants who exchange the articles in which
these towns trade, would neither be doing themselves any
good, nor any one else. . .The giving one article for another
has nothing to do with effectual demand, unless the canmodity
received so far exceeds In value the labour employed on the
commodity parted with, as to yield adequate profits to the
capitalists concerned, and to give them both the power and
the will to set fresh labour to work in the Bame trade. 27
Malthus saw a direct relationship between capital formation and a
widening of the market.

He stated in very emphatic terms:

^Ibld ., pp. 382, 383, 38^.
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No country with a very confined market, internal as veil as
external, has ever been able to accumulate a large capital,
because such a market prevents the formation of those wants
and tastes, and that desire to consume, which are absolutely
necessary to keep up the market prices of canmodities, and
prevent the fall of profits. The distribution of commodities
occasioned by internal trade is the first step towards any
considerable increase of wealth and capital.328
The same conditions in a capitalistic economy that caused internal
trade to be necessary in order that a proper balance could be achieved
and maintained between supply and effective demand, or production and
consumption, also dictated that a nation engaged in external trade.
Thus:
The motives which urge individuals to engage in foreign com
merce are precisely the Bame as those which load to the inter
change of goods between the more distant parts of the same
country, namely, a desire to increase or keep up the market
prices of the local products; and the increase of profits
thus made by the individual, or the prevention of that fall of
profits which would have taken place if the capital had been
employed at heme, must be considered as a comparative increase
in the value of the national produce. ^ 9
Malthus was particularly eager for the reader to understand that foreign
commerce increased exchange value.

He said:

It will readily be allowed that an increase in the quantity
of commodities is one of the most desirable effects of foreign
commerce; but I wish particularly to press on the attention of
the reader that in almost all cases, another most important
effect accompanies it, namely, an increase in the amount of
exchangeable value. And that this latter effect is so neces
sary, in order to create a continued stimulus to productive
industry, and keep up an abundant supply of commodities, that
in the few coses in which it does not take place, a stagnation
in the demand for labour is immediately perceptible, and the
progress of wealth is checked.130
Malthus * third and final method of increasing the value and
wealth of a nation, and at the same time maintaining a proper balance

128Ibid., p. 388.

129Ibid., pp. 388, 389.

13°Ibld., p. 393.
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between production and consumption, was the maintenance of consumers
who were unproductive.
nition of wealth.

It is Important here to state Malthus* defi

He says, "I should define wealth to be the material

objects, necessary, usoful, or agreeable to man, which are voluntarily
appropriated by individuals or n a t i o n s . p r o d u c t i o n , then, was the
creation of material goods for sale in the market.

Those persons who

produced personal services were unproductive.
Malthus believed that in a country which had great powers of
production, there was a need for the existence of a group of consumers
who did not participate in the productive process.

This need was based

primarily upon the fact that the productive groups in the econany did
not appreciably increase their consumption, particularly during those
periods when they were increasing their savings in order to form
capital.

But the matter of creating the proper proportion between

productive and unproductive laborers presented a problem that political
.economy could not solve.

Tho correct proportion depended upon many

circumstances, "particularly upon the fertility of the soil and the
progress of invention in machinery.

A fertile soil and an ingenious

people can not only support without injury a considerable proportion
of consumers not directly productive of material wealth, but may ab
solutely require such a body of demanders, in ordor to give effect to
the powers of production.

While, with a poor soil and a people of

little ingenuity, an attempt to support such a body would throw land
out of cultivation, and lead infallibly to impoverishment and ruin."^32
Another important factor which caused difficulty in arriving

131aia., p. 33.

13gIbid., p. 399.
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at a proper proportion between productive and unproductive workers,
"is the difference in the degree of consumption which may prevail
among the producers themselves."

133

Perhaps it will be said that there can be no occasion for
unproductive consumers, if a consumption sufficient to keep
up the value of the produce takes place among those who are
engaged in production.
With regard to the capitalists wh'o are so engaged, they
have certainly the power of consuming their profits, or the
revenue which they make by the employment of their capitals;
and if they were to consume it, with the exception of what
could be beneficially added to their capitals, so as to pro
vide in the best way both for an increased production and
increased consumption, there mi^it be little occasion for
unproductive consumers. But such consumption is not consis
tent with the actual habits of the generality of capitalists.
The great object of their lives is to save a fortune, both
because it is their duty to make a provision for their fami
lies, and because they cannot spend an income with so much
comfort to themselves, while they are obliged perhaps to
attend a counting-house for Beven or eigjit hours a day.*3*
Malthus contended that there were three factors necessary to make
demand effective, namely, desire, purchasing power, and an incli
nation to use it.

If any one of these were absent from a given

market at a given time, effective demand would not be present.
Malthus, then, the situation was clear.

For

Many capitalists and master

producers desired to save more than they desired to spend for con
sumption purposes.
effective demand.

They had the power but not the will to maintain
On the other hand, the moss of the population

desired to spend for consumption rather than save.

These people had

the will but not the power to maintain effective demand.

This situ

ation caused supply and effective demand to become improperly balanced.
The result was general overproduction and a decline in value and wealth.

133Ibld.

13^Ibld., pp. 399, *00.
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Thus, economic progress was hampered by the fact that the rich volun
tarily refused to consume and the poor Involuntarily refused to consume.
It was this situation that Malthus* unproductive consumers was supposed
to remedy.
There must therefore be a considerable class of persons
who have both the will and power to consume more material
wealth than they produce, or the mercantile classes could
not continue profitably to produce so much more than they
consume. In this class the landlords no doubt stand pre
eminent. . .^-35
To the class Malthus would add menial servants, and public aervant'3
such as statesmen, soldiers, Judges, lawyers, clergymen, teachers,
etc.
Malthus believed that workers should be well paid because this
was not only important to

the wealth of thenation, but also because

well-paid workmen created happiness for the
sounded a warning.

mass of society.

But he

"But as a great increase of consumption among the

working classes must greatly increase the cost of production, it must
136
lower profits, and diminish or destroy the motive to accumulate." -*
On the other hand, unproductive workers "are paid from revenue, not
from capital.
fits.

They have no tendency to increase cost and lower pro

On the contrary, while they leave the cost of production, as

far as regards the quantities of labour required to obtain any par
ticular commodities the same as before, they increase profits by oc
casioning a more brisk demand for material products, as compared with
the supply of them."^37

1 35jbid., p. hOO.

See also p. ^Ok.

137 Ibid., pp. U 08 , U09.

^ ^Ibjd., p. 1*05.
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Malthua had positive ideas concerning public policy.

With

reference to a national public debt, he believed that a slow retire
ment of it would be more beneficial to the country than paying it off
quickly.

He was a strong advocate of public works to rid the economy

of unemployment.

His tax program was closely related to his government

sponsored work for the unemployed.

Taxation should create a public

fund to finance the public works.

"In our endeavours," he said, "to

assist the working classes in a period like the present (depression),
it is desirable to employ them in unproductive labor, or at least in
labor, the results of which do not come for sale into the murket, such
as roads and public works."•L^® To the knowledge of the writer, Malthus
was the first to state this idea in economic literature.
Malthus was never very specific concerning his attitude toward
taxation.

However, he did indicate strongly that heavy taxation might

be necessary to maintain prosperity; that is to say, he was willing
that a goodly portion of the national income be Bpent by the govern
ment to support effective demand sufficiently higja to enhance economic
progress.
Let. us briefly summarize Malthus' major points.

The produc

tivity of labor on the land set an ultimate limit to the increase of
wealth.

Wealth and value depended upon the extent of effective demand

and not on the productivity of labor.

A nation of fertile soil mlf$it

still be a country of little wealth because of lack of markets for the
output that could be produced on that fertile land.

Population and

technological improvements were important to supply tut had little

^^Malthus, (1st. ed.), op. cit., p. 395.
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relationship to effective demand.

Proper distribution was necessary

to create and maintain economic progress.

Malthus argued that it was

true that the laborers worked in order to make a living, but it was
not true that capitalists invested for the sole purpose of making a
living.

The capitalists wanted more exchange values, not more use

values.

They wanted more capital and profits, not more goods for

consumption.
but to invest.

The disposition of the capitalist was not to consume,
Thus, whether they would invest or employ labor de

pended upon the prospects of making profits and forming capital.
Profits could be realized only if there were markets in which goods
could be sold at prices that exceeded the entrepreneur's costs of
production; that is, only if the extent of the effective demand for
output was such that it would maintain prices above costs.

If effec

tive demand were not sufficient to accomplish this, the productive
process ceased for lack of a motive.

No matter how great the need

for a good--poverty in the midst of plenty--the need itself did not
constitute effective demand, and hence would not result in increased
production.
It was very important to Malthus, in terms of effective demand,
to understand the distribution of goods and money.

Because producers

had the power to consume but not the will; laborers had the will but
not the power.
Malthus' general position was precisely the argument put forth
by Keynes.
demand.

They were in perfect agreement with reference to effective

They also agreed that the capitalistic economy operated in

such a manner that it tended to make effective demand insufficient.
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They both refuted Say's Lav of Markets and the classical theory of
capital formation.

These have alvays been the tvo major pillars of

the classical system.

Had Malthus 1 teachings been followed, the

classical tradition perhaps would hove ended more than a century be
fore Keynes attacked it.

Both Malthus and Keynes held that money was

more than a medium of exchange; it could be used as a store of value.
Althou^i Keynes developed more fully the concept of expectations as
one of the motivating forces for investment, this principle was defi
nitely a part of Malthus| idea system.

Malthus contended that the

savings of the capitalist would be invested if the rate of profit
were sufficiently attractive.
Malthus just as with Keynes.
manded theory of value.

Thus, over-saving was possible for
Finally, they both embraced the com

On this point, McCracken says, "Without

formal commitment or verbal definition Keynes consistently utilizes
the commanded value concept.

Even the purchasing power of gold is

determined, not by cost of production or labor embodied, but, to
some extent at least, by central banking policies.

The embodied

value theory of Ricardo cannot be fitted into his system of economic
thought."^39 of course, this was the Keynes of A Treatise on Money.
But Keynes indicated no change from this in his later writings, in
cluding the General Theory.
descendant of Malthus.

Thus it appears that Koynes vaB a true

"With respect to the importance of the 'short-

run forces'. . .we observe that Keynes Joins the swelling ranks of
those economists who insist that major attention, in the face of
business instability, should be given to those short-run forces to

13^cCracken, Value Theory and Business Cycles, p. 177.
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which Malthus alluded a century ago."

lUO

There is, of course, one major difference in the works of
Malthus and Keynes.

Keynes' criticism of the underconsumption theory,

of which Malthus was a representative, was that it assumed that con
sumption expenditures were an autonomous factor independent of the
level of income and determining the level of income.
of consumption ran precisely to the contrary.

Keynes' idea

For Keynes, con

sumption was a dependent variable, depending on the level of income
and not determining it; that is, the effect of income, not a cause.
The propensity to consume was a cause, for it determined how much
income would be spent on consumption out of a given level of income.
Thus, a variation- in the propensity to consume would cause a variation
in income.

Consumption would vary when and if incomo v a r i e d . T h i s

however, is perhaps not of great importance when the complete idea
systems of both men are considered.

For example, Keynes said,"Thus

our argument loads towards the conclusion that in contemporary

^llf, in fact, the level of employment and income depended
upon the current level of consumption, then any saving would be depress
ing on the economy, because whatever the current level of consumption
may be, the economy obviously is equipped to produce that output and
no additional capital goods are required. If out of current income
any portion should be saved--not spent for consumption--demand would
be inadequate to absorb current output of consumers' goods at current
prices, and losses would be incurred by producers. The underconsumption
theory, then, must necessarily find that any saving whatsoever is de
pressive on the economy unless Bcme external factor can be found to
offset the effect of saving. This was exactly the function performed
by Malthus' unproductive consumers. Later underconsumptionists who
have been unwilling to accept the concept of unproductive consumers
have been forced to look for some other way out of this dilemma. For
example, H. Gordon Hayes uses extraneous factors--opening of new ter
ritories and markets, new inventions, etc.
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conditions the growth of wealth, so far from being dependent on the
abstinence of the rich, as Is commonly supposed, is more likely to be
impeded by it.

One of the chief social justifications of great in-

equality of wealth is therefore, removed."A

This statement could

have very well appeared in Malthus' Principles.

It embodies the

major principles of the doctrine of effective demand to which both
men held so tenaciously.

If the two idea systems are considered from

this broad point of view, the fact that Malthus made consumption the
dynamic factor of effective demand, whereas Keynes made new invest
ment the dynamic factor of effective demand is of little Importance.
In the final analysis, what is significant is that they both assumed
a capitalistic economy in their respective analyses.
the fundamental "break" from Ricardian economics.
self-subsistence economy.

This was actually

Ricardo assumed a

Anyone who assumes the basic nature of the

capitalistic process, must, if he is logical in his argument, arrive
at much the same theoretical conclusions as did Malthus and Keynes.
Perhaps it is this assumption that has set the "heretics" apart from
the orthodox tradition for more than two hundred years,

lhis is the

link which has served to connect the "effective demand" theorists
from Boisguilbert to Keynes.

In short, the doctrine of effective

demand based upon a true realization of the capitalistic process has
been and continues to be the common denominator for these theorists.
In concluding the discussion of Malthus, it is proper to
note the tribute paid to him by Keynes.

He pointed out in the General

Theory that Malthus used a deficiency of effective demand "as a

•^General Theory, p. 373.
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scientific explanation of unemployment. "Il+3

jie qUOtes passages

from two letters which Malthus wrote to Ricardo to support his state
ment.

Perhaps there is no better way to show the relationship b e 

tween Malthus and Keynes than to quote these passages;
We see in almost every part of the world vast powers of
production which are not put into action, and I explain this
phenomenon by saying that from the want of a proper dis
tribution of the actual produce adequate motives are not
furnished to continue production. . .1 distinctly maintain
that an attempt to accumulate very rapidly, which necessarily
implies a considerable diminution of unproductive consumption,
by greatly impairing the usual motives to production must
prematurely check the progress of wealth. . .But if it be
truo that an attempt to accumulate very rapidly will occasion
such a division between labour and profits as almost to de
stroy both the motive and the power of future accumulation
and consequently the power of maintaining and employing an
increasing population, must it not be acknowledged that such
on attempt to accumulate, or that saving too much, may be
really prejudicial to a country?1^
The question is whether this stagnation of capital, and
subsequent stagnation in the demand for labour arising from
increased production without an adequate proportion of un
productive consumption on the part of the landlords and
capitalists, could take place without prejudice to the country,
without occasioning a less degree both of happiness and wealth
than would have occurred if the unproductive consumption of
the landlords and capitalists had been so proportioned to the
natural surplus of the society as to have continued uninter
rupted the motives to production, and prevented first an un
natural demand for labour and then a necessary and sudden
diminution of such demand. But if this be so, how can it be
said with truth that parsimony, though it may be prejudicial
to the producers, cannot be prejudicial to the statej or
that an increase of unproductive consumption among landlords
and capitalists may not sometimes be the proper remedy for
a stete of things in which the motives to production fail.A ?

l43 Ibld., p. 362 .
• ^ Ibid., pp. 362 , 363 . Keynes cites;
to Ricardo, dated July 7, 1821."
^ Ibld., p. 363 . Keynes cites;
Ricardo, dated July lo, 1821."

"A letter fran Malthus

"A letter from Malthus to
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Of course

Keynes said nothing about unproductive consumers in his

theory, but one must assume that he supported the doctrine in prin
ciple.

Furthermore, could it be that Keynes’ "make-work" programs

was a twentieth century expression of Malthus' unproductive con
sumers?
More to the point perhaps was the fact that Keynes quoted
the following passages from Malthus' Principles:
Adam Smith has stated that capitals are increased by par
simony, that every frugul man is a public benefactor, and
that the increase of woalth depends upon the balance of pro
duce above consumption. That these propositions are true
to a great extent is perfectly unquestionable. . .But it is
quite obvious that they are not true to an indefinite extent,
and that the principles of saving, pushed to excess, would
destroy the motive to production. .
Of all the opinions advanced by able and ingenious men,
which I have ever met with, the opinion of M. Say, which
states that, un produit consomme ou detruit est un debouche
ferme' (I. i. ch. 15), appears to me to be the moot directly
opposed to Just theory, and the most uniformly contradicted
by experience. Yet it directly follows from the new doc
trine, that commodities are to be considered only in their
relation to each other,--not to the consumers. What, I would
ask, would become of the demand for commodities, if all con
sumption except bread and water were suspended for the next
half-year? What an accumulation of commodities: Quels
debouches! What a prodigious market would this event occasion.'^T
One could not find better evidence to demonstrate the close relation
ship between the theories of Malthus and Keynes.

Perhaps H. Gordon

Hayes, a current underconsumptionist, was guilty of a sli®it exag
geration when he wrote, "Keynes was the first academic economist of

l^jbid., p. 363 . Keynes cites; "Preface to Malthus's
Principles of Political Economy, pp. 8 , 9."
^ ^ Ibid., pp. 363 , 36U. Keynes cites:
of Political Economy, p. 3&3> footnote."

"Malthus*s Principles
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high professional repute since Malthus to attack the doctrine that the
economic forces of a private-property economy tend to bring about the
employment of all who wish to work at the prevailing wage rates."

1UA

Nevertheless, the statement is to the point discussed in this chapter
and shows again the relationship between Malthus and Keynes.

And it

seems perfectly safe to state that Keynes believed it was he who rescued
Malthus1 doctrine of effective demand from the economic "underworld,"^49
Perhaps he did, but there were others who concerned themselves with
effective demand at the time of or after Malthus and before Keynes.
The writers remaining to bo examined with reference to effec
tive demand are Sismondi, Chalmers, Moffat, Hobson, Aftalion, and
Foster and Cntchings.

It will not be necessary to examine these

authors as extensively a3 Malthus was treated.

It was Malthus, fol

lowing the rather faint trail left by Boisguilbert, Mandeville, Stcuart,
and Lauderdale, who elevated the doctrine of effective demand to a
high pinnacle.

The writers to be discussed kept it there until a

"Keynes" appeared to send it soaring even higher.

To be sure, these

econanist3 based their idea systems upon the concept of effective
demand, but the idea did not dominate their thought as it did Malthus'
theory.

In fact, it is quite easy to demonstrate the attitude of

these writers toward effective demand and its importance to economic
activity by carefully selecting and quoting a few passages from each.

•^H. Gordon Hayes, Spending, Saving, and Employment (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 19^5), P. 133.
lJ|9one should read the essay on Malthus by Keynes in his Essays
in Biography (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1933)^ PP. 95-150.
On page l^k Keynes clearly shows that he thought Chapter I in Book II
of Malthus' Principles was a neglected basis of what migit have been
a better development of economic thought than what actually took place.
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This, the writer believes, is sufficient to show that there was a
continuous development in the effective demand principle from Malthus
to Keynes.

This, along with the fact that each of these authors has

been quite adequately examined by other writers, justifies the brief
treatment of them here.

Jean Charles Sismondl
Sismondi (1773-I8k2) was a contemporary of Malthus.

In fact,

two of his more Important works appeared before 1820, which was the
publication date of the first edition of Malthus' Principles.

One of

Sismondi's first books, De la rlchesse commorclale, was published in
1803.

His two-volume work, Nouvoauz prInclpos d'^conanle politique,

ou de la rlchesse dans seB rapports avec la population, first appeared
in 1819, and it came forth in a second edition in 1827.

One of hiB

/
*
latest works, Etudes sur 1 'Economic politique, was published in 1838.
According to Schumpeter, "Sismondi's reputation as an economist
rests on his Nouveaux Principes d'oconcmlo politique. , .which appeared
in 1819.

But we know that the essentials of this work had actually

been written by 1815 for an article that Sismondi contributed to
Brewster's Edinburgh Encyclopaedia, thou#i this article was not
published until after the Nouveaux Principes. By then--at the latest-he was in possession of all the elements of doctrine that are associated
with his name.

/
✓
His later works, such as his Etudes sur l'Economie

politique, emphasized and developed the main points--and his claims-150
but do not add anything essentially new." ^

A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (New York:
Oxford University Press, 195*0, P. ^93. See pages £ 9 3 ^ 9 6 and 7*+0-7^2

123

Although Sismondi has been justly criticized by many able
writers for his theory of economic crises, his reputation in the
history of economic thou$it rests upon his concept of economic in
stability.

And this idea was based upon his thinking along the lines

of overproduction as a result of underconsumption or Inadequate demand.
Sismondi first developed a theory of partial overproduction and then
151
formulated his thesis of a general economic glut. ' Sismondi's theory
of markets was his theory of crises,

lhe cause of the crisis in eco

nomic activity was the direct reault of inadequate consumption, which
was the result of the poverty of the masses.

The mass market simply

could not absorb the output of modern industry when it operated at
full capacity.
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This was the central theme of Sismondi's theory,

and it characterizes all underconsumption theory.
Sismondi looked with nostalgic eyes back to the days when
society was organized along rather primitive lines with each family
regulating its own economic needs.

In such a society, progress wus

retarded but "wherever are found peasant proprietors are also found
that ease, that security, that independence, that confidence in the
future, which assure at the same time happiness and virtue.

The

for Schumpeter'8 treatment of Sismondi.
A clear presentation and evaluation of Sismondi's idea system
is to be found in McCracken, Value Theory and Business Cycles, pp. 1^-36.
See also Tugan-Baranowsky's criticism of Sismondi in Alvin E.
Hansen, Business Cycles and National Income (New York: W. W. Norton,
1951), P. 2&0.
•'■ ^ e e McCracken, Value Theory and Business Cycles, pp. 16-28.
^-^SiBmondi, Nouveaux Principes d 'economie politique, I (Paris;
Delaunay, 2nd ed., 1827). See Hansen, op. cit., p. 280 .
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peasant who, with his children, does all the work on his little in
heritance. who neither pays rent to anyone above him, nor wages to
anyone below him, who regulates his production by his consumption. . .
care3 little about knowing the price of the market; for he has little
to sell and little to buy and is never ruined by the revolutions of
commerce.

. ."
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But the Industrial Revolution had broufdit to an

end this happy and stable society,

lhe result of machine-capitalism

was that:

lhe proletarii are cut off from all the benefits of civili
zation; their food, their dwellings, their clothes are in
salubrious; no relaxation, no pleasures except occasional
excesses, interrupt their monotonous labours; the introduc
tion of the wonders of mechanics into the arts, far from
abridging their hours of labour, has prolonged them; no time
is left for their own instruction or for the education of
their children; no enjoyment is secured to them in those
family ties which reflect their suffering; it is almost
wise in them to degrade and brutalize themselves to escape
from the feeling of their misery; and that social order
which threatens them with a worse condition for the future,
is regarded by them as an enemy to combat and destroy.
This is not all; whilst their own distress is increasing,
they see society overcome, as it were, by the weight of
its material opulence; they are in want of everything, and
on all sides their eyes are struck with what is everywhere

superabounding.15^
The new industrial economy had greatly enhanced output, but
the great mass of the workers did not share in this increase in pro
ductivity.

The capitalist received income in surplus amounts; the

laborer received just enoufh for subsistence.

The result of this

^3sismondi, Etudes sur les Sciences Sociales, II, pp. l69-l'70,
or Political Economy and the Fhilosophy of Government, arranged and
translated by M. Mifgrjet. See McCracken, Value Theory and Buslness
Cycles, p. 15.

let?),

■^Sismondi, Political Economy and Philosophy,
p. 199.

(Faris;

Delaunay,
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inequality in income distribution was that the mass of the population
could not bring into the market effective demand above the absolute
necessities of life.

There was room in Sismondi's system for reason

able profits, but not for exaggerated profits.

In Bhort, a proper

balance between profits and wages in order to maintain effective de
mand for the output of Industry was Sismondi's solution to the problem.
In his attuck on Say's Law that supply created its own demand,
Sismondi held that demand was independent of production and was a
function of the needs of the buyers, and the moans by which they had
to pay for goods,

he virtually dismissed the concept of human needs

as a determinant of demand und concentrated his argument on the lack
of purchasing power on the part of the workers.
of overproduction and underconsumption.

This was the cause

Sismondi believed that most

of the men engaged in production were not able to exchange the pro
ducts which their labor created for those goods which they desired.
The workers received only a small portion of the selling price in
exchange for their labor--a portion all too small to permit them to
absorb the entire supply of merchandise.

The manufacturers compete

with each other in placing upon the market a constantly increasing
quantity of products.

But the ability of the workers--who constitute

the great bulk of the population--to buy is diminished.

Demand con

tracts to the degree that supply expands.
This raised an issue with which economists have wrestled
throughout the history of modern capitalism.
and still is;

This issue has been

Does it really make any difference how purchasing

power is apportioned so long as enough is distributed to take off
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the market all the goods produced?

lhe manner in which an economist

answers this question Identifies him either on the side of Say's Law
and Ricardian economics or on the side of commanded value and "hereti

cal" economics.

Needless

to say, the

writers beingexamined in this

chapter placed themselves

on the side

of the latter.Of course, this

vould also be true of the

Austrians. Perhaps it has

been this atti- •

tude, as much or more than anything else, that links together the
"heretics" from Boisguilbert to Keynes.
Sismondi's position with reference to this issue was very
clear.

In his analysis, overproduction could not be avoided,
because the objects of prime necessity, the chief objects
of manufacture, are consumed to a very limited degree by
the wealthy, lhe rich desire those expensive and rare
things which single them out from among the crowd, i.e.,
objects of conspicuous consumption and conspicuous waste.
They encourage the industries de luxe, the industries which
do not have a wide market and appeal to a restricted clien
tele. As soon as any article is produced in abundance and
is found to be consumed by the vulgar, it is no longer
dignified for them. Therefore the rich will not permit
an excess of supply from the industries de luxe, industries
which they call exceptional. Hence, labor is always con
centrated in those factories which create necessities for
the masses, and overproduction results.
By an inherent contradiction in m o d e m economic con
ditions, while their great wealth push the wealthy to build
vast factories, their riches also exclude the products of
these very great factories from the consumption of the rich.
Those who receive the selling price of the merchandise,
those who benefit from fabrication, are not the same as
those who consume them. The production thus goes on ac
cumulating while consumption is restrained. Overproduction
is a fatal effect of contemporaneous economic organisation. 25

Thus for Sismondi, economic crises were inevitable.

They were a direct

result of the Industrial Revolution and the capitalistic system.

^■25siBmondi, Nouveaux Principes d'economic politique, I, p. 3^1.
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T. Chalmera, R. 5. Moffat, J. A. Hobson
lhe three men primarily responsible for keeping alive the
doctrine of effective demand for the remainder of the nineteenth
century were Thomas Chalmers, whose Folltical Economy was published
in 1832; R. S. Moffat, who published lhe Economy of Consumption in
1878; and J. A. Hobson, whose Physiology of Industry appeared in
1689 .

Of these three, Keynes noticed only Hobson, but they fash

ioned important links in the argument of the importance of effective
demand.
Chalmers distinguished between capitalistic accumulation and
consumers' accumulation.

"It is true of every single capitalist,"

he said, "that he i3 all the richer by saving than by spending.

But

it is not true that capitalists collectively will become richer by
saving than by spending."

156

Ibis was true, Chalmers believed, be

cause the rate of profits was reduced by over-investment.

But con

sumers' accumulation by not spending accentuated the losses of capi
talists.

If consumers saved and did not buy, capitalists could not

sell and make profits.

Thus, savings resulted in a loss of effective

demand, which caused production to fail.

Chalmers basic thought was

that, "Spending and trading mu6t be in due relation to each other,
or there will be general glut and depression.

Ihose who say that
157

this cannot happen are called the 'new economists." J

Chalmers was

referring here, of course, to the new Ricardian school of economics.

•^Sihcmas Chalmers, Political Economy (London:
Pickering, 1832), p. b2.

^ Ibid.

William

Moffat's argument was that consumption had not been given its
due place, and that the distribution and habits of consumption were
as important as the volume of production was to Smith.

It was a

fallacy to generalize saving as a way of increasing wealth; one per
son may profitably save, but not all.

"A general increase of parsimony

would evidently diminish the demand for commodities, lessen the need
for production, and reduce the amount of capital which could be held
in organic relation to industry.

lhe hoarding of the community is

limited; the hoarding of the individual is practically not limited."^®
For Moffat, capital accumulation was not made by saving out of con
sumption.

Industry itself formed capital on the basis of consumer

buying; that is, it was consumer buying and not consumer saving that
stimulated industry to accumulate capital.

"Effective demand is the

demand rendorod effective by industry itself.
no reward; the critical word is investment.

Abstinence itself gives
In order that the profit

motive may not gorge markets by over-investment, the buying power of
labour must be maintained, in relation to its producing power."^59
According to Hansen, "After reading Lauderdale and Malthus,
one gains relatively little frcm Hobson's work.

Hobson does indeed

make clearer than his predecessors the role of growth--changes in
technique and increase in population--in opening investment outlets.
But with respect to consumption, his treatment is less penetrating
than that of Malthus. " ^ 0

^•58pe s t Moffat, lhe Economy of Consumption (London:
Green and Co., 1878), p. 36.
159xbid.

^^Jansen, og. cit., p. 255.

Longnans
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Hobson repeated the proposition of Chalmers and Moffat that
separate persons mi^vt save too much, while a community, or a Crusoe,
would regulate saving.

Every Increase in saving and capital, in

order to be effective, required a corresponding increase in immediately
future consumption.

An increase in production did not force an in

crease in consumption bocause people wished to save as well as to con
sume.

"lhe desire to save may lead them to increase their production

independently beyond the desire for present or immediately future
c o n s u m p t i o n . I h e r e was enou#i income, according to Hobson, to
buy all the product, and replace the capital, if all the final pro
duct were consumed soon after production.

But "depression and ex-

cesaive thrift describe phases of the same phenomenon."

' Insufficient

demand falls especially, "by backward incidence, on the requisite of
production which is, in any country, the limiting requisite, in least
elastic supply.

In Britain that requisite is labour, since capital

can adjust itself, and the use of land depends on Import.

So that the

East End problem, with its concomitants of vice and misery, is traced
to its economic cause, and this economic cause is the most respectable
and hi^ily extolled virtue of thrift. " ^ 3
According to Hobson,
It is sometimes assumed that any proportion of the income
of a community can advantageously be saved. But this is not
the case. An industrial community cannot usefully save more
than a certain proportion of its income: that proportion is

■^J. A. Hobson and A. F. Mummery, Physiology of Industry
(London: Longmans Green and Co., 1889 ), p. 10. For an explanation
of why this book was written see General Theory, pp. 3^5> 3^6.
162Ibid., p. 13 .

l63 Ibid., p. 17.
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never accurately known, and it is always shifting with changes
In the arts of production and consumption. . .It Is only by
taking the partial standpoint of an individual or a group of
Individuals, or some other part of the industrial whole, that
it seems plausible to hold that there is no limit to effi
cacious saving. 161*
Then he concluded,
There exists at the present moment, a right proportion between
saving and spending. . .Industrial progress, or the economi
cal working of the industrial system, consists largely in the
ascertainment of this proportion and the adjustment of industry
to it. . .The right proportion of saving to spending at any
given time depends upon the present condition of the arts of
production and consumption, and the probabilities of such
changes in modes of work or living as shall provide social
utility for new forms of capital within the near or calculable
future. The proportion of its income which could be saved
for conversion into new forms of capital must depend upon
the state of the industrial arts upon the one hand, and the
standards of consumption upon the other. . .the increased
demand for final commodities which a rising consumption of
a growing population will create in the calculable future.
Beyond these growth requirements, saving would defeat its
purpose, creating more forms of capital than were wanted
and than would actually be used.l°5
Hobson foresaw the propensity to consume concept when he wrote,
"A greater equalization of incomes, either by the successful pressure
of the workers for a larger share of wealth or by the taxation of
'surplus1 for purposes of public expenditure” would increase demand
and employment, and so "validate at least as large an absolute quan
tity of saving as before, thoufpi a smaller proportion of saving to

166

spending.”

Hobson had reference hero to what would now be called

an upward shift in the propensity to consume or consumption function.
As was noted earlier, Keynes paid a great tribute to KobBon.

•^J . A. Hobson, The Industrial System (London:
Green and Co., Rev. ed., 1910) p. 33.

l65lbid.

166Ibid., p. 39.

Longmans,
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It bears repeating here.

"Theories of under-consumption hibernated

until the appearance in I889 of The Physiology of Industry, the first
and m03t significant

of many volumes in which

for nearlyfifty years

Mr. Hobson has flung

himself with unflagging,

but almostunavailing,

ardour and courage against the ranks of orthodoxy.

Thoutfi it is so

completely forgotten to-day, the publication of this book marks, in
a sense, an epoch in economic thought,"
Keynes, in six pages devoted to Hobson, quotes several pas
sages from The Physiology of Industry, and explains what he believes
to have been Hobson's major analytical error.

Keynes says that, "In

this early work Mr. Hobson with his collaborator expressed himself
.with more direct reference to the classical economics (in which he
had been brought up)

than in his later writings; and forthis reason,

as well as because it is the

first expression

of his theory, I will

quote from it to show how significant and well-founded were the
authors' criticisms and intuitions.

They point out in their preface

as follows the nature of the conclusions which they attack:"
Saving enriches and spending impoverishes the community
along with the individual, and it may be generally defined
as an assertion that the effective love of money is the root
of all economic good. Not merely does it enrich the thrifty
individual himself, but it raises wages, gives work to the
unemployed, and scatters blessings on every side. Fran the
daily papers to the latest economic treatise, from the pulpit
to the House of Commons, this conclusion is reiterated and
re-stated till it appears positively impious to question it.
Yet the educated world, supported by the majority of economic
thinkers, up to the publication of Ricardo's work strenuously
denied this doctrine, and its ultimate acceptance was exclus
ively due to their inability to meet the now exploded wages fund doctrine. That the conclusion should have survived the

^^general Theory, PP. 3<&, 365.

168Ibid., p. 366.
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argument on which it logically stood, can be explained on
no other hypothesis than the commanding authority of the great
men who asserted it. Economic critics have ventured to attack
the theory in detail, but they have shrunk appalled from touch
ing its main conclusions. Our purpose is to Bhow that these
conclusions are not tenable, that an undue exercise of the
habit of saving is possible, and that such undue exercise im
poverishes the Community, throws labourers out of work, drives
down wages, and spreads that gloom and prostration throu^i the
commercial world which is known as Depression in Trade. . .
Hie object of production is to provide "utilities and con
veniences" for consumers, and the process is a continuous one
from the first handling of the raw material to the moment .
when it is finally consumed as a utility or a convenience.
Hie only use of Capital being to aid the production of these
utilities and conveniences, the total used will necessarily
vary with the total of utilities and conveniences daily or
weekly consumed. Now saving, while it increases the existing
aggregate of Capital, simultaneously reduces the quantity of
utilities and conveniences consumed; any undue exercise of
this habit must, therefore, cause an accumulation of Capital
in excess of that which is required for use, and this, excess
will exist in the form of general over-production.170
Keyne3 • emphasis on investment and his "expectations" theory
of value caused him to make the following remarks concerning the
above quoted passages from Hobson.

"In the last sentence of this

passage," Keynes said, "there appears the root of Hobson's mistake,
namely, his supposing that it is a case of excessive saving causing
the actual accumulation of capital in excess of what is required,
which is, in fact, a secondary evil which only occurs through mis
takes of foreBif^vt; whereas the primary evil is a propensity to save

^This concopt that the productive process is a continuous
one is of great importance for a true understanding of the capital
istic system. It has always been clearly understood by those who
approach economic analysis from the demand side that there is no
"beginning" or "ending" of the productive process. It is a "belt
like" movement with no "starting" or "stopping" points. Consumption
can very well be the "beginning" instead of the "end".
17°0ener&l Hieory, pp. 3&>, 3^7. Keynes cites*
Mummery, Physiology of Industry, pp. iii-v."

"Hobson and
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in conditions of full employment more than the equivalent of the
capital which is required, thus preventing full employment except
when there is a mistake of foresight,

A page or two later, however,

he puts one half of the matter, as it seems to me, with absolute
precision, though still overlooking the possible role of changes in
the rate of interest and in the state of business confidence, factors
which he presumably takes as given:
We are thus brought to the conclusion that the basis on
which all economic teaching since Adam Smith has stood, viz.
that the quantity annually produced is determined by the
aggregates of Natural Agents, Capital, and Labour available,
is erroneous, and that, on the contrary, the quantity pro
duced, while it can never exceed the limits imposed by these
aggregates, may be, and actually is, reduced far below this
maximum by the check that undue saving and the consequent
accumulation of over-supply exerts on production; i.e. that
in the normal state of modern industrial Communities, con
sumption limits production and not production consumption.
Although Keynes did not mention many of the names who have contributed
heavily to the development of the doctrine of effective demand, his
recognition that Hobson was a Keynesian antecedent perhaps demonstrates
that he--much more so than seme of his ardent followers--knew his "place"
in the history of economic thoupjit.

Albert Aftalion
Using the subjective value theory and the principle of dimin
ishing utility developed by the Austrians, Aftalion formulated an
economic analysis that greatly enhanced the "demand" approach to

1^ General Theory, pp. 367, 368.
• ^ Ibid., p. 368 . Keynes cites "Hobson and Mummery, oj>. cit.,

p. ix."
^■^More evidence of this is shown in Chapter Five.
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economics.

The purpose of this chapter does not dictate, however,

that Aftalion be examined in any great detail,

lhe treatment of this

economist will be confined here to a few statements concerning his
attitude toward consumer wants and diminishing marginal utilities.
Aftalion used the principle of diminishing utility to refute Say's
Law of Markets.
Aftalion based his analysis upon the dynamics of human wants.
He believed it va3 this element in the economy which determined and
caused fluctuations in the rate of investment.

Capitalists based

their investment decisions upon their expectations of final consumer
demand for their products.

In short, the value of the final consumer

goods determined the value of the capital good9 used to produce them.
This, of course, was the derived demand concept.

Aftalion did not

believe that technological progress caused capital to be formed unless
the new techniques promised to more fully satisfy consumption wants.
'Jhus, consumption was the end of all production.

Fundamental to

Aftalion's analysis, then, was the principle that the demand for
capital goods could be explained only in terms of those forces which
controlled human wants and the demand which resulted from these wants.
For Aftalion, it was an excess of capital goods and not a
scarcity of them that brougit a period of prosperity to a close.
During a bocm period capital accumulates quickly.

Eventually the

output of capital goods exceeds consumer demand as a result of
"glutting of wants."

When this occurred the inducement to create

still more capital goods came to an end.
Hansen explains that Aftalion's principle of diminishing
marginal utilities is the result of two factors:

(1) as the stock
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of capital goods on hand becomes larger and larger, the possibility
of substituting capital for the other productive factors diminishes,
and (2) the value of consumers' goods--relative to the cost of capital—
diminishes as they become more abundant,
is a case In point.
houses increases.

lhe construction of houses

During a period of prosperity, net investment in
As a result, the rate of return (marginal utility)

on each new house constructed declines,

lhe Immediate result of this

is a reduction of rents and a fall in the value of houses relative to
the cost of construction.

The end result is a decline In the demand

for new houses, and the construction of new houses falls sharply.
As consumers' goods become more abundant, their marginal
utilities decline.
in their prices.

Producers of consumers' goods experience a fall
As consumers' goods become less valuable, the value

of the capital goods used to produce them declines relative to the
cost of capital goods,

lhe solution of this problem is an ever-

increasing demand for consumers' goodB.

If this can be achieved,

the marginal utilities of consumers' goods will not decline; further
more, the increasing consumer demand will create new capital investment opportunities.

17k

Although caused by somewhat different forces,

this position of Aftalion is almost identical with Keynes' concept
that the marginal efficiency of capital showed great instability in
the long-run.

Keynes emphasized the role of interest in determining

the rate of investment more than did Aftalion.

And for Keynes, it

was a low propensity to consume rather than diminishing marginal

^Hansen,

oip. cjt., p. 3^9.
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utilities that was a source of difficulty.
This concept of a diminishing intensity of desire to satisfy
human wants was the very heart of Aftalionfs analysis.

Furthermore,

he did not believe this to be in conflict with the fact that human
wants are insatiable.

The whole point is that persons experience

a decline in their intensity of desiring goods as they increase their
ability to satisfy their lesser needs.

Because of this factor, "the

decreasing utility of goods is in perfect harmony with the insatiability
of human wants."

175

According to Aftalion, then, if human wants or de

sires are viewed properly, the fact that wants are insatiable does not
prevent a general overproduction of economic goods and glutted mar
kets.1 ^
Bi commenting upon Aftalion's use of the principle of dimin
ishing utility, McCracken explains that, "Aftalion definitely rejects
the Ricardian theory of embodied value and joins the Malthusian group
and Austrian School of 'commanded value.'"

177

In concluding this brief treatment of Aftalion, let us see
how he used the principle of diminishing utility to refute Say's Law
of Markets.

According to McCracken:

Aftalion next directs his attention to the classic doctrine
that goods exchange against goods, creating a law of two

Aftalion, "La Realite des surproductions gen^rales," in
Revue d'economie politique, XXIII (1909), pp. 86 , 8 7 . ThiB was one
of a series of articles. The major elements of his analysis were
presented in the March, 1909, issue, pp. 201-229. Aftalion expanded
his main thesis in his two volume work, Lea Crises periodiques de
surproduction (Paris, Marcel Rivere et Cie, I913 J.
176 Ibid., p. 87.

■^^McCracken, Value Theory and Business Cycles, p. 132
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supplies, making impossible a general overproduction. The
most that could happen would be maladjusted production or
partial overproduction. In reply, Aftalion says it is of
little import to say that one's power to acquire increases
proportionately with his production. "Intensity of desire
for goods is not identified with the power of acquisition.
It may be that my ability to buy cloth depends upon how much
wheat I produce. But the strength of my desire for cloth
is not a function of ray wealth of wheat. It diminishes with
the increased abundance of cloth, since this abundance will
permit only of the satisfaction of a lesser need. Wheat and
cloth may be mutually exchangeable but if production is carried
to the point where increased consumption satisfies a less
intense desire then the value of both will fall." Thus it is
with the total ensemble of products. If supplies are in
creased quite generally, they meet on the demand side a dimin
ished intensity of desire. But as general intensity of de
sire flees away, so does value. Prices will no longer cover
cost of production. We still have general overproduction,
even if consumers have the power to clear the market but be
cause of diminished intensity of desire refuse to do so.-1^
It seems quite clear fran this analysis that supply could not create
its own demand because of a voluntary failure of demand.

Aftalion's

concept of voluntary failure of demand was of course the same as
Malthus' producers who had the power but not the will.
Aftalion apart from the "pure" underconsumption theory.

This sets
The under-

consuraptionist holds that demand is deficient bocause of an invol
untary failure of purchasing power based upon maldistribution of
income.

Shis is the same as Malthus' worker who had the will but

not the power to demand goods.

Malthus wa9 the fountainhead for

both concepts.
Perhaps it is quite correct to give Aftalion credit for de
molishing Say's Law of Markets, However, it is perhaps more correct
to state that it is the concept of commanded value which destroyed it.

^Ibld., p. 131.
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And many economists, Including Malthus and the powerful Austrian trio,
embraced this value theory.

In short, one cannot give to any one person

the credit of completely refuting the principle that supply creates
its own demand,

Keynes, in his attack on Say's Lav, merely added the

vei#it of his prestige to a bitter struggle that had been running for
over two centurieB.

W. T. Foster and Waddill Catchings
And now the trail of the doctrine of effective demand is
brou^it very close to Keynes in the writings of Foster and Catchings.
Here is found the underconsumption theory, based upon the principle
of involuntary failure of demand, in full bloom.
These writers believed that the objective of economic activity
was to keep the economy operating at full capacity at all times in
order that the population could enjoy as hi$i a real income as was
possible with existing technology.

Their analysis and their public

policy were derived directly from this belief.
They pointed out that, "First, that there is no possibility
of attaining the economic goal upon which all are agreed unlesB con
sumers somehow obtain the money, year in and year out, to buy the
goods about as readily as they are produced; second, the present money
and profit economy does not enable consumers long to obtain the re
quired money; third, there is consequently no possibility of sustained
economic progress, and extreme alternations of prosperity and depression
are i n e v i t a b l e . P e r h a p s no writer has ever expressed the

■^Foster and Catchings, Profits (New York:
Co., 1925), P. 231.

Houston Mifflin
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underconsumption theory with more exactness than this.
For Foster and Catchings, consumption was the regulator of
production, "since it is always possible to produce far more than
IpA
we consume, consumption regulates production."
In more emphatic
terms, "There could not possibly be a serious setback' of business
in general if consumption regularly kept pace with production.

Sus

tained business depression accompanied by adequate consumer-demand
is no more possible than drought accompanied by heavy rains."

xdi

They ask an allimportont question, "Why do we ever curtail production
in general--reduce crop acreage, bank furnaces, shut down mills, throw
men out of work?"

And their answer was simple and direct,

"Because

we cannot get our products consumed, which means that we cannot sell
them to the people who want to use them, at prices that make continued
production possible."

7AP

They were firmly convinced that, "The one

thing needed above all others to sustain a forward movement of business
is adequate consumer purchasing power.

Sunshine campaipis may start

business, but only consumers' dollars can sustain it ,"'*'®8 "A willing
buyer does not have to wait long, but a willing seller may have to
wait forever.

Adequate consumer-demand would do more than any other

means now within human control towards increasing wealth, abolishing
poverty, maintaining employment, solving labor problems, increasing
iQJ)
good will among men generally, and maintaining the peace of the world."

l8oFoster and Catchings, "The Dilemma of Thrift," Atlantic
Monthly, (April, 1926 ), pp. 10, 11.
l8 lIbld.

182Ibid.

l83profits, p. 239.

l8^"The Dilemma of Thrift," p. 23.
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Foster and Catchings were impatient with any analysis which
stated that production and consumption would balance in the longrun.

"To keep business free from extreme fluctuations, production

and consumption must balance within a sufficiently short period of
time.

Time is the essence of the problem."

and factories are idle in the short-run.
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People are unemployed

It was repugnant to these

writers to even think of waiting for the long-run to run its course
and bring about hi$i economic activity.
Law of Markets was quite simple.

Their attack against Say’s

They held that it was obsolete and

fallacious in a money and credit economy.
"What a mess we get into.'," they said, "We work hard to pile
our shelves high with what we most desire, and then we have to stop
working because we are unable to take these things off the shelf and
enjoy them."

The two writers explain that, "production must slacken,

and thus render increased consumption impossible, unless products find
their way to consumers about as rapidly as they are produced.

This

condition prevails, obviously as long as there is close and continuous
correspondence between the dollar-sales of consumers' goods and the
output of these goods measured in dollars at prevailing prices."

1A7

However, saving by individuals upsets this balance and glutted markets
result.
When producers save and invest, "Money that 1b used once to
bring about the production of goods is again used to bring about

J-Q^Profita, p. 2L8 ,
l86,tThe j3iiemraa 0;f» thrift,"pp. 5, 6.
l87Profits, p. 279.
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the production of goods, before it is used to bring about the con
sumption of goods.

In other words it is used twice in succession

to create supply."-1-08 Again, overproduction is the result.

Thus,

a lack of effective demand is a direct result of savings and profits.
Hie major points in the theory of Foster and Catchings may
be summarized in the following manner.
its income.

Society does not spend all

Some part of it is bound to be saved.

Some of this

saving is carried out by industry itself, for not all the value pro
duct of industry is distributed in incomes; part is retained to add
to productive equipment.

Of that which is distributed in incomes,

acme part also is saved.

These savings, via banks and security issues,

find their way back to industry where they are invested; that is to
say, they are used to purchase productive equipment, the means to
produce more goods.
On the face of it, this volume of consumer and business
saving would seem to create a deficiency of buying power in respject
to goods offered for sale.
mediately.

It does thi3 in the end, but not im

No deficiency arises immediately, for all the savings

thus apparently taken out of incomes, and therefore out of purchasing
power, are, by the process of investment, being paid out to wage
earners (and other factors of production) engaged in the capitalproducing industries.

Hence the total volume of purchasing power

is not affected by savings, since what is given up by one group is
transferred to another.
Yet this situation of adequate pjurchaBing power is temporary

108Ibid.
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and short-lived.

In due time, the productive facilities on which

savings are being spent are ready for operation, and, after the
lapse of a further period, the goods they are capable of producing
are ready for the market and added to the existing supply.

When this

finally happens, then purchasing power is inadequate to buy both the
original and the additional flow of goods at the existing levels of
prices; or, more exactly, it is inadequate to do so unless the total
volume of money is increased, either by incoming gold or by the in
flationary action of banks.
To suppose that banks can continue to meet this situation
is to misconceive the lessons learned from experience.

The truth

is, they cannot continue to do so; sooner or later, the state of
reserves calls a halt or imposes some restriction on the rate of
increase of the money supply.

When this time comes, the ultimate

results of the process of saving can no longer be postponed.

The

deficiency of purchasing power, put off for a while by an increase
in the supply of money through the banking system, is finally here;
and the crisis begins.

It follows that it is impossible for a

society to save without causing crisis and depression.
capitalistic society, savings are in fact made.

But in a

Thus, depressions

are inevitable.
There has been no attempt made in this chapter to include
all those writers who have contributed to the doctrine of effective
demand.

To do so would have been impossible in a work of this type.

■ ^ S e e McCracken, Value Theory and Business Cycles, pp. 1^7-151,
for an appraisal and criticism of Foster and Catchings.
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Following the trail as It was blazed by the more Important authors
was the only concern of this chapter.

This was the trail, these

were the economists who fashioned it, which led In an unswerving
line to the General Theory In 1936.

Faced with this picture of the

evolution of the doctrine of effective demand, Inadequate as It may
be, it seems quite clear that the economics of Keynes should never
be referred to as "revolutionary" or "the new economics."

The writers

presented in this chapter were the main stem of the argument on ef
fective demand In relation to saving, which was Integrated Into a
system by Keynes,

lhe system Is new, which was no mean accomplishment,

but the Ideas go far back.
In summary form, theBe ideas were, first, the Incomes of
all people depend on the expenditure of other people.

Second, if

all the Incomes are spent in one way or another, the whole Income
will be maintained, and also the employment which created it, If
general prices are steady.

Third, money which Individuals save must

therefore re-enter the circulation by the borrowing and spending of
other persons, public or private, failing which the whole income will
fall.

Fourth, there Is a gap between saving and Bpending, since the

saver Is not the same person as the spender of borrowed money; this
gap should therefore bo quickly closed by the Investment of savings.
Fifth, if savings are invested, they will maintain both the income
out of which they have come, and will themselves be exactly maintained
so that the investment will in a sense be self-financed.

The effective

demand of the nation will thus be maintained, but it will require a
public intervener to do it, if private enterprise does not rapidly

take up private savings.

There must either be public investment,

or policies to increase private enterprise or private consumption.
Saving must be offset by some kind of spending, in order that full
expenditure may maintain full employment, and vice versa.

Idle

savings limit the income they might have maintained, and clog the
whole effective demand.

These ideas forged into a system by Keynes

constitute the economics of Keynes.

CHAPTER V

MONETARY HERESY AND FINANCIAL CAPITALISM

The significant basis of uniformity in the monetary heresy
tradition resides in a common practical attitude which ascribes the
existence of unemployed resources to tho prevailing financial insti
tutions.

According to this system of thought, money and credit

reprosent a monopoly which embodied itself in the financial structure
and developed alongside modern industrial enterprise.

These finan

cial institutions are viewed as important inhibitions to the on-going
capitalistic process.

They prevent the full employment of community

resources, lead to an inadequacy of effective demand, and result in
an artificial scarcity of capital assets.

The central argument is

that the financial structure of capitalism must be changed in such
a manner that will eliminate its undesirable consequences.

A dis

tinguishing characteristic of the theoretical argument is the in
tegration of money and credit theory into the general body of economic
principles. Criticism of the orthodox point of view centers around
the classical theory of interest.
The monetary heretics attribute interest to the private owner
ship of money held as a store of value, and attack all income derived
from the mere ownership of property.
social cost of production.

Labor cost becomes the sole

Income consists of labor income plus

IU5
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scarcity rents from land and capital.

.With regard to class structure,

a characteristic feature of this attitude is the condemnation of the
rentier class because of its non-functional role in production and
exchange.

Income from private entrepreneurship, as contrasted with

income from private ownership, is justified from the social point of
view on functional grounds because the entrepreneur is regarded as
indispensable to industrial progress and to the exercise of individual
Initiative.
Keynes' theoretical and policy arguments fit neatly into this
system of thoupfrt.

The general reference of this chapter is to the

history of these ever-persistent theories of monetary reform.

The

specific investigation attempts to trace the monetary aspects of
Keynes' General Theory back to two important antecedents, P. J.
Proudhon and Silvio Gesell.1

Why these two men?

There are two reasons.

That which is called in this study the Keynes-Gesell-Proudhon
tradition extends much further into the history of capitalism and is
much broader in the contemporary world than the particular thread which
is being pursued in this chapter. It was perhaps the most important
type of reform in the early history of industrial capitalism prior to
the age of mass production, which began approximately in the middle of
the nineteenth century. After 1850 there was a shift in emphasis among
European social reformers, away from proposals fdr financial and ex
change reforms toward programs calling for the collective ownership of
property used in production.
In the early nineteenth century the attack on money and banking
institutions was implemented by an appeal to the labor theory of value.
Attempts were made, with the sanction of the theory that price should
equal cost, to organize systems of exchange which were intended to
'eliminate interest and middlemen's charges. In England the Ricardian
socialists pointed out that since all income is produced by labor, there
can be no social justification for the receipt of incane by money lenders
and land owners.
Robert Owen put such a system into practice when in 1832 he estab
lished the National Equitable Labour Exchange, which was an attempt to
bring producer and consumer into direct contact throu$i the use of labornotes or labor-tickets. In this way all non-labor income would be

1U7

First, of course, in a study of this type a writer is limited in the
material that he can examine.

It would be Impossible to make a com

prehensive analysis of all the antecedents of Keynes' monetary reform
proposals.

Fortunately, that is not necessary to achieve the general

objective of the dissertation, which is to assign Keynes to his proper
position in the history of economic thought.

Second, and a more im

portant reason, is that Keynes in the General Theory^ expresses sym
pathy and admiration for both the technical theory and the social
premises of Gesell's most important work, The Natural Economic Order.^
Keynes refers to Gesell as "the strange, unduly neglected prophet. . .
whose work contains flashes of deep insight and who only Just failed
to roach down to the essence of the m a t t e r . A c c o r d i n g to Keynes:
The purpose of the book (The Natural Economic Order) as a
whole may be described as the establishment of an antiMarxian socialism, a reaction against laissez-faire built
on theoretical foundations totally unlike those of Marx in
being based on a repudiation instead of on an acceptance
of the classical hypotheses, and on an unfettering of com
petition instead of its abolition. I believe that the
future will learn more from the spirit of Gesell than from
that of Marx.5

eliminated. The plan operated less than two years. The Ricardian
socialists designed similar schemes. And programs of a related nature
were attempted in France, Germany, and the United States. The common
characteristic of all these programs was a frontal attack on financial
and marketing institutions. There was no justification for using gold
as money and for the existence of interest. Furthermore, they chal
lenged J. B. Say's law of markets because of the inflexible and monopo
listic financial organization which prevented "supply" from creating
its own "demand."
^General Theory, pp. 32, 371, 379*

See also pp. 353-358.

^published in two parts, Money Part and Land Part (San Antonio,
Texas: Free-Economy Publishing Co., 193*0. Translated from the sixth
German edition by Philip Pye.
^General Theory, p. 353.

5Ibid., p. 3 5 5 ,
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With respect to governmental intervention and free competitive
enterprise, Keynes recorded his approval of Gesell in the following
manner:
Hius I agree with Gesell that the result of filling in the
gaps in the classical theory is not to dispose of the
"Manchester System," but to indicate the nature of the
environment which the free play of economic forces requires
if it is to realize the full potentialities of production.6
While expressing disagreement with certain aspects of Gesell's tech
nical analysis, especially with its incompleteness, Keynes was for the
most part sympathetic toward his theory.

He says, "the idea behind

7
stamped money is sound."
Gesell unstintingly acknowledged Proudhon as the only economist
prior to himself whose investigations into the theory of capital and
interest had suggested a workable solution for the reform of capitalQ
ism.
The passage from Proudhon which he quotes and paraphrases time
and time again i3 this:

"Money is a sentinel posted at the entrance

of the markets, with orders to let no one pass.

Money, you imagine,

is the key that opens the gates of the market (by which term is meant
the exchange of products); that is not true--money is the bolt that
bars t h e m . The durable (and therefore hoardable) character of money,
the monopoly of credit, and the propensity to hoard money, are, for
Gesell, Proudhon, and Keynes, respectively, the strategic factors in
the explanation of the conflict between wealth and welfare in the

^General Theory, p. 379*

^Ibid., p. 357.

Q

°Gesell, op. cit., see esp. Money Part, p. 3.
^Cited by Gesell, o]3• cit *^ p * 7 . Sgs also pp• 9*7^ 112 ^ 132 ^
182 , 271, 272 .
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social economy.
To Proudhon'b insist into the theory of capital and interest
Gesell attributes the former's suggestion for eliminating unearned
income without socialization of productive property.10 Gesell's
clearest statement of his relation to Proudhon in this connection
is contained in the introduction to the Natural Economic Order.11
He begins with a citation from Proudhon's What is Property? and in
the course of the introduction he commends Proudhon while castigating
Marx in a series of comparisons:
Hie abolition of unearned income, of so-called surplus value,
also called interest and economic rent, is the immediate
economic aim of every socialistic movement. The method
generally proposed for the attainment of this aim is
Communism in the shape of nationalization or socialization
of production. I know of only one socialist— Pierre Joseph
Proudhon— whose investigations into the nature of capital
point to the possibility of another solution of the prob
lem. . .No one, except Proudhon, was able to conceive that
the preponderance now manifestly on the side of property
can be shifted to the side of the dispossessed (the workers),
simply by the construction of a new house beside every ex
isting house, or a new factory beside every factory already
established.12
These observations indicate the basis for the contention that
Keynes was a follower of Proudhon as well as Gesell.

The acknowledg

ments of Keynes to Gesell and Gesell to Proudhon relate to matters
which appear to be fundamental to their social outlooks as well as
their technical analyses.1^ Proudhon, Gesell, and Keynes reacted
similarly to relatively similar issues, thougfc there were wide

10Gesell, o£. clt., Money Part, p. 3.

U Ibid., pp. 3-1*+.

^ Ibld., p. 3.

■^Keynes makes no mention of Proudhon in the General Theory.
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differences In the chronology and geography of their environments.
Proudhon wrote In France during the hectic years of the revolution
of I8 *f8 . Gesell early In life moved from Europe to Argentina, where
he lived during the financial, commercial, and industrial crises of
the late 1880's and 1890*8.

Keynes developed gradually to his posi

tion of the General Theory under the Influence of such post-war prob
lems as International indebtedness, prolonged economic depression,
financial crisis, and mass unemployment.

lU

First, Proudhon's theories will be investigated; second,
Gesell's argument will be examined; and finally, the similarities of
the idea systets of Proudhon, Gesell, and Keynes will be reviewed.

A.

Proudhon'8 Idea System '
Despite his voluminous writings,^ proudhon did not develop

a systematic body of economic theory.

His central concern and pre

occupation was with a system of gratuitous credit.

This major interest

stimulated him to explore and come to definite conclusions about the
theory of interest and capital, and the theory of a specie standard.

The periodic recurrence of the association of theoretical
ideas with a criticism of financial institutions has interesting
implications, not only for the nature of economic theory, but also
for a study of capitalism as a type of economic organization whose
characteristic structure gives rise to similar problems in different
times and different places.
15His most important publications werej Qu'est-ce que la
propriety?
SystSme des contradictions economlques (l8£677
Organization du credit et de la circulation et solution du problbnu
social (1848), Blsurnd* de la question soclale, banque d '£change
(18^8), les Confessions d 'on rSvolutionnaire (181+977 Iht6 r6t et
principal (1850 ), De la justice dans la revolution et dans l'Sglise
(1858 ), la Guerre et la paix
and De la capaclttf politique
des classes ouvribres*T l 8 6 5 ).

(l8Uo),

(l86l),
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This was his method of attacking financial capitalism.

Proudhon's

Idea system will be examined In terms of these major aspects of his
economic theory.
Proudhon's theory of Interest and capital has been classified
as an "exploitation theory,"

and this classification is justified

because he looked upon labor as the sole creator of economic goods and
services and thou^it of capital as being unproductive insofar as it
did not contribute anything to net current output.

"Capital can be

exchanged," he says, "but cannot be a source of Income."

17

On the

basis of this labor theory of value, interest, for Proudhon, was a
monopolistic income which flows to the privileged owners of moneycapital and was in sharp contrast with the income received by the
owners of legitimate productive wealth, which was quite permissable
and logical for the creation and maintenance of individual enterprise.
Proudhon defined capital in a typical socialistic manner.
For him capital was "Every settled value, whether in land, machinery,
merchandise, provisions, or money, serving or capable of serving in
production."

1ft

And he drew a sharp distinction between what he termed

"free" and "engaged" capital.

Capital was free when it took the form

which "can be regarded as realized or immediately realizable— that is,

■^See Eugen von Bbhm-Bawerk, Capital and Interest (New York:
Stechert and Co., 1932), p. 321. See also pp. 375-377.
"^Proudhon, What is Property? (Princton, Massachusetts: Tucker,
1876), p. 123. Translated from the French by Benjamin B. Tucker.
1®Proudhon, Solution of the Social Problem (New York: Vanguard
Press, 1927), p. 1&2. Commentary and exposition by Charles A. Dana and
William B. Greene, edited with introduction by Henry Cohen.

152

converted into such other product as may be desired; in this case the
form that capital most readily assumes is that of m o n e y . A n d ,
"capital is said to be engaged. . .when the value that constitutes
it is employed definitely in production; in this case it assumes all
possible forms."

PO

Interest was the payment which was necessary to induce the
owners of "free" capital to "engage" it in productive use.

Ohus by

Proudhon's definition and Keynes' terminology, interest was a money
reward paid to the owners of liquid-wealth for parting with the
liquidity for a given period of time.

In Proudhon's words:

Values created by net product are classed as savings and
capitalized in the most highly changeable form, the form
which is freest and least susceptible of depreciation. . .
the form of specie, the only constituted value. Now if
capital leaves this state of freedom and engages itself,-that is, takes the form of machines, buildings, etc.,1— it
will still bo susceptible of exchange, but much more ex
posed than before to the oscillations of supply and demand.
Once engaged, it cannot be disengaged, without difficulty;
. . .Exploitation alone is capable of maintaining engaged
capital at its nominal value;--Interest is the insurance
premium paid on the capital.
' Proudhon's many statements on interest and capital theory are
sometimes seemingly contradictory and never too clearly formulated,
but the statement quoted above was the central emphasis of his argu
ment.

It is quite evident that Proudhon believed that interest

originated and was possible because of the peculiar characteristics
of conventional money.

Hiere is virtually no difference between

1 9lbid., p. 1U3 . . g 0 Ibid.
21Proudhon, System of Economic Contradictions (Boston: Tucker,
1888), p. 291. Italics by Proudhon. Translated from the French by
Benjamin B. Tucker.
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this theory of interest and Keynes 1 view that interest is a payment
to money-holders for not hoarding money.
Proudhon did not believe that capital was productive.

For

him, the concept of "productivity" of capital was sheer fiction.22
Of course, this attitude toward capital was a part of his labor theory
of value.

He reasoned that if interest were a non-functional form of

money income resulting from a system of private monopolized credit
institutions (the Bank of France and its branches), the activity of
the money lenders could not be classified as productive because it
was not associated with the actual creation of economic goods.23 He
did not deny that labor working with capital was more productive than
labor working without capital.

He maintained, however, that labor

itself was the creator of capital and that this capital was consumed
by labor in the process of production.

ok

And, he argued, that this

was entirely different from the view that capital itself was productive.
As a matter of fact, Proudhon did not give to any one factor of pro
duction the credit for being the sole productive force.

In his First

Memoir he was hi$ily critical of some of his predecessors with refer
ence to this issue.

He disagreed with Quesnay and earlier economists

because they imputed productivity to land; he criticized Smith’s and
Ricardo’s labor theory of value; and he did not believe that J. B. Say
and his followers had stated the thesis correctly when they imputed

22proudhon, Oeuvres completes, Nouvelle ed, (Paris: Riviere,
1923), p. 160 . Notes and unpublished documents under the direction
of C. Bougie and M. Mousset.
^Solution of the Social Problem, pp. 123, 1^6.

2UIbid., p. 1U 9 .
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productivity to land, labor, and capital.

"The truth is," he says,

"that neither land nor labor nor capital is productive.

Production

results from the cooperation of the three equally necessary elements,
which, taken separately, are equally sterile."2^ Unfortunately, this
argument that production is a function of the total social process
was not developed in a rigorous or consistent manner, and the reader
is left with an unsatisfied hunger.
In the final analysis, Proudhon argued, interest was not a
payment for the use of existing money funds but a monopoly payment
made to the banking system to induce it to manufacture bank credit.
And since this creation of credit involved no sacrifice to society
as a whole, there was no social necessity to charge for this service.
The fact that such charges did exist meant that the economy contained
a socially unnecessary private monopoly of credit, a monopoly which
did not in fact supply additional capital but merely provided the
social sanction for the creation of capital.^
By attempting to demonstrate historically that the rate of
interest had not decreased in France with the accumulation of capital,
Proudhon tried to prove his position that interest was a payment for
monopoly-created-credit and not a payment for the use of capital.

In

this attempt, he shows that the discount rate of the Bank of France
had remained at four per cent during years in which both the national
capital of France and the assets of the Bank itself increased

^ w h a t is Property?, p. l6^.
^Solution of the Social Problem, p. llU.

155
27

several-fold.

His remedy for the unnecessary and Illegitimate Interest
payments was a financial system which would supply gratuitous credit.

28

This procedure would fully recognize the fact that the function of a
credit institution was to substitute its well-known credit for the
little-known credit of the individual enterpriser.^

Thus a "mutual"

(socialized) credit system was the answer to the problem.

30

In a

specific sense, Proudhon's mutual credit system would nullify interest
by making it equal for all producers ,3^
to:

h

Ib position reduced itself

If I used as much of your capital a3 you use of mine, the interest

which you suppose to derive from the productivity of capital would
councel out leaving a balance of zero.

32

Proudhon insisted that in

equality of income distribution existed because of interest and argued
that this could be corrected only "by centralizing credit and abolish
ing interest, in order to equalize facilities, needs, and chances."33
Proudhon further supported his exploitation theory of interest
by contending that there was no analogy between the rate of interest
ok
and the price of a commodity.
He explained that a "loan" and a
"sale" are qualitatively different.

When a merchant sells a commodity

g^0 euyres completes, p. 2 6 5 .
^ Solution of the Social Problem, pp. 123, 125.
g 9 Ibid., p. 11U.
3<^This perhaps was also the logical conclusion of Keynes 1
argument that the interest rate must be pushed down to zero.
33Solutjon of the Social Problem, p. 125.
32Ibid., p. 117.

33Ibld., p. 12U.

3UIbid., pp. 123, 131.
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at a given price, the price Is the equivalent value of the good,
and the seller relinquishes all future claim to the commodity.
In this type of activity there is no exploitation (receipt of non
functional income) because the "price" and the "value" of the com
modity are quantitatively equal.

However, when a capitalist makes

a loan of either money or credit, he not only does not relinquish
title, but he receives it back and can lend it over and over again.
Furthermore, he receives a payment in the form of interest in
addition to the repayment of the amount of the

loan.

35

This was

exploitation, according to Proudhon, because the lender of moneycapital extracts from this exchange process a greater value than
he contributes to it.3^

Thus Proudhon made no distinction between

"value" and "price," did distinguish between a "loan" and a "sale,"
and contended that exploitation occurs only in the payment of interest
by borrowers to lenders.
Finally, Proudhon held that it was not the multiplication of
capital which decreased the rate of interest, but it was the de
crease in the rate of interest which caused capital to multiply.37
This position closely approximates Keynes 1 central thesis that it
is the rate of interest which determines the rate of accumulation
of capital, and thus the marginal efficiency of capital, and not
vice-versa.3®

Thus

listic privilege

35lbid.,

both Proudhon and Keynes believed that themonopo

of interest charging inhibited a nation's

p. 123.

36 Ibld.

attemptto

37 Ibld., p. 13U.

3% e e P.
G. Hawtrey, Capital and Bnployment (New York:
Longnans, Green, 1937), p. 230.
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accumulate wealth and was contrary to the welfare of society.
In order that his theories and views concerning interest and
capital mi^it bear fruit, Proudhon advocated a reorganization of the
exchange process.

To accomplish this, he proposed that what he called

a "bank of exchange" be organized and replace the Bank of France,

It

was through this new financial institution that Proudhon hoped to achieve
a gratutious credit system, which was the very heart of his reform pro
gram.

Free credit, he believed, would eliminate the major evils of

financial capitalism.
The basic function of the bank of exchange was discounting.
A producer who sold a commodity or rendered a service would make out
a bill of exchange, have it accepted by the purchaser and then take
the bill to the bank to have it discounted,

lhe discounting process

consisted of the substitution of a bill of exchange of the bank— called
a "bon de circulation"--for the bill of the individual.

The. "bon de

circulation" bearing the signature of the exchange bank, was redeemable
at si$vt in merchandise or services equal to the face value of the "bon."
All members of the association were pledged to honor these notes by
products or services of the type which they customarily produced.^9
Hie notes, in contrast to those of the Bank of France, were not to be
redeemable in specie.

According to Proudhon, "Gold is the talisman

which congeals life in society, which binds circulation, kills labor
and credit, and makes slavery mutual.

We must destroy the royalty

of gold; we must republicanize specie by making every product of

^ S e e Proudhon, Oeuvres completes, VI, p. 309 for a model
of a "bon de circulation"?1

labor ready money."
Ihe basic Principle of the bank was to make the bill of ex
change universal and thus overcome the scarcity of money and credit;
that 1 b make credit free.

In its most complete form the bank would

have been essentially a system of national bookkeeping in which the
bill of exchange served as the medium of transfer.

Every commodity

was to be raised to the level of exchangeability; products would ex
change directly for products.

While Proudhon's reform called for com

plete abandonment of a relation between gold, or any other type of
specie,

1+1

and legal tender money, it was not his intent to establish

a new type of paper money.

He asked,

"Is this a paper currency?"

he answered, "I answer unhesitatingly, No.'

And

It is neither paper money,

nor money of paper; it is neither government checks, nor even bank
bills; it is not of the nature of anything that has been hitherto in
vented to make up for the scarcity of specie.
generalized."

kp

It is the bill of exchange

Ohe essence of the idea, in Proudhon's view, was to

1+3
make every product of labor ready money. J

The "bon de circulation" was

merely a means for facilitating the exchange of commodities for com
modities between producers.

Bank paper was to be based upon neither

specie nor land but upon products of labor.

1+ 1+

In order to be eligible

for discount, bills had to represent "products accepted or sold,

^°Ibld., p. 112.
^ ^Specie would have been used only for small change.
^Proudhon, Oeuvres completes, VI, p. Il6.
^Solution of the Social problem, p. 60.

delivered or immediately deliverable."

1+5

Such discount credit was to

be unlimited when there was previous acceptance of products by an
actual buyer.

1+6

Die bank would grant credit to borrowers on open ac

count with the guarantee of two signatures by association members, who
would be jointly and severally liable.

h7
1

The bank would also make long-term loans on notes secured by
mortgages, and would purchase property on time, consign it to a pro
prietor and permit him to repay in installments with no interest.

If

a proprietor were unable to repay, the bank would take over the prop
erty.

It would, however, oxtend to the proprietor the privilege of

lift
continued occupancy as a tenant or manager. ° These bank loans differed
from ordinary loans only in that they carried no interest charges.
The essential feature of Proudhon's exchange bank was to make
all commodities as exchangeable as money.

His argument was that if

labor-time were the true measure of value, then there was no neces
sity for a second measure of value in the form of money.

Furthermore,

if it were the presence of money which caused economic difficulties,
the sensible solution was to abolish gold and silver money and sub
stitute labor-money.

All commodities being the product of labor and

their value measured in labor-time, they would exchange directly for
one another.

After the initiation of his bank and the consequent

elimination of interest charges as a corrupting element in the price
structure, the competitive market was to be the process for equating

l6o

prices to true value.

1+9

Thus it is very obvious that the reform program which Proudhon
proposed as a general solution to the social problem was in every
respect a financial one.

His new financial system would eliminate

interest— bank credit would be gratuitous— and every producer would
always have a market for his goods; that is, commodities would ex
change for commodities.

There could not be a lack of effective demand

because the bunk of exchange would create a market for all the goods
that producers were capable of supplying.
exist.

Thus unemployment could not

Proudhon believed that the ideal of a barter economy envisaged

in classical economic theory was at long last to be made to function
free from monetary inhibitions and aberrations.

He was convinced that

a revolutionary change in the distribution of property ownership would
follow as a consequence of his banking reforms, and that the bureau
cratic form of government would be transformed into an anarchistic
type of society.

Every producer would become a small capitalist,

either as an agricultural proprietor, an artisan, or in such instances

,f% a r l y in l81+9 Proud.hon organized the Bnnque du Peuple, which
was modeled after his bank of exchange, but was much less pretentious.
Its basic operating principles were:
(l) no interest would be charged
on loans, (2) circulating notes would be issued based on economic
goods, certain types of securities, and outstanding loans on landed
property, and (3 ) buyers and sellers, throu^i the bargaining procedure,
would determine commodity prices, and the seller could take the cer
tificate of Bale to the bank and have it discounted at par.
Just when Proudhon had secured sufficient subscribers, and ad
herents to begin operation of the bonk, ho was sentenced to a three
year term in prison for articles against Louis Napoleon, who was at
the time (spring of I8U9 ) serving as the first president of the newly
established French Republic. Rather than allow his associates to
carry on without him, Proudhon dissolved the enterprise and refunded
the subscriptions.

l6l

as vas necessary, an "associate" in an industrial enterprise.50

This

was possible because the bank of exchange would make free credit availa
ble to all workers.

3.

Silvio Gesell *3 Idea System
Gesell viewed the capitalistic economy as an interest ex

ploiting system.

For him, capitalism was, "an economic condition

in which the demand for loan-money and real-capital exceeds its sup51
ply and therefore gives rise to interest."^

It was in terms of this

definition that Gesell developed his economic theory and his attack
on financial-, rentier-capitalism.
Gesell*s attack on financial'capitalism centered on interest
and rent.

These types of income, he believed, were non-functional

(unearned) because they derived frcm monopolies of money and land.
His new economic order would be one in which interest and rent would
not e x i s t . H i s program called for a periodic stamping of all cur
rency, which would eliminate the private monopoly of money; and for
the nationalization of all natural resources, which would eliminate
the private monopoly in land.

53

The stamped currency plan would cause

•^Proudhon, General Idea of devolution in the Nineteenth
Century (London: Freedom Press, 1923)> PP. 215, 2l6. Translated
from the French by John Beverley Robinson.
Natural Economic Order, Money Part, p. 110.
52The Natural Economic Order, Money Part and Land Part. Sub
title: A Plan to Secure an Uninterrupted Exchange of the Products of
Labor, Free from Bureaucratic Interference, Usury and Exploitation.
53Gesell*s land reform program is of no direct interest to the
subject natter In this chapter. His Free-Land program was much less
important than the Free-Money program in the sense that the former is
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interest payments to wither away until income from the mere owner
ship of capital goods had disappeared.

This would be the euthanasia

of the rentier class.
Geaell'a money program consisted of rigid controls over the
quantity and velocity of money.

Hie regulation of the quantity of

money was for the purpose of maintaining a stable price level, and by
regulating the velocity of money "hoarding" would be prevented.

Thus,

the prevention of "hoarding" money and the maintenance of a stable
price level were the two aspects of Gesell's money program.
He would prevent "hoarding" of money by requiring that all
currency be stamped at a rate (rate of demurrage) which would be suf
ficient to cause people to part with their money.

According to Gesell,

the issuance of this currency (Free-Money) would eliminate checks,
k L.

bills of exchange, and all other credit instrumentsS

This Free-

Mcney was to take the form of notes ranging in value from $1.00 to
$1,000.

Perforated sheets of stamps would serve as a medium of ex

change for amounts less than $ 1.00 and for weekly attachment to the
currency notes.

Metallic money would not enjoy legal tender priv

ileges, and there would be no redemption of Free-Money in specie.

only a problem in the distribution of a given volume of output, where
as the Free-Money program is essential to the maintenance of the total
output at a maximum. The problems of unemployment and economic crises
are essentially problems of money and exchange and not of distribution
as such, according to those who find the evils of capitalism in its
financial aspects. Furthermore, with respect to the objectives of this
study, there is no relationship between Gesell1s land program and Keynes'
policies. Hence, we shall not treat this aspect of Gesell’s idea system.
For the essence of his land program see, The Natural Economic
Order, Land Part, pp. 77 , 7 8 .
5^The Natural Economic Order, Money Part, p. 151.
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At the time of Introduction, no one would "be compelled to redeem
gold or silver for Free-Money, but after a period of grace, all metal
coins and other types of old money would cease to be legal tender.
Gesell believed that a rate of demurrage of 5*2 per cent per
year would be sufficient to prevent "hoarding."

He would accomplish

this by taxing (attaching a stamp) currency bills one-thousandth of
their face value each week.

In this manner, "hoarded" currency would

lose value each week, and if held long enough would cease to have
value.

This rate of demurrage was to be administered upward or down

ward-depending upon changing economic conditions--by the National
Currency Office, which was the administrative agency that would exer
cise the State's monopoly power over money.

Gesell insisted that this

monetary agency of the State must be guided by and base its rate of
demurrage decisions on his theoretical principles. ^

Another basic

function of the National Currency Office was to issue new money each
year in amounts sufficient to offset the annual shrinkage in the total
quantity of money; that is to say, enough new money would be issued
to equal the total volume of the tax levied on currency.
Gesell was firmly convinced that if his money program were to
be successful a stable price level would have to be maintained.

This

could be accomplished, he believed, by correlating the total quantity
of money to the volume, of output of economic goods and services.

This

would be still another function of the National Currency Office since
it would have displaced the central bank of issue.

This monetary agency

55ihese principles are presented in seme detail later in this
chapter.
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of the government would issue and withdraw money in relation to Changes
in the volume of output.5^

As the

price level, calculated hy anindex

number, ^ tended to rise or fall, the monetary circulation would be
reduced or increased.

New money would be injected into the economy

through a reduction in taxes.

3he currency office would pay into the

public treasury the necessary amount of new money, and the treasury
would reduce the collection of taxmoney by an eqiivalent amount.

A

reduction in the quantity of money would result automatically from
the annual depreciation in its value.

If a further decrease were re

quired, additional taxes could be levied which would withdraw money
from circulation.
The effects which Gesell expected from the introduction of
Free-Money indicate the intent of his proposal.

He listed the antici

pated effects of Free-Money as follows;
"On Commerce:
"1. An uninterrupted circulation of money and consequently
a steady increase of cash-payments.
"2. Unlimited sales of goods.
”3. Elimination of the causeswhich led to the general fall
of prices of goods and securities.
"Ij-. Elimination of commercial and industrial criBes.
"5. Cessation of the market fluctuations, of
the cyclesof
general trade activity of depression (alternating periods
of rising and falling prices) resulting from changes in
the exchange relation of goodB to money.

Natural Economic Order, Money Part, pp. lUl, llj-2.
Awhile Gesell was skeptical of the indices of Jevons, Sauerbeck,
and Soetbeer, he felt that the determination of proper index numbers was
no real obstacle to his program. He proposed a law requiring all pro
ducers to furnish data on the amounts of commodities produced and the
prices obtained from sales. On a basis of this information, a weighted
index would be established.for the guidance of the National Currency
Office in its injection and withdrawal of money. The Natural Economic
Order, Money Part, p. 68 .

165
"6 . Elimination of stock-Jobbing ana speculation.
”7. Cessation, to a large extent, of retail commerce in its
present form, an increasing number of commercial employees
becanlng available for productive work.
"8 . Simplification and cheapening of commerce generally.
"9. Reduction of the present high cost of commerce from 30bof> to about 10 -15$ of production.
"10. Abolition of protective tariffs which will no longer be
needed, and transition to Free-Trade. ,
"11. Removal of the economic causes of war.
"12, Facilitation of international trade through a currency
agreement on the basis of common interests.
"On Interest and Wages:
"1. Money loses its power of exacting interest and is reduced
to the rank of goods and labor.
"2. Continuous conversion of all money surpluses into means
of production, dwellings, etc., even if such investments
yield no profit (interest, "surplus-value1).
"3 . immediate and permanent cessation of unemployment, entire
disappearance of the labor reserve.
"1*-. Gradual decline and, if Free-Money is adopted universally,
disappearance of interest.
"5. Gradual rise of wages until they completely absorb capital
interest with the exception of rent on land, which will be
made to accrue to the whole population by our land reform
(Free-Land).
"6 . Facilitation of saving by removal of the present burden
of capital interest, by the unfettered development of
production and trade, and by the reduction of the cost
of commerce."58
It is interesting to view Gesell*s expected results from his
Free-Money plan in connection with what Proudhon wrote when he proposed
his Bank of Exchange.

He said:

I no longer hesitate to propose that which speculative study
of social economy shows me is most applicable to the situation
in which we now find ourselves. Work is at a standstill— it
must be resumed. Credit is dead--it must be resuscitated.
Circulation is stopped--it must be reestablished. The market
is closed— it must be reopened. Taxes never suffice— they must
be abolished. Money hides itself— we must dispense with it.
Or better still, since we should express ourselves in an
absolute manner, for what we are going to do today must serve

58Ibid., pp. 138, 139.
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for all time. Doable, triple, augnent labor indefinitely,
and in consequence the products of labor. Give credit so
broad a base that no demand will exhaust it. Create a market
that no amount of production can supply. Organize a full,
regular circulation, which no accident can disturb. Instead
of taxes always increasing and always insufficient abolish all
taxes. Let all merchandise become current money and abolish
the royalty of gold.59
Dius the. problem of full employment for Proudhon was one of organizing
exchange (credit) for the purpose of Increasing the effective demand for
goods.

For Gesell, effective demand could be maintained by organizing

exchange (money).

It is quite obvious that in many ways Gesell's list

of expectations bears a close similarity to Proudhon's anticipated
effects despite the fact that Gesell's program was a currency reform,
while Proudhon's program called for a credit reform.
Gesell did not pretend that the introduction of stamped money
would immediately eliminate the necessity for paying interest on loans.
Die rate of loans would be equal to the rate of return on so-called
real capital, and would fall continuously as real capital became more
and more abundant.

However, interest would never disappear entirely

unless Free-Money were adopted universally.

The Important anticipated

effect of the change to demurrage money was that the monetary barrier
which impedes production and acts as a brake an accumulation would
disappear.
Attention is now directed to a rather brief examination of
Gesell's major theoretical principles as they relate to his program
for reform.

Die objective of his theory as a whole was to develop a

theory of interest and money which would explain the non-utilization

59solutlon of the Social Problem, p. U 6 .
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of resources and the existence of unearned income in terms of the
peculiarities of conventional money.

The theoretical argument in

his program of monetary reform was "based upon the principle of as
signing to money a rate of interest of its own.

He believed this

rate was determined independently of the return on assets other than
money.

He was very explicit on this;
It used to be considered a scientifically proven fact that
money bore interest only because the instruments of production
bore interest^ that the interest-bearing power of money was
fundamentally a delegated or borrowed power. And it now
seems that the reverse is true.°0

There is great similarity between this position of Gesell and Keynes
when the latter says:

"Instead of the marginal efficiency of capital

determining the rate of interest

it is truer (though not a full state

ment of the case) to say that it is the rate of interest which deter
mines the marginal efficiency of capital."^l
Throughout the history of economic theory, economists, as a
group, whether they were orthodox or unorthodox, have concerned them
selves with the issue of economic value.
in this respect.

Gesell, however, was unique

He was intolerant of all value theory, and criticized

both orthodox and unorthodox theory for attaching central significance
to it.

He refers to value theory as "futile theological speculation,"

"completely sterile," "an illusion," "a fantasy," and "pernicious by
its very existence."

He acknowledged supply and demand schedules

^°The Natural Economic Order, p. 186.
^ J . M. KeyneB, "The General Theory of Employment," Quarterly
Journal of Economics, LI (February, 1937), pp. 222, 223.
^gThe Natural Economic Order, pp. 32, 33.
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as the "sovereign regulators of

p r i c e s . " ^

The practical intent of Gesell!s criticism of value theory was
to show why metallic money and banking currency should be replaced by
money made of paper without any kind of promise of conversion into
substance of "Intrinsic" value.

6k

"Our gold standard," he said, "is

6*5

the off-spring of the theory of value." p

And Gesell believed that

a monetary system which in any way was linked to gold was inherently
unstable.

It was primarily against the misuse of gold money as a.

store of value that he directed his attack on financial capitalism.
The physical durability of conventional money and its consequent
desirability as a form of "hoarded" wealth was, in Gesell's view,
the basis for the use of money as an object of speculation.

He there

fore proposed that money be made unhoardable, and that its quantity
be regulated in such a way that industrial activity would not be sub
jected to a fluctuating level of prices.

Gesell's program reco&iized

that money was Indispensable to an economy that enjoyed the advantages
of the division of labor, but he held that the material from which
money was made was of no importance as long as its value periodically
decreased.

Biua the precious metals were one of the few substances

unsuited to serve as a medium of exchange.

66

When Gesell argued that the "laws" of demand were different
from the "laws" of supply, he meant that those who produced commod
ities for sale were under compulsion to exchange their products for
money, whereas the owners of money were not always willing to exchange

63ibjd., p. 92 .

^ Ibld., pp. 2h, 63.

^ Ibid., p. 100 .

^Compare with General Theory, pp. 235 > 236 .
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their money for products.^

The owners of commodities had no choice,

they had to sell because their products were subject to carrying costs
in the form of deterioration, depreciation, storage costs, rust, rot,
etc.

The inadequacy of effective demand In a money economy was ac

counted for by the fact that the conventional forms of money did not
Involve carrying coBts similar to those "naturally" Incurred In the
case of all, or almost all, other assets.

Individuals who received

Income (in the form of money) and did not spend It all would "hoard"
unless there was sufficient Inducement to offset the advantages which
money enjoys as a medium of saving.

The premium which was necessary

to Induce conversion Into non-monetary assets, either directly or
through an agent, was called "basic-interest."

68

In a barter economy, according to Gesell, Interest could not
exist because when real products confront one another in a market,
they cancel each other.

In a money-economy In which goods exchange

for money and money exchange for goods, basic Interest would continue
to be extorted as long as money could be withheld from circulation
without loss to the owner.

In order to stimulate the circulation of

money and create a continuous demand, basic interest had to be abol
ished.

Its abolition involved placing money under the same handicap

which all other commodities were under.

In short, money muBt be

perishable and the periodic tax in the form of stamps on the currency
was to serve this function.
for stamped money.

Such was Gesell's theoretical argument

By "compelling demand (money) to appear regularly

^?The Natural' Economic Order, pp. 88, 95.

^ Ibid., p. 263.
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In the market," the fluctuating price level and the accompanying
variations in employment and output could he eliminated.^

Gesell

refers to his plan as the "revolutionary proposal of compulsory
demand,"70 which is all that is needed "to protect the exchange of
goods against any conceivable disturbance, to render crises and un
employment impossible, to reduce commercial profits to the rank of a
wage, and in a short space of time to drown capital interest in a
sea of capital."7^

Gesell proposed to alter the currency system so

that the capitalist economy would work as if goods exchange directly
for goods.

His attack upon Say's law was part of his appeal for a

reformed economy in which supply would create its own demand, and
in which money would be "neutral."

72

Gesell's theory of interest must be classified as an exploi
tation theory in much the same sense as Proudhon's.

Interest income

was non-functional (unearned) income incident to the monopolistic
position of money in relation to other ccmmodities.

This share of

the total social income was a deduction from the social income created
73
by workers.

He finds the explanation for the existence of interest

6 9lbid., p. 133 .

7 °Ibid., p. 136 .

71 Ibld., p. 13^.

f^on pages 266-275 In The Natural Economic Order, Gesell
discusses former attempts to explain interest on capital. One by
one he discards as unsatisfactory the fructification, productivity,
utility, and abstinence theories. In BShm-Bawerk's history and
analysis of interest, he finds nothing satisfactory. It is in terms
of the superiority of his own analysis that Gesell rejects the previ
ous theories.
^Despite his "disgust" with value theory, Gesell seems to
have embraced a labor theory of value at this point.
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Income In the hoardable character of money.^

Gesell states that,

"Interest is the byproduct of our traditional form of money and can
therefore be scientifically explained only with the help of a theory
of money. . .a theory of interest can only be derived from a theory
of money. "75

According to Gesell, "Money is an instrument of exchange

and nothing else."7^

Die use of money as a medium of saving as well

as a medium for facilitating the exchange of commodities and services

77

has been described as an anomaly, a misuse of the meditlm of exchange.
The misuse derives from the durable qualities of the prevailing types
of money.

"Its material privilege (as a precious metal) and its legal

privilege (as legal tender) give gold money an exceptional position
among the products which depend upon money for their exchange."7®
The advantages of the durable character of money do not accrue
to all members of society, but only to those members who save their
money and do not invest it in capital assets which they themselves
own.

These savers "will not pass their money into circulation again

79

without the promise of interest.'"^

In the consumers' market, money

does not extract interest because the necessity of existence of the
Oq
consumer compels him to spend his money.
Likewise the producers

7^This is what basically distinguishes Gesell's exploitation
theory of interest from the "surplus-value" theory of Marx.
The Natural Economic Order, p. 19.

^ IbldtJ p, 130 .

T^silvio Gesell, Die Foundations of Peace (San Antonio,
Texas: Free-Economy Publishing Co., 1937*57 p. W>. Translated from
the German by Philip Pye.

7®Ibid.

79jbid.

8°Oie Natural Economic Order, p. 225.
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cannot postpone sale of their products to the merchant because delay
results in increasing losses connected with the storage of products.

01

Hius the fundamental aim of Gesell's theory of interest was to show
that interest was a payment to prevent "hoarding" of money.

According

to his analysis, the great difficulty in economic life arises because
the same money which is needed as a medium of exchange is also capable
of being used as an instrument of savings.

Hie purpose of stamped

money was "a complete separation of the medium of exchange and the
medium of saving."

82

Gesell’s concept of interest assumed the utmost

Importance in his theory as a whole because he conceived the fundamental
aspects of economics to be "commodities" and "exchange."

For him, all

economic life resolved itself into a series of exchange transactions.
He described terms such as "wages," "labor," and "value" as "superfluous
circumlocutions" of the two basic concepts, commodities and exchange.83
In order to explain why unemployment, crises, and unearned in
come have their origins in the dual use of money as a medium of exchange
and a medium of saving, and also in order to explain the manner in which
stamped money would eliminate these difficulties, Gesell employs a three
fold classification of interest rates:

the basic rate (a theoretical

rate), the rate of real capital (an estimated rate), and the loan rote
(a contractual rate).
Basic interest is a purely monetary phenomenon whose existence
has nothing to do with time-preference, waiting, or the productivity
of real capital.

^Ibid.

Instead, it is a payment extracted for the use of

8 g(Ihe Natural Economic Order, p. 112.

83 Ibid., p. 202 .
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money in exchange.

It is a monopoly price which must he paid in

order to induce those who save to transfer their savings into a
non-monetary form, and it can be charged because historical coin
cidence has made the moBt efficient medium of exchange also the
most desired store of value.

The basic rate is measured by the

difference between the efficiency of money and its surrogates:
"Basic interest corresponds to the difference of efficiency between
money and the substitutes for money (bills of exchange, barter and
DJi

primitive production) as media of exchange."
Gesell refers to the payment made to the owners of assets
other than money as "interest" on real capital.

This rate depends

on the relative scarcity or abundance of instruments of production,
though a very important characteristic is the fact that it can never
fall below the basic interest rate.

As the quantity of instruments

is augmented, the rate of return on real capital declines.

While

Gesell retains the term "interest" in referring to this phenomenon,
he says, in contrasting it with basic interest, "We ought to cease
designating two so fundamentally different things by the same word,
85
interest,"

This is the reference of Keynes' statement that Gesell

distinguishes clearly between the rate of interest and the marginal
efficiency of capital.

86

Of course it is Gesell's basic rate of

interest which corresponds to the rate of interest in Keynes*
liquidity-preference schedule, and Gesell’s rate of interest on
real capital is analogous to Keynes' marginal efficiency of capital.

Q^Ibld., p. 263.

^ Ibid.

^General Theory, p. 355.
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She meaning of the distinction between basic interest and the
rate of interest on real capital may be seen in relation to Gesell's
practical program.
interest.

The object of stamped money was to eliminate basic

The elimination of basic interest meant the elimination of

unemployment because persons who otherwise would tend to hold money

in order to extract baBic interest, would, under stamped money, be
willing to part with their money even if they received no return in
excess of the loan.

With money no longer hoarded, thero would be no

lack of effective demand and no unemployment.

One who received money

would create demand directly through the purchase of a. consumption
good or capital asset, or indirectly through someone else who would
invest in a capital asset.

According to Gesell's theory, all private

income not consumed would be invested.

After money had been received

from the sale of a service or commodity, it would be immediately passed
on.

"If money is to fulfill its purpose, purchase must follow step
flT

for step on the heels of sale." ' This is the point at which Gesell
insisted that social control was necessary.
Gesell's distinction between basic interest and interest on
real capital is also used to contrast the declining rate of return on
QQ
real capital assets with the constant rate of return on money.
In
this way he points out that it is the money rate of interest which
checks accumulation and impedes production.

Hie accumulation of

8 ?The Natural Economic Order, p. 115.

^Gesell cited evidence to show that the basic rate of interest
had been relatively constant throughout the ages, or at least since
money was first used as the medium of exchange. The figure he gave
was about four per cent. Ibid., pp. 2Bk, 285 .
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capital assets in no way reduces the independently determined money
rate of interest.

The accumulation of capital assets, on the other

hand, does lower the rate of return on real capital, and when the
latter tends to fall below the basic rate of interest,

accumulation

of capital ceases because it is more profitable to hold money for the
premium it will bring from those who prefer to have it for use as a
medium of exchange, than to invest in industrial enterprise.

If it

were not that money had a rate of interest of its own (basic interest),
accumulation would continue without interruption and the rate of re
turn on real capital would fall and soon become zero.

Under a system

of stamped money, with basic interest eliminated, the only reason for
paying a reward to the owners of instruments of production would be
their scarcity.
Gesell did not concern himself with the question of the rate
at which the productivity of capital assets would probably fall under
the impetus of unrestrained accumulation.

He took an optimistic view

of the productive powers of the industrial system and held that it
would not be long until the payment of scarcity rents would disappear.89
The purpose of his theory was to show that payments for the use of real
capital were caused by the special character of money, whereas in an

1

economy employing stamped money, they would depend upon the demand for
loans exceeding the supply of loans at a zero loan rate of interest.90
This loan interest is the third aspect of Gesell's complete
theory of interest.

It is the interest paid to lenders by the borrowers

89The Natural Economic Order, pp. 26l, 262.

^°Ibld., p. 263.
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of liquid funds.

According to Gesell, the loan rate would always

be equal to the rate of return on real capital assets, whether the
loan be made In conventional money or Free-Money.

It will be re

called that Gesell's Free-Money program would not cause interest on
loans to disappear Immediately.

The explanation of this is found in

the distinction between basic interest and loan interest, a distinction
which turns on the difference between an exchange and a loan.^

Basic

interest is not interest on a loan, but the tribute that arises when
money is exchanged for other commodities in cases in which the purchaser
is in a position to delay the transaction.

In saying that basic inter

est will disappear with the introduction of stamped money, Gesell meant
that the consequences which flowed from the use of conventional money
would be eliminated, and processes would be set in motion which in
time would reduce the loan rate and the real rate to zero.

When this

had come about, interest income would have disappeared, and with this,
rentier-capitalism, the "interest exploiting system," would come to
an end.^
Loans contracted in stamped money would bear loan-interest as
long as the demand for loan capital and real capital exceeded the sup
ply at a zero loan rate, or, in other words, as long as a scarcity of
real capital assets existed.
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Since real capital assets would con

tinue to yield a return above cost, and since money could be used to
purchase such assets, "anyone seeking a loan of money must pay for it

91lbid., p. 261 .
92see Gesell's definition of capitalism, Supra, p. 16 1 t
93The Natural Economic Order, p. 262 .
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the same Interest as Is yielded "by real capital,
from the laws of competition."^

This is obvious

The Immediately significant dif

ference arising from the substitution of Free-Money for conventional
forms would be that all resources would be continuously employed.
Basic interest would not exist as a barrier inhibiting new capital
formation.

The "natural" forces of competitive production would

adjust to a level of output at which all the resources would be
fully employed.

This is the meaning, in terms of practical conse

quences, of Gesell’s distinction between basic and loan interest.
Gesell did not develop a separate theory of crises.

Fluctu

ations in output and employment were' viewed as part of the normal be
havior of an economy which emplqyed hoardable money as the medium of
exchange.
prices.

For Gesell, the immediate cause of crises was falling
Most important among the reasons why prices must sooner or

later fall in an economy employing conventional money was the decline
in the rate of return on each new unit of real capital produced.
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When this rate tended to fall below the basic-rate of interest, money
would be withdrawn from circulation, or what amounts to the same
thing, the velocity of circulation of money would be reduced.

The

reduction in the supply of money, which was equivalent to a reduction

9^Ibid.
^Gesell gave two other reasons why prices fall, "because the
conditions under which gold is produced do not allow the supply of
money (demand) to be adapted to the supply of wares," and "because
with increased production and prosperity money 1b melted by gold
smiths. . ." The Natural Economic Order, p. 109. It is clear that
Gesell's argument w b b addressed to a gold standard economy.
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In the demand for products, caused prices to begin falling.
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Die fall

in prices would lead to an expectation of a further fall, developing
into a cumulative process of deflation.
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The merchant would cease

buying goods, fearing that the goods he was tempted to buy so cheaply
today could be bou^it still more cheaply tomorrow.

"Wares are un

salable because they are too cheap and threaten to become still
cheaper.

This is the crisis."
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Recovery from a crisis began with

the discovery of gold, the issue of paper money, or any factor which
would increase credit, and the velocity of circulation.
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Clearly, Gesell's explanation of crises was based upon his
theory of interest, the essence of which was that interest on money
was independent of the. interest on real capital.

C . Similarities of the Idea Systems of Proudhon, Gesell, and Keynes
The purpose of this Section is to make a comparative analysis
of the practical attitudes and theoretical positions of Proudhon,
Gesell, and-Keynes.
Die programs of these three men attempted to initiate social
controls which, they believed, were justified by the theoretical pre
mise that the competitive market system was not automatically selfadjusting because money had characteristics not possessed by other
commodities.

These unique qualities of money were linked directly

to the existence of restraints imposed upon the activity of the entre
preneur by the cost and difficulty of securing money capital for

96Die Natural Economic Order, p. 100.

9^Ibid.

"ibid.

1Q0Ibid., p. 108.

^ Ibld., p. 101,
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industrial enterprise.

All three men believed they had formulated

programs which would result in a rectification and preservation of
a system of private enterprise.
In their critical aspect these men were dedicated to a con-'
demndtion of financial institutions which seemed to the authors to
inhibit the free flow of community resources into the production
and satisfaction of community wants.

In particular their anti-

financial capital orientation was associated with attitudes toward
private property, metallic money, speculation, and the rentier.

It

was in these areas that the practical attitudes of Proudhon, Gesell,
and Keynes took form and substance.
With respect to property, the attitudes of Proudhon and
Keynes bear an interesting relation to one another.

In spite of

difference in terminology, they come essentially to the same position
on the private ownership of property and money.

It was the intention

of both that there should be no legal change in the rights to the
ownership of property.

But both condemned all income from property,

and attributed the flow of such income to the artificial scarcity
of property caused by the peculiarities of money.
Proudhon's objection to "property"--his name is universally
associated with the phrase, "Property is theft"— had much the same
meaning as Keynes 1 objection to interest income, or rentier income
in general.

Proudhon distinguished between "property" and "possession."

By the latter he meant the private ownership of the instruments of pro
duction minus the unearned (non-labor) income which usually accrues to
such ownership.

Keynes said that it was not the ownership (possession)

0
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of property which was important for the state to assume.

The state

should merely control certain aspects of investment and determine
the basic rate of reward to those who own the instruments of pro
duction.^0^

Since interest rewarded no genuine sacrifice any more

than did rent frcm land, the non-functional rentier capitalist would
gradually disappear,
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economic reform program.

as a result of the inauguration of a rational
To be sure, Keynes differs from Proudhon

in that he is not directly concerned with the problem of non-functional
income from land.
a scarcity rent.

He does, however, refer to the income frcm land as
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Insofar as Proudhon believed that free credit

would lead to the disappearance of rent as well as interest, his pri
mary preoccupation did not differ from that of Keynes.

In both cases

it is the money (credit) institutions to which the principal difficulty is attributed.

10 ^

The focal point of the historical attacks on financial capital
has always been a criticism of the conventional forms of money.

Througi-

out the writings of Proudhon, Gesell, and Keynes there is a very vig
orous condemnation of the practice which makes gold the basis for the
money and banking system.
common this characteristic.

Their oppositibn to metallic money has in
It is associated with an abnormally

101General Theory, p. 378.

10gIbid., pp. 376 , 378 .

103Ibid., p. 376 .
•1,oiHj'hen an economic theorist combines the view that private
property in production is fundamentally sound, with the view that
the hoarding, or tendency to hoard, money is the real source of the
economic problem, his theoretical analysis is almost certain to
center on money and interest. This is the fundamental basis for
the similar idea systems of Proudhon, Gesell, and Keynes.
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hi$i rate of Interest, which acts as a brake on industrial enterprise.
Proudhon's bank of exchange called for complete abandonment of the
relation between gold and legal tender money.

To Proudhon and to his

predecessors in England, the Ricardian socialists, gold was the symbol
of economic disharmony.

The relation which it bore to the rate of

interest involved his theory of constituted value and "engaged" capital.

»
In the passage which Gesell so frequently quoted from Proudhon

concerning money as the barrier to the exchange of products, "gold"
is scmetimeB substituted for "money" in the

paraphrase.1*^

stamped currency represented a technique for avoiding the

To Gesell,
unnatural

restraints placed on industrial enterprise by any money such as gold,
which is‘protected by its physical properties against depreciation
in substance.
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He regarded interest as a direct consequence of

the durability of precious metals.

Keynes was one of the most influ

ential opponents of the gold standard in England.

His country's

greatest economic ills were ascribed by him to an attempt to protect
her foreign balances at the expense of exercising control over the
domestic rate of interest.
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The international gold standard, which

necessitated maintenance of foreign balances, limited the degree of
monetary autonomy and precluded the possibility of independence in
national economic policy.

Keyne3 ' advocacy of economic self-sufficiency

was largely responsible for his protectionist policies,
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and was

directly related to his view that the international gold standard was

1 05The Natural Economic Order. Compare the quotation on p. 7
. with the paraphrases on pp. 182 and 271 , 272 .

l0^Ibid., p. 95.

-^General Theory, p. 339.

10^Ibld., p. 339.
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In no small degree responsible for the struggle for foreign markets
among nations, and in consequence, to the economic causes of war:
Never in history was there a method devised of such
efficacy for setting each country’s advantage at variance
with its neighbours' as the international gold standard.
For it made domestic prosperity directly dependent on a
competitive pursuit of markets and a competitive appetite
for the precious metals.
This passage could serve well as the thesis of Gesell's pamphlet on
The Foundations of Peace. Much of Keynes' best social satire, intended
to illustrate the contradictions in the present economic organization,
related directly to the characteristics of gold.^‘L®
All three authors condemned the stock exchange, no less than
the gold standard, as one of the institutions by which financial capi
tal exerts a perverting influence on industrial capital.
tion may be summed up in this way.

Their posi

The legitimate function of money

is to move goods and services through the stages of production to the
final consumer.

It is important that the volume of money correspond

to the needs of such transactions, and particularly important that
there should be no sudden shifts in the rate of output.

Unfortunately

a major source of disturbance was to be found in the buying and selling
of shares on the stock exchange.

The absorption of money into the

financial sphere for speculative purposes impinged on industrial ac
tivity by making it difficult for the industrial entrepreneur to
secure funds for operating and extending his plant.

The exchange also

added to the uncertainties of the industrial entrepreneur until he

1Q9lbid., p. 31*9 .
■^General Theory, esp, pp. 130, 131.
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was forced either to close down hia film or participate himself,
through the anticipation of price changes, in the speculative pro
cess.

Keynes said, "Business loses its genuine character and be

canes no better than a speculation in the exchanges."

lli

The business

man became a gambler in a process in which his gains bore no relation
to what his activities had contributed to society.
of industry to the activities of the exchanges was a
emphasis with all three writers.

The sensitivity
major point of

Of course, Keynes made a more

direct attack upon the investment market than did either Proudhon
or Gesell when he advocated the socialization of investment.

This

resulted from his skepticism of monetary reform (lowering the interest
rate) as an adequate Bocial control for securing a sufficient induce
ment to invest, and his belief that the incidence on the marginal
efficiency of capital of the instability of market estimations made
through the stock exchange would be too great to be offset by reductions in the rate of interest.
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Neither Proudhon nor Gesell called

for socialized investment; however, the logical implications of their
programs make quite clear the fact that, had their reform plans been
adopted, investment would have been socialized.
The fourth aspect of the attack on financial capital relates
to the rentier.

The finance capitalist and the rentier were the

twin results of the separation of management frcm ownership, a con
dition associated at the present time with the growth of the corporate

M. Keynes, Economic Consequences of the peace (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1920), p. 2^3.
• ^ General Theory, p. 16k.
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form of economic organization, but formerly with absentee land pro
prietorship as well as the growth of large public debts.

Hie rentier

is a passive income receiver, whereas the term "finance-capitalist”
refers to the promoter, speculator and banker.
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J

The most deep-seated change in the social structure involved
in the type of reform proposed by Proudhon, Gesell, and Keynes is the
passing of the rentier, whose disappearance will occur when the rate
of return on capital falls to zero.

Ihis implies no necessary ethical

judgnent prejudicial to the rentier.

The attitude toward the rentier

is not fully explained until the emphasis on the role of the entre
preneur has been clearly indicated.

Disappearance of the non-functional

rentier is incidental to a practical program which makes the entre
preneur the initiator of economic activity.

Society has no particular

stake in the inactive, functionless rentier.

On the other hand, any

thing which dampens the ardor of entrepreneurship is inimical to the
welfare of society as a whole.

In an economy in which enterprise is

carried on with borrowed capital, a reduction’in the cost of borrowing
1b obviously a stimulus to enterprise.

The Proudhon-Gesell-Keynes

attack on the rentier involves, on the objective level, a matter of
fact pronouncement that if the conditions under which enterprise is
carried on are not bettered, the community as a whole will suffer in
consequence.
In directing attention to a comparative analysis of the theo
retical positions of Proudhon, Gesell, and Keynes, the concern is with

1^3l. C. Merriam, "Rentier," Encyclopaedia of the Social
Sciences, X I U , pp. 296 -300 , esp. p. 297.
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the theories as a whole rather than to matters of specific detail.

Ilk

It Is necessary to note first that the primary reference of
Proudhon, Gesell, and Keynes was to the sphere of circulation, thougi
some exceptions must he allowed In the case of Keynes.

The three

authors selected from the entire economic process the difficulties
arising from the use of money in making transfers between buyers
and sellers as the special point of emphasis.

Proudhon's statement

that the theory of circulation of capital constituted the whole of
economic theory11-* corresponds to Gesell's assertions that the fundamental concepts of economics are "exchange" and "commodities."

tt6

Gesell represents the social relations between the Industrial employer
and the worker as an exchange of the product of the worker for a value equivalent.

With Keynes the Institutional process which links indi

vidual non-consumption to social accumulation was the particular point
of friction in the economic process.
This "transfer" difficulty was associated with the peculiarity
of exchanges of commodities for money.

The preferred qualities of

money were related in a casual way to interest.

Thus the theories

HkThese writers differed greatly in their preparation for
technical economic analysis. Keynes was the only academically
trained economist in the group. Proudhon was largely self-educated.
Although he wrote prolifically on economic subjects, he was by no
means a master craftsman with the tools of analysis of political
economy. Gesell was even less an academician than Proudhon. His
writings were stimulated by his experience as a business man who
was implicated in situations in which he could scarcely have avoided
pondering the events which affected his affairs daily. For these
reasons, a detailed comparison would not be particularly relevant
under any circumstances.
■^^proudhon, Oeuvres completes, XIX, p. 218.

Natural Economic Order, p. 20e,
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of Proudhon, Gesell and Keynes are theories of money and Interest
considered In relation to the utilization of resources and the ac
cumulation of capital.

While Interest is purely a monetary phenom

enon, money Is Important In ways not related directly to Interest,
and insofar as this is significant, this type of theory may better
be described as the "theory of a Monetary Economy."
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The purely

monetary theory of interest of Proudhon, Gesell, and Keynes is dis
tinguished by the strategic role which interest plays in relation
to the total theoretical construction.
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The way in which money, working through the rate of interest,
acted as a brake to the growth of real capital assets was singularly
significant for this trinity of economic reformers.

They all main

tained that if the monetary barriers to production were removed, the
accumulation of real capital assets would increase so rapidly that
the necessity for paying scarcity rents to the owners would disappear
in a relatively short time.

The integration of money into general

economic theory is closely connected with the insight that the failure

^ ^General Theory, p. 293. Keynes refers to the "complete
theory of a Monetary Economy."
iiQ
There have been economists who Interpreted interest as
essentially a payment for money who cannot be identified with the
Proudhon-Keynes type of economic theorizing. For example, both
Marx and Schumpeter regarded interest as a purely monetary problem,
but in the theoretical systems of Marx and of Schumpeter the rate
of interest occupies a somewhat incidental position. See Marx,
Capital, III, p. k35, and Schumpeter, "Eevidw of Keynes’ General
Theory," Journal of the American Statistical Association, New
Series, XXXI, (December, 1936), p. 795 . Schumpeter said: "I wish
to welcome his (Keynes) purely monetary theory of interest which
is, as far as I can see, the first to follow upon my own. Unfor
tunately, I must add that the similarity stops there and that I
do not think my argument open to the objections which this one is
sure to meet."
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to accumulate assets and the continual lack of effective demand for
products are attributable to the Impediments to continuous production
afforded by the behavior of financial capital.

It was because Keynes

and his predecessors believed that they had discovered In monetary
processes the strategic flaw In the capitalist economy that they logi
cally Insisted that money could not be abstracted away, even on a
preliminary level of analysis.
In the writings of each author there is a particular concept
with which the pretended uniqueness of his entire theory is associated.
In the case of Keynes, it is "liquidity-preference," In the case of
Gesell, "basic-Interest," and In the case of Proudhon, "constituted value." ^ 9

These are parallel concepts in the sense that they are

the most important in the views of the theorists.

"Basic-interest"

and "liquidity-preference" are directly related to the theory of
Interest, but "constituted'value" is not.

Each was rather preten

tious concerning his theoretical Innovation.

Upon a basis of the

idea described by the concept, each proclaimed the superiority of his
theory over that of any predecessor.

The advocacy of practical policy

was closely connected with these "scientific discoveries."

The meaning

^ % y having values "constituted" Proudhon meant having the true,
and therefore stable and certain values assigned to commodities. In
the existing organization of society, with its particularltype of money
and credit institutions, the only commodity whose value is constituted
is specie (money). It is the uncertain value of other commodities which
makes these less readily exchangeable than specie. If this quality of
constituted value could be extended to all commodities, they would be
raised to a level of exchangeability equal to that of specie, and in
this way would serve directly as money. For Proudhon's complete theory
of value, see System of Economic Contradictions, pp. 65 , 73, 82, 83 ,

91,

95, 102, 226, 233, 236.”
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of the proposition that the theories as a whole are theories of
interest may be illustrated by taking these strategic concepts and
showing how they are related to one another and to the ideas about
money.
These theories differ from the orthodox theory in that the
latter assumes in its general principles that all c.apital is indus
trial capital.

Ihe repudiation of this assumption is the starting

point of the Proudhon-Keynes tradition.

It is precisely the presence

of financial capital which causes the disturbances to the movements
of industrial capital in such a way as to lead to the characteristic
difficulties associated with capitalism:

unemployment, poverty,

unearned Incomes, inequality, and insufficiency of effective demand.
This distinction focuses the analysis on the different behavior of
financial and industrial capital.
Each is agreed that financial capital possesses characteristics
which, because of its strategic place in the mobilization and exchange
of Industrial capital, impose profound limitations on the working of
an otherwise sound competitive system.

Hie theoretical systems of

Keynes, Gesell, and Proudhon are most similar in relation to their
theories of interest.

Allowing for differences in exposition, all

three migfct be appropriately described as liquidity-preference theories
of interest.

According to each theory, interest is the payment, or

the reward, for parting with liquidity, i.e., with money.

Proudhon

says that interest payments are necessary in order to induce the
owner of money to "engage” it.

Gesell maintains that interest has

to be paid by those who want money for a medium of exchange to those
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who prefer money as a medium of saving.

It is preferred as the medium

of saving because it does not involve carrying costs.

Ih the case of

Keynes, the preference for holding money is explained by the uncertainty
of the future rates of interest and the instability of the marginal ef
ficiency of capital.
Proudhon's constituted value becomes coordinate with Keynes'
liquidity-preference and Gesell's basic interest in that it attempts
to explain how the bank of exchange would overcome, or eliminate, the
preference of wealth-owners for money.

If the objective of the bank

could be realized, there would be no basis for preferring money to
any other asset.

According to Proudhon, the value of money was the

only constituted value.

The aim of his bank of exchange was to con

stitute the value of all commodities.

If this condition were realized,

there would be an uninterrupted exchange of products for products in
proportion to their "true" or constituted values.

Gesell believed

that stamped money would eliminate the preference for money as a
medium of saving.

Keynes' central bank control was designed to re

duce uncertainly concerning the interest rates which prevail in the
future.
Starting frcm the proposition that reductions in the rate of
interest are of fundamental significance in the programs of Gesell
and Keynes, the question may be asked how this practical view was re
lated to the use of the concepts basic interest and liquidity-preference
and how these concepts were analogous in the analyses of the two theorists.

Keynes' description of interest as the reward for not hoarding,

General Theory, p. 171*.

120

or alternatively, as the reward for parting with liquidity,
easily into Gesell's notion of interest.
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fits

In proposing that currency

be taxed by requiring periodic stamping, Gesell's idea was to prevent
wealth-owners frcm hoarding money, or to compel them by pecuniary
penalty to part with liquidity.

Keynes employs the concept liquidity-

preference (due to speculative motive) to denote the resistances
which must be overcome before people will part with their money.
The reference of the concept is to the subjective state of mind of
wealth-owners, and in this sense liquidity-preference is an independ
ent variable, though of course it is subject to change.

Analytically,

Keynes represents liquidity-preference in a diagram involving three
variables.

When' the liquidity-preference schedule is held constant,

the coordinates are the rate of interest and the quantity of money.
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Given the state of liquidity-preference and the quantity of money,
the rate of interest is determined.
If the liquidity-preference curve is assumed to be given,
Gesell's basic rate of Interest could be represented as the rate of
interest which appears in Keynes' liquidity-preference diagram.

If

the liquidity-preference schedule were lowered, e.g., following Gesell's
stamped money proposal, and assuming a constant volume of money, there
would be a point at which the basic rate of interest would fall to zero.
Keynes states that the rate of stamp-taxing should be, in his
terminology, approximately equal to "the excess of the money-rate of
interest. . .over the marginal efficiency of capital corresponding
to a rate of new investment compatible with full employment."
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This corresponds in Gesell’s terminology to the difference between
the basic rate of interest and the rate of return on real capital.
It would appear from his analysis that Gesell intended the stamping
rate should be equal to the basic rate of interest.

In Keynes'

system this corresponds to the rate of interest appearing in the
liquidity-preference schedule.
Keynes’ major criticism of Gesell's theory is that it repre
sented "only half a theory of the rate of interest. . .because the
notion of liquidity-preference escaped him."

I0I4.

In his discussion of

Gesell, Keynes does not once mention the theory of basic interest,
which contains the crux of Gesell's whole position.

Keynes' pro

nouncement was valid only in the sense that Gesell did not develop
in explicit fashion a theory of liquidity-preference.
. Gesell's argument may be restated as follows.
economy there would be no interest.
exists for two reasons:
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In a barter

In a money economy interest

(1 ) the carrying costs of money are negli

gible compared to the carrying costs of other commodities, (2 ) money
is more efficient than bills of exchange and other media for transferring goods.
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Money is more efficient because it is the unit of

account, and no special knowledge is needed to know its value.

More

over, it is easily divisible into fractions for making payments.
Private property includes the rigit to accumulate on a large scale,

^ I b l d . , p. 356.
3-25The Natural Economic Order, pp. 228, 238.
^ I b i d . , p.

263.

and accumulation presupposes saving.

The function of saving Is

divorced from the function of producing goods and services.

Interest

Is necessary to Induce the Inactive savers to transfer their wealth
Into the control of the active producers.

With Gesell, as with Keynes,

Interest was a rentier phenomenon, and would disappear with the rentier.
The object of Gesell's explanation of basic interest was to show why
money draws interest.

It was not true, as Keynes said, that Gesell

completely overlooked the need of an explanation why the money rate
of Interest was positive.
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' Gesell's theory represented a refinement

of his practical insist that money should be forced to circulate by
means of a periodic taxing which would offset the preference of wealth
owners for holding, or "hoarding" money rather than spending it for
seme form of productive or consumable wealth.

In attempting to refine

and theoretically justify this insigit, it should not be surprising
that Gesell, in a sense, anticipated the notion of liquidity-preference.
Gesell's stamped money fits logically into Keynes' general
program, which is otherwise lacking in proposals for lowering the
money rate of interest below the. minimum attainable through manipu
lating the quantity of money.

The socialization of investment as such

has nothing to do with reductions in the rate of interest for the
reason that the latter is a monetary phenomenon and is subject to
change only via monetary influences. Some variation of stamped money,
such as a tax on bank deposits, is a logical step toward the attain
ment of the long-term implications of Keynes' position, i.e.,

•^General Theory, p. 35^.
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disappearance of a rate of return on accumulated wealth and the conse
quent euthanasia of the rentier.

Dius the theoretical problem for

both Gesell and Keynes was to develop a theory which would show the
way to eliminate the private ownership of money while maintaining
the private ownership of other forms of wealth.
The above discussion has been concerned with the similarities
between the theories of interest of Gesell and Keynes.

Let us now

turn to a consideration of Proudhon's theory in this same respect.
As has been shown, Proudhon viewed Interest as the premium paid for
getting capital to "engage itself," and stated that "exploitation
alone is capable of maintaining engaged capital at its nominal
value."

128 The owner of money was able to extract this premium

because of the peculiar nature of money, which was, in Proudhon's
language, explained by the fact that money was the only article of
exchange whose value had been "constituted."

Of course the meaning

of Proudhon's constituted value was related to his bank of exchange,
which was his method for extending constituted value to all other
commodities.
Proudhon's proposal to convert the bill of exchange into the
universal medium of exchange may be described in terms of the con
ditions under which a "debt" in the Keynesian sense can be used as
"money."

Keynes said that there was no hard and fast division be

tween a "debt" and money;

"We can treat as money any command over

general purchasing power which the owner haB not parted with for a
period in excess of. . .three months, one month, or three days or

^®Econcmic Contradictions, I, p. 291.

three hours or any other period; or we can exclude from money what
ever is not legal tender on the spot."^2^

The use of a "debt," i.e.,

Proudhon's bill of exchange, directly as money, would be possible in
circumstances in which there was no reason for preferring money.

If

there were no uncertainty about the future value of a "debt," and
if it could at any time be converted into general purchasing power
without inconvenience to the owner, there would be no preference for
holding money,

Proudhon believed that his program would create an

ideal exchange economy in which production and circulation would be
well coordinated, and in which there would exist no uncertainty about
the liquidity of bills of exchange (about the debtor's ability and
willingness to pay).

" D e b t s l i k e bank notes, would earn no interest. ,

Under these circumstances the distinction between money and "debts"
would have no practical significance.

The rate of interest could be

zero as Proudhon believed it would be.
Whether such a scheme is realizable under private enterprise
production raises an issue of the validity of the program and of the
significance of the theory devised in support of such a program.

If

an investigation of this problem were made, it would probably indicate
that the evidence, drawn from the historical development of the private
enterprise economy, would be against supposing such a proposal workable.
One of the essential implications of the formal principles of a free
enterprise economy is that the less efficient forms will be forced out
of the market.

ttie competitive process itself produces uncertainty

concerning the future exchange "value" of any particular debt and

^General Theory, p. 167.
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affords a basis for preferring cash to "debts."

It is likewise

difficult to imagine that a system of production based on private
enterprise could be coordinated in production, circulation, and con
sumption after the fashion of an ideal planned economy.

The least

shock may interrupt the chain of payments by bills of exchange.
Goods would depreciate and if the fall in prices gained momentum,
a cumulative deflation and crisis would result.
Uiere are, then, fundamental similarities among the concepts
liquidity-preference, basic-interest, and constituted value.

Each

involves the notion that money possesses distinctive qualities which
cause it to be preferred, particularly in times of crisis, to all other
forms of wealth.

When on individual acquires money from the sale of

commodities, there is no social control over its subsequent use.

The

money may be withheld from circulation, thus failing to be exchanged
for commodities produced in anticipation of exchanging for money.
Again, the money may be used for speculative transaction.’ Hie diver
sion of money away from industrial transactions interferes with the
process of production by reducing the money demand for consumption and
investment goods,

lhis is the heart of the Proudhon, Gesell, Keynes

tradition and to view Keynes* theory of interest and money as a revolu
tionary contribution to economic thought is to completely ignore this
strong tradition.
Arguments for reform which involve an attack on incomereceiving groups characteristically take on a theoretical dress
which attempts to demonstrate that the group attacked occupies a
non-functional position in the creation of output.

KeyrieB, Gesell,
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and Proudhon all point to the rentier as non-functional and conclude
that the rentier will disappear with the inauguration of a rational
program of reform.

They all point out that the institutional mech

anism which is responsible for rentier income is contrary to the
interests of society because it inhibits the activity of the entre
preneur, the initiator of new enterprise and innovations.

The com

munity will benefit from a lowering of the rate of interest because
it facilitates transferring the use of wealth into the control of the
active entrepreneur from the control of the inactive rentier or specu
lator.
Uhe attack on the rentier involves in each case arguments
that the payment of interest is not necessary to induce individual
saving, and also that the rate of social accumulation will be accel
erated by a low or zero rate of interest.

It is not necessary to

deny the tendency of individuals to save more out of a given income
at a higher rate of interest than at a lower rate.

Die essence of

this position is to regard the rate of interest as the principal
deterrent to the creation of income.

The functional relationship

between the rate of interest and the volume of saving from a given
income is of secondary importance.

The existence of unemployed

resources is the substantial basis which gives validity to the argu
ment that consumption and the accumulation of capital can proceed to
gether.

This contrasts with the orthodox view that accumulation can

increase only at the expense of consumption, or vice-versa.

Thus

Proudhon said:
It is not the multiplication of capital which decreases
the rate of interest, but the decrease in the rate of
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Interest which increases capital.^0
G e s e U said:
The greater the fall in interest, the greater the amount
of real capital created. . .If interest is an incentive,
it is still more an obstacle to saving. ^31
Keynes said:
Thus, even if it is the case that a rise in the rate of
interest would cause the community to save more out of
a given income, we can be quite sure that a rise in the
rate of interest. . .will decrease the actual aggregate
of savings.132
All ‘three theorists were extreme optimists concerning the rate
at which accumulation would proceed if substantial reductions were made
in the rate of interest.

They believed that within a relatively brief

period capital could be deprived of its scarcity value so that the re
turn over the life of an investment would Just be equal to its cost.
Keynes estimated that in countries as wealthy as the United States and
Great Britain, a period of about twenty-five years would be required
to reduce the marginal efficiency of capital to zero.^^

Gesell be

lieved likewise that unimpeded production would soon lead to an "ocean
of real capital necessary to drown interest."^*’
’ He gives no specific
indication as to how long this would take but says that interest- would
have been eliminated long ago, had not production been frustrated by
the traditional medium of exchange.^5
Proudhon was iess clear as to the length of the period requisite

130Qeuvres completSs, X3X, p. 267 .
•^ T h e Natural Economic Order, pp. 250, 251.
^

General Theory, p. 111.

^

Ibld., p> ^2k.

•^The Natural Economic Order, p. 262 .

‘^

Ibld., p< 361 .
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under the bank of exchange plan to abolish interest.

The actual

proposals which he drew and presented for adoption called for a
gradual lowering of the discount rate, thou^i his writings often
implied that the interest rate could be reduced forthwith to zero.
The passage from Proudhon which Gesell quotes at the opening of The
Natural Economic Order is, however, a significant indication of the
similarity in their views.

"Qhe surest method of depreciating real

capital. . .is to create and operate additional real capital.

By

every economic law, increased production of capital increases also
the total of the capital supplied to the workers, thus raising wages
and finally reducing interest to zero'.'^6
Opposition to the so-cdlled productivity and abstinence
theories followed logically from this position on interest.

The

interpretation of interest as a scarcity rent paid for the use of
unnecessarily scarce capital assets is not consistent with the view
that capital is "productive."

All versions of the productivity theory

wereexplicitly rejected by P r o u d h o n , G e s e l l ,

and

Keynes.

If all income is said to be created by labor, including the efforts
of entrepreneurs, the income received by the owners of capital is
not a consequence of the "productivity" of capital, but a deduction
from the income created by labor.

In this sense the interest theories

of Proudhon, Gesell, and Keynes are "exploitation" theories.

3.

The

Cited by Gesell from Proudhon's What is Property?

^ o e u v r e s completes t XIX, passim, esp. pp. 217, 291.
^•38>[he Natural Economic Order, pp. 268, 2 69 .
■^ G e n e r a l Theory, pp. 213-217.
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exploitation results from the institutional monopoly vhlch centers
around the restrictive tendencies of financial capital.
The above comparative analysis indicates that there Is a sig
nificant theoretical similarity corresponding to the similar practical
outlooks of Proudhon, Gesell, and Keynes.

Their attack on financial

capital directed their emphasis toward money and Interest theory, and
led to Interesting uniformities In seme of the special aspects of the
respective theories.

Thus Keynes' place In the

history of economic

thought, so far as money and Interest theories are concerned, Is with
the "circulation" reformers, the monetary "heretics."

1^0

Keynes was

completely honest when he said:
Now I range myself with the heretics. I believe their flair
and their instinct move them towards the right conclusion.
But I was brought up In the citadel. . .A large part of the
established body of econanic doctrine I cannot but accept as
broadly correct. I do not'doubt it. For me, therefore, It
Is Impossible to rest satisfied until I can put my finger on
that part of the orthodox reasoning that leads me to the
conclusions that for various reasons seem to me to be unac
ceptable. I believe that I am on my way to do so. There Is,
I am convinced, a fatal flaw In the part of orthodox reason
ing that deals with the theory of what determines the level
of effective demand and the volume of aggregate employment;
the flaw being largely due to the failure of the classical
doctrine to develop a satisfactory and realistic theory of
the rate of Interest.1^!

lUOjhQ material in this chapter Is based upon Dudley Dillard,
Proudhon and Gesell; Antecedents of John Maynard Keynes' General
Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. An unpublished Doctoral
Dissertation, 19^0.
M. Keynes, "A Self-Adjusting Economic SyBtem," The
New Republic, IXXXII (February 20, 1935)» P* 36.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS

No longer do professional economists debate whether or not
the economics of John Maynard Keynes had tremendous Influence upon
economic theory, inquiry, thinking, and policy.

The validity of the

many facets of Keynesianism is still a topic for discussion, but It
Is safe to say that now— after twenty years of the General Theory—
all economists agree that economic theory was profoundly affected by
J. M. Keynes, the English aristocrat, a scholar of Eton and King’s
College, Cambridge, a director of the Bonk of England, an advisor to
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, a peer of the Realm.'1' This is not
to say that all economists have become Keynesians or Keynesian economists.

p

The economics of Keynes has its converts and critics, its

friends and foes, and there are those who classify themselves as
Keynesians and there are economists who consider themselves to be

•^See: OBITUART— The Times (London), April 22, 1946, Reprinted
in The New Economics— Keynes ’ influence on Theory and Public Policy
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945). Hereafter cited as The New
Economics.
2The writer has heard H. L. McCracken, Professor of Economic
Theory and Head of the Department of Economics at Louisiana State
University, say many timeB that there is a great difference between
a Keynesian and a Keynesian economist. A Keynesian is one who begdns
and ende: his study of economic theory with the General Theory. A
Keynesian economist, on the other hand, is one who has been thoroughly
trained in the complete history of economic thought, with the General
Theory being only a part of his economic education.
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non- or anti-KeynesIans.

But they all agree that Keynes ". . .stirred

the stale economic frog pond to its depth.
Seymour Harris says, "Keynes' influence, both in theory and
practice, has of course been outstanding.

It is indeed doubtful

whether any other economist ever had so large an influence on policy,
and particularly in so short a time."14' Harris' final appraisal of
the General Theory is that;
. . .Keynes was undoubtedly the great figure in economics
of the twentieth century and may well prove to be the
giant of m o d e m economics. . .Certainly, the economic
historian interpreting the middle year^ of the 20 th cen
tury will characterize the period b b the struggle for,
and over, full employment. He may well refer to the
period as the Keynesian period in the same manner as we
now refer to the Mercantilist, the Physiocratic, and the
Classical periods. He will point to Keynes' emphasis on
the level of employment against the classical concern with
the allocation of economic resources; he will stress
Keynes' skill in marshalling available weapons and tech
niques and inventing of new oneB for attaining the objective;
and he will comment on the persuasive manner in which the
message was passed to disciples and policy-makers.5
Alvin H. Hansen, perhaps the most thorougi-going Keynesian
economist in the United States, does not believe that one should draw
a complete line of demarcation dividing pre-Keynesian and Keynesian
economics.

Nevertheless, "If a stranger from Mars," he says, "should

undertake to read the literature of economics from, say, 1700 to the
present day, he would be struck, I believe, particularly by the new

^Gottfried Haberler, "Hie General Theory," The New Economics,
p. l6 l.
^Seymour Harris, "Keynes' Influence on Public Policy," The
New Economics, p. 12.
^Seymour Harris, "About This Book," and "Keynes’ Influence on
Public Policy," The New Economics, pp. 6 , 15.
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direction and outlook injected by the publication of (a) Wealth of
Nationst (b) the works of Jevons, the Austrians, and Walras, and

£
(c) Keynes' General Theory.11 . Hansen's attitude toward the economics
of Keynes may be summarized by quoting the following statements:
It is evident that a new outlook was injected into econanics, both with respect to theory and policy, by the publi
cation of the General Theory. That it was not Just "old
stuff" is evidenced by the terrific effort it required for
economists to readjust their thinking and, indeed, the dif
ficulty they had in understanding what it was all about.
Witness, for example, the first reviews (including my own)
and the endless controversial articles on concepts which,
in retrospect, are rarely a credit to the profession.
More and more, even those who professed to see little in
Keynes that was new or valid began to reveal that they
had experienced a rebirth despite their protestations to
the contrary. Add to this the fact that the Influence of
Keynes permeates all official international gatherings grap
pling with economic problems and is present wherever internal
economic problems are under consideration. . .It is difficult
to avoid the conclusion that nothing like it has happened in
the whole history of economics. It is too early to say, but
it does not now appear an extravagant statement, that Keynes
may in the end rival Adam Smith in his influence on the econcraic thinking and governmental policy of his time and age. . .
Paul Samuelson, probably the most outstanding young Keynesian
economist in this country, believes that the doctrines of Keynes have
correctly been named "The Keynesian Revolution."

Becoming lyrical

in his praise for the great English economist, Samuelson says, "To
have been b o m as an economist before 1936 was a boon--yes.
to have been b o m too long before!

But not

Bliss was it in that dawn to be

^Alvin H. Hansen, "The General Theory," The New Economics,
p. 133.
7Ibid., pp. lk3~lhk.

®Paul Samuelson, "The General Theory," The New Economics,
p. 1^5.
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alive, But to be young was very heaven?"^
The General Theory caugit most economists under the age
of 35 vith the unexpected virulence of a disease first at
tacking and decimating an isolated tribe of south sea islanders.
Economists beyond fifty turned out to be quite Immune to the
ailment. With time, most economists in-between began to run
the fever, often without knowing or admitting their condition.
With respect to the influence of the General Theory and its
importance as a lasting body of thought, Samuelson takes a firm stand:
Fashion always plays an important role in economic science;
new concepts become the mode and then are passe. . .In this
case, gradually and against heavy resistance, the realization
grew that the new analysis of effective demand associated with
the General Theory w b b not to prove such a passing fad, that
here indeed was part of "the wave of the future." This im
pression was confiimed by the rapidity with which English
economists, other than those at Cambridge, took up the new
Gospel: e.g., Harrod, Meade, and others, at Oxford; and,
still more surprisingly, the young blades at the-London
School, like Kaldor, Lemer, and Hicks, who threw off their
Hayekian garments and joined in the swim.
Instead of burning out like a fad, ten years after its
birth, the General Theory is still gaining adherents and
appears to be in business to stay. Many economists who
are most vehement in criticism of the specific Keynesian
policies— which must always be carefully distinguished from
the scientific analysis associated with his name— will never
again be the same after passing through his hands.
Finally, and perhaps most important from the long-run
standpoint, the Keynesian analysis has begun to filter down
into the elementary text-books; and, as everybody knows,
once an idea gets Into these, however bad it may be, it be
comes practically immortal.
So much for the unswerving admiration of the Keynesian econo
mists for the General Theory. They are disciples of Lord Keynes in the
truest meaning of the term.

Although Samuelson believes that the "new

doctrines" of Keynes are something more than a religion, he refers to
Keynes and the General Theory in a religious manner.

9Ibid., (Italics by Samuelson).
^Ibid., pp. 1U6 -IU7 .

"True, we find

10 Ibid., p. lU6 .

(Italics by Samuelson).
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a Gospel, a Scripture, a Prophet, Disciples, Apostles, Epigoni, ana
even

aDualityj and if there 1b no Apostolic Succession, there is

at least an Apostolic Benediction."

12

And Harris refers to the General

Theory as "the Keynesian bible," and says, "Keynes indeed had the
Bevelation.

His disciples are new dividing into groups, each taking

sustenance from the Keynesian larder.

Die struggle for the Apostolic

Succession is o n . " ^
But even the critics have had high praise for Keynes* idea
system.

In commenting upon Keynes* influence, Joseph Schumpeter sajs.;
A Keynesian school formed itself, not a school in that
loose sense in which some historians of economics speak of
a French, German, Italian school, but a genuine one which is
a sociological entity, namely, a group that professes al
legiance to one master and one doctrine, and has its inner
circle, its propagandists, its watchwords, its esoteric and
its popular doctrine. Nor is this all. Beyond the pale of
orthodox Keynesianism there is a broad fringe of sympathizers,
and beyond this again are the many who have absorbed, in one
form or another, readily or grudgingly, some of the spirit
or some of the individual itemB of Keynesian analysis. There
are but two analogous cases In the whole history of econcmics-the Physiocrats and the Marxists.^
And Paul Sweezy, a Marxian and hence an anti-Keynesian, has

characterized Keynes as "one of the most brilliant and versatile gen
iuses of our time. . .the most important and illustrious product of
the neo-classical school,. . .whose mission was to reform neo-classical
economics, to bring it back into contact with the real world."

Sweezy

has said that he has no doubt that "Keynes is the greatest British

^ Ibid.. p. lJ+7 .
^Seymour Harris, "About Diis Book," The New Economics,
PP.

9.
^Joseph Schumpeter, "Keynes, Die Economist," Die New Economics,

P. 97.
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(or American) economist since Bicardo," and that he thinks "his school
sheds a flood of ligit on the functioning of the capitalist economy.
Thus economists are in agreement that the Keynesian idea sys
tem was a phenomenal development in the history of economic theory.
No one now denies the fact that Keynes' equilibrium analysis has had
tremendous influence on economic policy.

According to the best au

thorities the economics of Keynes has forced all economists to subject
their thinking to a rather rigid re-examination, and has had the effect
of compelling many to revise and reformulate their basic theoretical
framework.
Of course it comes as no great surprise to anyone to learn
that the Keynesian economists account for the great popularity and in
fluence of the General Theory on the basis that contained within the
Keynesian idea system are very important and everlasting contributions
to economic science.

It is claimed that Keynes manufactured new ana

lytical tools by the use of which the economic problems of the present
day can be solved.

"Keynes contributed Importantly to the solution

of the following problems:

reparations, exchange rates, international

equilibrium, appropriate rates of interest, central banking policy,
inflation, deflation and wastage of economic resources, and employment.
Ihese problems are, of course, interrelated; they are not, and perhapB
never will be, solved satisfactorily; nevertheless, by removing under
brush, building foundations, and illuminating the signposts, Keynes

•*-5paul Sweezy, "John Maynard Keynes," Science and Society,
X (Fall, 19^6), p. i+m.
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prepared the road to full employment and stability."
Lawrence R. Klein wrote The Keynesian Revolution in 19*+7> a
book which was based on his doctoral thesis written in 19^

at the

Massachusetts Institute of Technology under the guidance and inspi
ration of Paul Samuelson.

In the Foreword, Klein says, "Hie Keynesian

theory is viewed in the following pages as a revolutionary doctrine in
the sense that it produces theoretical results entirely different from
the body of economic thou$it existing at the time of its development.
The 'Revolution' discussed here is a revolution in thou^it, not in the
economic policies of government."^

According to Klein, once Keynes

realized that orthodox interest theory did not conform to the facts of
the real world and what was needed was a theory of income determination
to replace traditional interest rate theory, "a revolution occurred in
economic theory."

Klein also maintained that Keynes' refusal to ac

cept the standard theory of flexible wage rates as a cure for unemployment rendered the Keynesian system revolutionary.

19

Klein asked "what has been Keynes' revolutionary contribution?"
And he answers the question in a quite precise manner;
. . .the revolution was solely the development of a theory
of effective demand; i.e., a theory of the determination of
the level of output as a whole.
There are two major economic problems— the problem of
achieving full employment, and the problem of allocating
resources in a full-employment economy. Keynes haB shown
how the level of employment gets determined, and thus has
provided a theory with which to attack the first problem.

l^Seymour Harris, "Keynes' Influence on Public Policy," Hie
New Economics, pp. 12, 13.
^Lawrence R. Klein, The Keynesian Revolution (New York;
Macmillan Company, 19*+7) p. vii.
l8 Ibld., p. 3 7 .

19 Ibid., p. Wj.

The
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He did not presume to advance a solution of the second problem,
except in so far as the first must necessarily be cleared
away before thinking about the second can start.2°
Samuelson is in basic agreement with Klein concerning the sig
nificance of Keynes' work when he says, "I myself believe the broad
significance of the General Theory to be in the fact that it provides
a relatively realistic, complete system for analyzing the level of effective demand and its fluctuations."

21

In a more restricted or spe

cific sense:
I conceive the heart of its contribution to be in that
subset of its equations which relate to the propensity to
consume and to saving in relation to offsets-to-saving.
In addition to linking saving explicitly to income, there
is an equally important denial of the implicit "classical
axiom that motivated investment is indefinitely expansible
or contractable, so that whatever people try to save will
always be fully invested.22
Harris thinks the great contribution of the General Theory to
bo its adaptation of economics,
to the changing institutional structure of m o d e m society.
Economics had failed to keep pace with the developments of
science, of government, of changes in the market-place, of
organization by groups, and in general with institutional
developments. Up to 1936, when the General Theory was first
published, accepted economics in general belonged much more
to the vanished age of competition, of capital deficiencies,
of full employment or transitional unemployment, and the like,
than to the twentieth-century economy which tolerated and,
to some extent encouraged, monopolies, rigidities, excessive
savings, deficiency of demand, and unemployment. To make
up for the growing lag, Keynes sailed boldly and vigorously

2QIbld., p. 5 6 .
21paul Samuelson, "Lord Keynes and the General Theory,"
Econometrlca, XIV, No. 3 (July, 19*+6), P« 192.
22paul Samuelson, '"Dae General Theory," The New Economics,
p. 151. (Italics by Samuelson).

into uncharted

w a t e r s . 2^

Hansen is very specific concerning what he believes to be Keynes'
greatest contribution in the General Theory.

"It has been my con

viction for many years," he says, "that the great contribution of
Keynes' General Theory was the clear and specific formulation of the
consumption function.

This is an epoch-making contribution to the

tools of economic analysis, analogous to, but even more important
than, Marshall's discovery of the demand function."

oh

In more general

terms, Hansen says, "The effect of variations in income upon all man
ner of economic variables has, since Keynes, become an important field
for research and analysis.

Income analysis at long last occupies-a

place equally as important as price analysis."

25

Dudley Dillard sees a very close relationship between the
theoretical and the policy concepts of the General Theory.

First,

"Keynes1 major purpose may be characterized as an attempt to buttress
political liberalism with a new economic program and to fortify this
economic program with a new political economy."

26

Second, "The his

toric significance of Keynes' new political economy is that it fur
nishes the theoretical basis for a new liberalism, which, unlike
classical liberalism, rejects laissez-faire."

27

And finally, "The

2 3seymour Harris, "About This Book," The New Economics, p. h.

""Alvin Hansen, "The General Theory," The Hew Economics,
P. 135.
25 Ibid., p. 135 , 136 .
26

York:

Dudley Dillard, The Economics of John Maynard Keynes (New
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 19^8), p. 3lST
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ultimate significance of the theory. . .resides in the program of
action with which it is associated."

pA

Schumpeter and Haberler, perhaps the two leading critics of
Keynes in this country, concede a victory for the General Theory hut
for somewhat different reasons than those given by the disciples of
Keynes.

Haberler attributes, as a partial cause,
. . .the brilliance of (Keynes') style, the versatility,
incredible quickness, and fecundity of his mind, the manysidedness of his intellectual interests, the sharpness of
his wit, in one word the fullness of his personality.
(These, he says, were) bound to fascinate scores of people
in and outside the economic profession. Only a dullard
or narrow-minded fanatic could fail to be moved to admi
ration by Keynes' genius.29

He further notes:
The tremendous appeal of the General Theory to theoretioallymihdpd economists has been attributed by many to the (alleged)
fact that it uses for the first time in the history of economic
thought a general equilibrium approach in easily manageable
macroscopic (aggregative) terms.3°
Yet in Haberler's opinion neither the brilliance of Keynes' style and
wit nor the attractiveness of macroscopic general equilibrium analysis
is the major cause of the sweeping success of the General Theory.

On

the contrary, "we can safely assume," he sayB, "that the concrete con
tent and the policy recommendations which Keynes and others deduced
from hia system had oven more to do with its persuasiveness (even for
\

his theoretically-minded followers) than its theoretical beauty and
simplicity."31

With respect to the thesis of this study, it is

28 Ibid.t p. 326 .

2 9Gottfried Haberler, "The General Theory,"
p. l6l.

3°Ibld., p. 162.

31Ibld.

Tie New Economics,
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interesting to note Haberler's attitude towards Keynes' aggregative
approach.

"The

by no means new.

ubo

of aggregative systems of general equilibrium is

All business-cycle theories run in macroscopic

terms.
Schumpeter in an even more straightforward manner attributes
the appeal of the General theory to the fact that it once more re
duces economics, which over the past decades "had been growing in
creasingly complex and increasingly incapable of giving straightforward
answers to straightforward questions. . .to simplicity," and enables
"the economist once more to give simple advice that everybody can
understand."

Yet, Schumpeter continues, "exactly as in the case of

Ricardian economics there was enough to attract, to inspire even, the
sophisticated.

Die same system that linked up so well with the notions

of the untutored mind proved satisfactory to the best brains of the
rising generation of theorists."33
Ihis reminds one of Keynes' answer in the General Theory to a
similar question pertaining to David Ricardo's Principles, viz., what
accounts for the victory of Ricardian economics over the Malthusian
doctrine of inadequacy of general demand?

According to Keynes,

"Ricardo conquered England as completely as the Holy Inquisition
conquered Spain.

Not only was his theory accepted by the city, by

statesmen and by the academic world.

^14But controversy ceased. . ."**

32lbld.
33joseph Schumpeter, "Keynes, the Economist," The New Economics,
pp. 99, 100 .
3^General Theory, p. 32.
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The completeness of the Ricardian victory is something
of a curiosity and a mystery. It must have been due to a
complex of suitabilities in the doctrine to the environment
into which it was projected. That it reached conclusions
quite different from what the ordinary uninstructed person
would expect, added, I suppose, to its intellectual prestige.
That its teaching, translated into practice, was austere and
often unpalatable, lent it virtue. That it was adapted to
carry a vast and consistent logical superstructure, gave it
beauty. That it could explain much social injustice and
apparent cruelty as an inevitable incident in the scheme of
progress, and the attempt to change such things as likely
on the whole to do more harm than good, commended it to
authority. That it afforded a measure of justification to
the free activities of the individual capitalist, attracted
to it the support of the dominant social force behind au
thority. 35
Like Ricardo's Principles, the General Theory also was highly suited
to the environment into which it was projected--the breakdown of
capitalism in the great depression of the nineteen thirties,

Like

Ricardian theory, the General Theory reached "conclusions quite dif
ferent from what the ordinary uninstructed person mi#it expect."

It

may be noted, among others, the conclusions that employment and real
income ore independent of the price level and money wage rates, that
saving is a residual and is determined by the level of investment,
that thrift is generally an economic vice and spending an economic
virtue, that boondoggling in a depression increases income and the
wealth of the nation.

The General Theory, like Ricardo's Principles,

is "adapted to carry a vast and consistent logical superstructure."
Here, thou$i, the similarity ends.
Keynes' teaching translated into practice is not, like Ricardo's,
austere and unpalatable.

Quite the contrary.

35Ibid., pp. 32, 33.

It calls for hi^ier
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living, more consumption, and more leisure.

It explains social

injustice and apparent cruelty not as an inevitable incident in the
scheme of progress, but as a result of stupidity and ignorance which
prevent the formulation of policies and the

ubo

of controls already

at hand to establish and maintain full employment and maximum income.
Since these policies, thougji, call for a rather severe redistribution
of income and a vast deal of government interference in the activities
of businessmen, the General Theory is damned by authority and by the
dominant social force that stands behind authority.
Undoubtedly all the opinions noted above as to the signifi
cance of the General Theory to economic theory and public policy are
important.

The writer should like to submit, however, the idea that

the above list does not include one important and significant point of
the General Theory.

Schumpeter hints at this idea, but his analysis

does not include the essential point.

He notes that in economics such

enthusiasm--and correspondingly strong averBions--as greeted the General
Theory "never flare up unless the cold steel of analysis derives a
temperature not naturally its own from the real or putative political
implications of the analyst’s message."?^

A survey of the development

of economic thou^tit will reveal the fact that economic theory at any
given time is an intellectual reaction to particularly pressing eco
nomic issues and problems of the time.
major issues demand resolution.

Major problems demand solutionsj

The great shifts in economic theory

(for example, from Mercantilism to Classical doctrine) have been

^Joseph Schumpeter, "Keynes, the Economist," The Hew Economics,
P. 98.
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Intellectual responses to the changes in economic conditions; that is
to say, the great systems of economic thou^it originally were developed
in an attempt to solve problems and resolve issues.

The economic

theorists who have contributed most to economic thought have been the
great thinkers who were deeply concerned with the issues that concerned
their generations.

Their theories were attempts to deal scientifically

with those problems.

Thus economic theory does not develop in a vacuum;

it is an intellectual response to economic problems, issues, conditions,
and circumstances of the time.

In consequence perhaps each of the great

systems of economic thought in its time derived "a temperature not
naturally its own" from the political implications of its message.
Several examples supporting the above thesis may be given.
Adam Smith lived during a period that witnessed a gradual disintegra
tion of mercantillstic theory and a very rapid integration of the
policy of individual initiative in economic affairs.

This rise of

individual initiative was hampered by the multitudinous regulations
of economic activity which the government exerted under its scheme
of economic planning.

Smith was a philosopher.

He lived at a time

when economics was juBt beginning to separate itself clearly from
other disciplines and interests.

Reflecting on existing conditions,

he became convinced that the policy of economic planning inhibited
the progress of the nation.

So he propounded the idea that progress

would be greater if the government interferred less.

He was concernod

with the wealth of nations and the policy that would allow a nation
to most fully achieve its potentialities.

This was the issue he

raised and it is still one that men are debating.

Smith centered
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economic theory on the problem of the production of wealth and how
best to encourage this production.
as he saw it.
cal.

That was the problem of economics

Thus, Smith was interested in something hi^ily practi

In fact, he was dealing with the overwhelming issue of his age,

and he came to quite definite conclusions as to what should be the
best policy for the English government to follow.

In addition, he

did not hestitate to say what he thou$it.
Another example is Thomas Malthus and his theory of population.
Malthus lived at a time when the industrial revolution was beginning
to produce its marked effects on the increased population.

Population

was increasing at its most rapid rate in history, and this was particu
larly true in England.

In addition, the French Revolution had dras

tically disrupted foreign trade channels, and later the continental
blockade by Napoleon cut England off from her food supply just when
she had ceased to be self-supporting.

Malthus reflected on these

practical issues and his conclusions were set forth in his theory of
population.
David Ricardo presents another example.

Adam Smith centered

his economics around the problem of how to increase the wealth of
nations.

Ricardo changed the perspective of economic theory to the

problem of distribution of wealth.

Ho believed that the Job of eco

nomics was to search out and analyze the determinants of the dis
tribution of income among the three great classes that composed
society:

capitalists, landowners, and laborers.

He differed from

Smith on the fundamental problem with which economics should be con
cerned.

This difference

wbb

because of the economic conditions that
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existed In Ricardo’s time.

Ihe great problem In government was the

Issue posed by the C o m Laws.

These laws Imposed Import duties upon

the Importation of the staple food products of the British people.
Everybody believed that these laws would mean an increase in the price
of food.

Economic theory of the time related money wages with the cost

of living; hence, higji food prices would mean hi$i wages.

This would

mean h i ^ e r costs of production for the entrepreneur, which would place
British merchants at a disadvantage in competing with other countries
for both foreign and domestic markets.

The rising class of manufac

turers and merchants were greatly concerned
lest they should decrease their profits.

with these Corn Laws

On the other hand, the

landowners favored the C o m Laws as protecting their rents.

The

Laws kept up the price of agricultural foods thereby keeping up rent.
So the issue was clearly drawn.

The issue was the distribution of in

come between landowners and the capitalists.

It was generally believed

that the Corn Laws increased rents and reduced profits.

That was the

issue which was largely responsible for Ricardian economics.

It was

because of him that the issue of distribution became the central theme
of economics for the following one hundred years.

Clearly, Ricardo

attempted to solve a practical problem of the day.
Many such examples could be given.
to suffice, however.

One final one will have

John Stuart Mill lived during the period when

England was reaching maturity industrially and the evils of the in
dustrial revolution were becoming apparent to everybody.
living conditions and extremely low wages were prevalent.

Crowded
British

capitalists were growing wealthier and wealthier, while the laborers

were becoming poorer and poorer.

What should be done about this

condition was a major Issue of the time.

Economists had long since

adopted the theory that economic laws were natural laws about which
nothing could be done.

Mill was a logician and a humanitarian, and

he was deeply concerned with existing economic conditions.

He dis

agreed with the economists’ concept of natural laws and drew a dis
tinction between the laws of production and the laws of distribution.
In other words, he distinguished between the wealth of a nation and
the distribution of that wealth.

He said the laws of production were

natural, but those of distribution were not,

The laws of distri

bution resulted from the institutions of the society.

Hence, they

were man made--man had made them; man could change them.

He explained

that the laws of distribution were different in different societies,
and that, lie believed, proved his position.

Mill believed that to a

very great degree, the future welfare of the nation depended upon what
alterations were made in the methods of distribution of income.

Thus,

Mill was concerned with the practical issue of his day and his theory
reflects this interest.
And so it was with the economics of J. M. Keynes.

The General

Theory was an intellectual response to the momentous economic problems
and issues created when capitalism ceased to. function throughout the
Western world between 1929 and 1936.^
this period were terrifying.

For everyone, the events of

The most direful predictions of Karl

^ T o be sure, the depression continued for another four or
five years, but its most terrible phase was between 1929 and 1936 ,
particularly between 1929 and 1933.
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Marx seemed to have a better than even chance of coming true.

In

the United States, the wealthiest and strongest of the capitalist
countries, capitalism appeared to be In its death throes with some
thing like fifteen million people walking the streets searching for
any kind of work and the great American industrial system— the envy
of the world--operating at less than fifteen per cent capacity.

The

Gross National Product declined from 103.8 billion dollars in 1929 to
55*8 billion dollars in 1933, the low point of the depression.

Personal

income fell from 85.1 billion dollars to k6.6 billion dollars during
the same period.

Personal savings were 3.7 billion dollars in 1929

and a negative 1.2 billion dollars in 1933.

It is interesting to note

what happened to personal consumption expenditures and private domestic
investment, the two most important economic indicators in the Keynesian
system, during this same period.

Personal consumption expenditures

declined from 78.8 billion dollars to b6.3 billion dollars.

Private

domestic investment decreased from 15.8 billion dollars to 1.3 billion
OQ

dollars.

Something had to be done, but what?
To provide a theory adequate to diagpiose the illness of capi

talism in the Great Depression and thus to indicate what was required
to be done to restore that system to health and vigor was the task
Keynes set himself in the General Theory.

For Keynes was convinced

that the postulates of the classical theory were applicable only to
a special case, and "the characteristics of the special case assumed

^Statistics taken from W. Nelson Peach and Walter Krause,
Basic Data of the American Economy (Chicago: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.,
3rd. Ed., 1950-1951),"PP. 9, 11, 13, 1^.
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by the classical theory happen not to be those of the economic society
In which we actually live, with the result that its teaching is mis
leading and disastrous if we attempt to apply it to the facts of ex
perience,"^
Keynes was not a socialist, radical or otherwise.

He did not

claim to be a member of the Proletariat; he had nothing but scorn for
Marxian economics, and certainly there is no adherence in the General
Theory to Marx' "class-strugglc" theory of history.

Keynes promulgated

his ideas concerning Marxism and the economic system of Soviet Russia
after visiting that country in the early part of the nineteen twenties.
Writing in 1925; Keynes says, "Marxian Socialism must always remain a
portent to the historians of Opinion--hop a doctrine so illogical and
so dull can have exercised

bo

powerful and enduring an influence over

the minds of men, and, through them, the events of history.

How can

I accept a doctrine which sets up as its bible, above and beyond criti
cism, an obsolete economic textbook which I know to be not only scien
tifically erroneous but without interest or application for the modern
1+0

world."

Keynes concluded that perhaps communism had a future, but it
would be as a new religion and not as a more efficient form of economic
organization.

And he was quite impressed with the economic inefficiency

of the Soviet Union;
On the economic side I cannot perceive that Russian

^General Theory, p. 3#
^Pjohn Maynard Keynes, Laissez-Faire and Communism (New York:
New Republic, Inc., 1926), pp. 1+7; *+8, 99.
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Communism has made any contribution to our economic problems
of intellectual interest or scientific value. I do not think
that it contains, or is likely to contain, any piece of use
ful economic technique which we could not apply, if we chose,
with equal or greater success in a society which retained all
the marks. . .of British bourgeois ideals.
As to aligning himself on one side or the other in case the class strug
gle

materialized, Keynes refused to become a member of the Labourparty

in England, desiring to be associated with
"boorish proletariat."

the bourgeoisie and not the

Keynes listed his reasons for not joining the

Labour party in quite precise terms:
To begin with, it is a class party, and the class is not
my class. If I am going to pursue sectional interests at
all, I shall pursue my own. When it comes to the class
struggle as such, my local and personal patriotisms,. . .
are attached to my own surroundings. I can be influenced
by what seems to me to be Justice and good sense; but the
Class war will find me on the side of the educated bour
geoisie. g
Althou^i these philosophical, economic, and political ideas were ex
pressed in 1925--long before he started writing the General Theory-there is no evidence in his published works after 1925 to indicate
that he changed his basic thinking in those areas.

In point of fact,

on pages 380 and 38 I of the General Theory and on pages 7, 53 > on*3 55
of How to Pay for the War, there is positive evidence which indicates
a continuation of his earlier views.
However, there are similarities between Keynes and Marx.

The

General Theory, like Das Kapital, teaches that unemployment and de
pression are the norms to which the capitalist economy tends.

Both

^ 1Ibld., p. 130 .
John Maynard Keynes, Essays in Persuasion (New York:
Brace, and Co., 1932), p. 321*. (Italics by Keynes).

Harcourt,
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Keynes and Marx were aware of deficient demand and oversaving, of
the declining profit rate resulting from limited investment oppor
tunities, of the unwisdom of capital exportation.

But Keynes was an

ardent believer in and defender of the virtues of industrial capital
ism.

That system, he was convinced, possessed great values and ad

vantages, values and advantages that must be preserved in the interest
of economic efficiency and of human dignity and freedom.
This, however, did not blind him to what he thou^it were the
major faults of capitalism.

For him, the illness of capitalism was

manifested in the form of periodic depressions that had tormented
industrial capitalism throu^iout its lifetime.

Keynes believed that

the most obvious faults of capitalism were its failure to, provide for
full employment and its arbitrary and inequitable distribution of
wealth and income.
and effect.

These faults, in his opinion, were linked as cause

But Keynes was sufficiently sophisticated to realize that

no economic system is perfect.

And he was convinced that these faults

of industrial capitalism could be eliminated by measures that would
not impair the basic institutions of the system or injure any of its
vital organs.

Keynes has nothing but praise for industrial capital;

the villain in the plot is financial capital.

It is the presence and

operation of financial capital that causes capitalism to function by
a series of "spurts and stalls."

The source of the periodic sicknesses

(depressions) of the system is financial capital.
Keynes reserved his most vehement remarks for the rentier,
the idle and functionless receiver of property income, and the specu
lator, who, he says, has made the capital development of the country
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a "by-product of the activities of a c a s i n o . i n the Keynesian
system the rentier would be eliminated by reducing the rate of inter
est to zero.

Such a measure not only would mean the "euthanasia of

the r e n t i e r , a s he puts it, but would also cause investment to in
crease to the point at which the marginal efficiency of capital, the
expected return over cost, would fall to zero; that is to say, capital
goods would cease to be scarce.

He would make up for deficiency of

private Investment and eliminate the speculator as the guiding force
in investment by what he calls the "socialization of investment.
He never explains precisely what he means by socialized investment,
but perhaps he means a wide expansion of public investment to augment
private Investment and some public control of private investment.
These measures, together with progressive taxation and regressive
expenditures to raise the propensity to consume, constitute the major
means proposed by Keynes for correcting the faults of capitalism and
making it function effectively at higfr. levels of employment, output,
and income.

Collective ownership of the means of production, he in

sisted, was unnecessary.

"If the State is able to determine the ag

gregate amount of resources devoted to augmenting the instruments
and the basic rate of reward to those who own them," he says, "then
it will have accomplished all that is necessary."

He admits that

the controls required to insure full employment involve a large ex
tension of the traditional functions of government, but contends that
"there will still remain a wide field for the exercise of private

^ General Theory, Ch. 2U.

^ Ibid.

^ Ibid.

^ I b i d ., p. 378,
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Initiative and responsibility."

"By rig£it analysis," he concludes,

"it is possible. . .to cure the disease whilst preserving efficiency
and freedom.
Many economists insist that the Keynesian analysis is a
static one.

For example, John H. Williams says:

Assuming, as Keynes did, constant technique, and confining
himself to short-period analysis, with no analysis at all of
economic processes— how we get from one state of static equi
librium to another--Keynes' theory has always seemed to me
peculiarly inapt as a starting point for an analysis of growth
and change, and in this regard inferior to the classical
theory it was intended to supplant.
According to E. E. Hale;
He (Keynes) assumes that the technology of production is
constant and the amount of fixed capital unchanged through
out the periods which his analysis treats. He makes the
highly traditional assumption that perfect competition exists
throughout "the economy. No where in the General Theory is
there reference made to monopoly or monopolistic competition.
He assumes increasing costs and diminishing returns in all
industry as production increases. Of course this is neces
sary because of the assumption of constant techniques. Fi
nally, he assumes a closed economy. Indeed, Keynes yielded
to no person in making unrealistic assumptions. Die tech
nique that flows from these assumptions is one of static
equilibrium analysis in the tradition pf Ricardo and Marshall
and of classical economists generally.*"9
And Arthur Smithies states:
Die General Theory is static and consequently does not
take into account the fact that economic events at one point
of time are not independent of what went before and will

^ I b i d ., pp. 380, 381 .
^8Jchn H. Williams, Economic Stability in a Changing World
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1953); p. 11.
^9e, e. Hale, "Some Implications of Keynes' General Theory of
Employment, Interest, and Money," pp. 16, 17, an unpublished paper
read at the annual meeting of the Southwestern Social Science Associ
ation in 19^9 .
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not fail to influence what will occur subsequently.

50

If the economics of Keynes is static, then, the following interpre
tation of the General Theory may be made.
In a capitalist economy the rate of interest could not be
reduced to zero without completely nationalizing or socializing the
banking system, and the banking or credit system is the very heart
of capitalism.

With a zero rate of interest, Keynes assumes that

investment would be pushed to the point at which the marginal ef
ficiency of capital equals the rate of interest; that is to say, a
zero rate of interest would be the motivating force causing the mar
ginal efficiency of capital to fall to zero.

No one can possibly

predict all the effects of this drastic measure on the free enter
prise system, but one result is quite obvious.

Property income as

it is recognized in the capitalistic system would disappear, and the
desire to acquire and hold property would undergo change.

After all,

it is not the mere satisfaction of owning something that induces
people to acquire property; it is the income which property yields
to its owner that makes the acquisition of property significant.

If

the income producing power of property is eliminated, it is impos
sible for any rational person to argue that the desirability of own
ing property would remain unaltered.
Keynes concludes that when the marginal efficiency of capital
has fallen to zero, the rentier will have disappeared.
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Uiere is

•^Arthur Smithies, "Effective Demand and Employment," The
New Economics, pp. 558 , 559 .
5lsee Hale, og. cjt.

^ General Theory, p. 221.
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something of a hiatus in his argument at this point.

Hie euthanasia

of the rentier requires a zero rate of interest rather than a zero
marginal efficiency of capital.

In his own analysis, Keynes admits

that the interest rate could not be reduced to zero in the absence of
measures which are not suggested in his program.
case.

Indeed, that is the

As suggested above, it would be necessary to completely social

ize the banking and credit system of the economy to achieve a zero
rate of interest.

Hiat is what is not included in his program.

So

cialized investment is the instrument which will reduce the rate of
interest and the marginal efficiency of capital to a value of zero.
But if socialized investment, either of a self-liquidating or non
self-liquidating type, does not compete with private enterprise, it
will not lower the marginal efficiency of private industrial capital.
On this basis, the socialization of investment would be irrelevant to
its purported aim of lowering the marginal efficiency of capital, and
would be useful only as a means for increasing employment through the
modium of "make-work" projects.

If it does compete with private enter

prise, it will lower the marginal efficiency of private capital and
weaken the inducement to invest.

If carried to the extent necessary

to reduce the marginal efficiency of capital to zero, the inducement
to invest would be destroyed.

In the absence of some additional meas

ure to reduce the preference for liquidity, private wealth holders
will shift their holdings from industrial securities to money assets
on an ever increasing scale.

Ihus Keynbs' socialization of investment

can mean nothing less than a transition (perhaps gradual) to what he
deemed to be unnecessary, namely, government ownership of the means of
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production.

In the "social philosophy" of the General Theory, the

rentier must he eliminated, and also "the cumulative oppressive power
of the capitalist to exploit the scarcity value of capital.

53

Keynes said there was no way to maintain sufficient private
investment to fill the "gap" left between a full-employment income
level and the amount of that income spent by consumers on consump
tion.

dhe purpose of public investment is to absorb this difference,

and in so doing, maintain full employment which would serve as a
strong inducement to private investment.

This is not a simple "pump-

priming" proposition to be used until "things economic get better,"
but a permanent procedure to follow for the purpose of maintaining
. prosperity.

For Keynes, prosperity was not the normal condition of

capitalism; quite the contrary, a less than full-employment equilibrium
characterized the capitalistic system.

Consequently, a constant and

permanent injection of public expenditures was necessary.

Hence, it is

perfectly obvious that Keynes believed he was merely advocating that
public investment be used only to compensate for the deficiency of
private investment.

What form would this public investment take?

Well, the government could spend money on a host of investment pro
jects; for example, a m o d e m hi#iway system could.be constructed,
parks and playgrounds could be built all over the country, school
houses could be made to materialize wherever needed, and floodways,
dams, etc. could be built.

In short, the government would invest

heavily in those areas where private capital is reluctant to enter.
So far so good.

But after all these areas have been completely

53ibid., p. 376.
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developed, what then?

This Is a permanent program and thus the govern

ment would have to move Into those areas which are considered to be
for private investment only--starting perhaps with heavy industry and
moving through the whole industrial system.

And this is the manner

by which industrial capital would become socialized.

If this is added

to the method of reducing the rate of interest to zero (socializing
the banking and credit system), only one conclusion is possible.

Ihe

entire economy becomes socialized.
But there is more.

There can be no question but that Keynes

was thinking in terms of a full investment economy when he said, "I
feel sure that the demand for capital is strictly limited in the sense
that it would not be difficult to increase the stock of capital up to
a point where its marginal efficiency had fallen to a very low figure."

5b

At another point he guesses "that a properly run community equipped with
modern technical resources, of which the population is not increasing
rapidly, ought to be able to bring down the marginal efficiency of capi
tal in equilibrium approximately to zero within a single generation."^
Diis, according to Keynes, would rid capitalism of many of its objec
tionable features.

Perhaps it would rid the system of all its faults

and weaknesses because it would eliminate capitalism itself.
Keynes recognized that a full investment economy would result
in a quasi stationary community where change and progress would result
only from changes in technique, taBte, population, and institutions,
with the products of capital selling at a price proportioned to the
labor embodied in them.

^ Ibld.. p. 375.

He realizod that enormous social changes would

55lbid., p. 220.

result from a gradual disappearance of a rate of return on accumulated
vealth.

He Is perfectly willing, In fact urges, that the rentier should

pass from the scene.

But he refuses to recognize the most significant

aspect of his program.

Not only would the rentier disappear, he would

take with him capitalism Itself.

This Is true because in a full invest

ment economy the entire amount of net income produced each year would
necessarily have to be spent on consumption goods.

There could be no

net addition to investment, by definition, and therefore, if any given
level of income were to be maintained, 100 per cent of it would have to
be consumed.

Anything less than 100 per cent would result in a decline

in national income.

In other words, under conditions of full investment

consumer spending is the only contribution to the national income; they
are identical in amounts.

This certainly would not resemble capitalism,

a system which is characterized by profit making and capital accumula
tion.

Profits are made through investment and not from consumption,

and capital is accumulated by continued investment and not from 100
per cent consumption.

A capitalistic economy cannot consume all that

it produces and remain capitalistic because thero would be no profits
from net investment and no accumulation of capital, the two character
istics of capitalism which distinguishes it from a collective economy.
A zero-investment economy with 100 per cent consumption would be the
antithesis of an economy in which capitalists engage in enterprise to
make profits, not merely to make a living, and to acquire investment
goods, not consumer goods.
Hale contends, "Keynes could maintain that his program of ac
tion would create and maintain a stronger capitalism only because he
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excludes from his analysis all phenomena that really dominate the
56
capitalist processes.''-'

She classical economists tau$it that capi

talism evolves into a stationary state characterized by full employ
ment and maximum wealth and income.

For Marx, the capitalistic evo

lution eventually results in complete breakdown.

Keynes viewed

capitalism as a system that constantly threatened to break down and
is prevented from doing so by the state.

But the amount of govern

ment activity that the Keynesian program calls for would destroy
capitalism.

No matter how one feels on this issue, the fact is that

capitalism is an economy operated by free private enterprise and not
one operated from Washington by a government bureaucracy.
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Hale con

cludes :
Thus Keynes attacked the major citadels of capitalism,
private property and investment profits, and smashed them
to dust. This is the logical conclusion of his program.
3 M g is the significance of his idea system. This, if one
is so inclined, is the "new economics." To search for
ro
something new elsewhere in Keynes* idea system is futile.
While the above analysis is logical, it is not necessarily
true.

One may accept the idea that the General Theory contains static

elements without drawing the above conclusions.
In analyzing Keynes' concepts of a zero rate of interest and
a zero level for the marginal efficiency of capital, one must keep
in mind that Keynes was well steeped in the "equilibrium" and "tend
ency" aspects of classical and neo-classical economics.
Reducing the interest rate toward zero by monetary measures
couldmake feasible the development of more

5%ale, op. cit., p. 15.

and more investment

-^Ibld., p. 15.

^ Ibld., p. 17.
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opportunities vith lower and lower marginal efficiencies.

A tend

ency for the Interest rate to move downward would stimulate private
Investment as long as economically efficient Investment opportunities
existed.

It is not logical to assume that private Investment would

decrease merely because the marginal efficiency of capital Indicated
a tendency to decline.

Furthermore, there Is no need to assume that

the banking system would have to be socialized under conditions of
a zero rate of Interest.

Banking incctne--much of which now comes

from bank ownership of public debt--could bo supplemented by service
charges.

This was done during the depression of the 1930's and has

been continued since.
With reference to the rate of Interest, attention must be
called to the fact that the government does In effect determine the
private rate of Interest In today's world.

It does so by the Interest

rate it pays on the public debt and by the particular monetary policy
It follows.
Because the federal government is so large a borrower,
and because the public debt Is greater than the private,
the rates of Interest paid on government securities set the
rates paid on private borrowing. If the Treasury secures
an easy money policy, the rates of Interest in the private
area of the economy decline. If the Federal Reserve System
secures a hard money policy, there tends to be an Increase
In Interest rates on private borrowing.59
The long-run point of view regarding the size of the public debt Is
that it will remain large.

Hence, the government will continue to

determine the private rates of Interest, and It is unrealistic to
assume that the government will adopt a policy calling for zero rates
of Interest.

Nelson Peach, Principles of Economics (Homewood, Illinois;
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1955), p. 386.

230

Even if it is true that there are forces at work in the
economy to cause interest rates and the marginal efficiency of
capital to fall to zero, this can be interpreted as a tendency in
the tradition of classical equilibrium.

The Classicists taught that

there was a tendency for profits to disappear, but they did not say
this position would be achieved.

If Keynes is to be charged with

advocating the end of capitalism because of his belief that capital
assets would not be a source of Income once they ceased to be scarce,
then, the same charge must be made against the classical economists.
Capitalism could not exist without the presence of profits.
Keynes did not say in the General Theory that the rates of
interest and marginal efficiencies would fall to zero.

It was a

tendency concept, and this tendency toward zero rates can very well
be an ultimate which the system ever approaches but never reaches.
The American economy is not static, it is not a closed system, end
the arts are not in a constant state.

The zero rate concepts, viewed

as goals to approach but not to attain (as in the case of classical
equilibrium), are not inconsistent with capitalism, technological
progress, and rising standards of living.
With reference to the above argument, the following is sig
nificant;
In my last talk with Keynes, a few months before his
death, it was clear that he had got far away from his
'euthanasia of the rentier.' He complained that the easy
money policy was being pushed too far, both in Jh gland and
here, and emphasized interest as an element of income, and
its basic importance in the structure and functioning of
private capitalism.®0

^fyilliamB, o£. cit., p. 60 .
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Of the two Interpretations of Keynesian economics presented
above, the latter one appears to be more tenable.

It Is true that

there are static elements In the General Theory. But It Is equally
true that there are dynamic tendency elements.
The exact skeleton of Keynes' system belongs. . .to
macrostatics, not to macrodynamics. In part this limitation
must be attributed to those who formulated his teaching
rather than to his teaching Itself which contains several
dynamic elements, expectations In particular,6 l
Keynes' national Income formula, his concept that the consumption
function may change, his ex-ante and ex-post analyses of the equality
of savings and investment, his attitude toward varying supplies of
money, his concern with shifting values of the multiplier, his ex
pectation theory of value, and his tendency analysis of zero rates
of interest and marginal efficiencies are evidence that the Keynesian
system Is one largely composed of dynamic tendencies.

It appears

that this characteristic far outweighs the static aspects.
The proposition that Keynes embraced a dynamic philosophy was
explored In seme detail In Chapter Two.

There It was shown that Keynes

did accept the concept of an emerging society and viewed the econcmy
In a quite realistic manner.

For too long now segnents of the Keynesian

system have been examined In lsolatlon^fran other parts of the system.
This has been a grave error and has perhaps postponed a proper under
standing of the General Theory.

The system must be considered as a

whole— no one part Is logical without the support of all the other
parts— to be clearly understood and appreciated.

And when It Is so

^Schumpeter, "Keynes, the Economist," The New Economics,
PP. 92, 93.
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considered, the dynamic tendency characteristic becomes clear.

Fur

thermore, perhaps it is time that economists abandon the old argu
ments about dynamic and static economics and substitute the word
"evolutionary" for the word "dynamic" when they find it necessary
to treat qualitative changes.

For quantitative changes, economists

perhaps would profit by doing what many physicists do, namely, con
sider statics as including dynamics.
Both in terms of quantitative and qualitative factors, the
economics of Keynes measures up to the dynamic requirements.

His

concepts involving movement toward and oscillations around an under
employment equilibrium level are clearly in the nature of quantitative
dynamics.

And the forces which cause the movement and oscillations

are the dynamic factors.

His concepts of changes or reforms--pri

marily in the financial and monetary areas--take on the characteristics
of qualitative dynamics,

dhe fact that Keynes' evolutionary dynamics

is teleological rather than scientific is of no great importance.

IhoBe

persons who treat qualitative or evolutionary dynamics in a teleolological manner see change as tending toward sane end or ideal, which
of course they assume that they know.

Those who believe that their

evolutionary dynamics is scientific attempt to think of evolution in
terms of survival, free from any presumptions as to the first cause or
ultimate goal.

Keynes clearly had "ends" in mind when he developed

his ideas concerning the euthanasia of the rentier, the socialization
of investment, and zero rates of interest and marginal efficiencies.
Sane familiarity with the thougit of those who mean by dynamics a
particular kind of qualitative change, seems to warrant the observation
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that they are seldom free from teleological assumptions.

After all,

they are dealing with qualitative values, and if they are frankly
teleological, they must make some choice among ends; while if they
reason in terms of survival, the question is, Who are the "fittest"
to survive?

Also it is difficult to escape the question as to whether

the results of the survival test are. "best."
The logical content of Keynesianism involves the consumption
function, the marginal efficiency of capital, liquidity preference,
the wage-unit and the labor-unit concepts, a "labor-expectation"
theory of value, and the assumption of a given quantity of money.
These are the factors which, according to Keynes, govern and determine
the level of income and employment.

In brief, the welfare of the econ

omy is dependent upon these factors and the relationships between them.
But surely no one will any longer claim that these .are new factors in
the body of economic theory.

Schumpeter announces, "What a cordon

bleu to make such a sauce out of such scanty material."
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Mention has already been made of Haberler's view towards the
belief held by some that Keynes was the first to UBe a macroscopic
analysis of general equilibrium.
The use of aggregative systems of general equilibrium
is by no means new. All business-cycle theories run in
macroscopic terms. It is true that most of the earlier
business-cycle theories are incompletely stated, the number
of explicitly stated relations is frequently not equal to
the number of unknowns, the structure of the system is such
that it is unstable (or does not oscillate, which is bad
for a business-cycle theory). But even before the appearance
of Keynes' General Theory, the work of econometricians,
notably Frisch and Tinbergen, had done much to clarify
•

6gIbld., p. 91.
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these issues and had set higher standards of formal complete
ness and precision. 3 In fact, these early models, or models
of models, were superior to Keynes' system in scientific work
manship because they made a clear distinction between static
and dynamics, while Keynes' system is entirely static. .
As to the logical content of Keynes' idea system:
We thus reach the conclusion that, as far as the logical
content of Keynes' theory goes, i.e., apart from his judgnent
of the typical shape of the various functions and of concrete
situations and apart from policy recommendations, no revolution
has taken place; the General Theory marks a milestone, albeit
a conspicuous one, but not a break or a new beginning in the
development of economic theory. 5
As has been shown, Hansen argues that Keynes' consumption
function was the new contribution to economic theory.

It is quite

true that Keynes honed this analytical tool to a very fine edge,
but he did not originate it.

The consumption function is a major

factor in the entire analysis and argument of the underconsumption
economists.

Surely no one will deny that Boisguilbert, Malthus,

Sismondi, Marx, Hobson, and many others were quite aware of the im
portance of consumption to the welfare of an economy,

perhaps even

more important to a proper chronology of economic thought is the fact
that the consumption function is a major factor in the subjective

63The quickest way to learn how far aggregative analysis had
progressed before the publication of the General Theory is to read
Tinbergen, "Suggestions on Quantitative Business Cycle Theory,"
Econometrics, July, 1935* Haberler cites this source.
^Haberler, op. cjt., p. 162.
^ Ibid., p. 176 . The writer is of the opinion that Haberler
minimizes certain differences between the Keynesian and the Classical
systems and is in error in holding generally that where they differ,
as for example, in the theory of interest or the relation between
money wages and- employment, the classical theory is more realistic
and useful. However, the quotation above is certainly accurate.
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value theory and demand analysis of the Austrian school of economics.
The consumption function is virtually stated in Engel's Law of Con
sumption.
Many economists have claimed that the significant and new
factor in the General Theory was Keynes' frontal attack on saving and
hiB enthusiasm for spending.

Schumpeter says:

Many of the men who entered the field of teaching or
research in the twenties and thirties had renounced al
legiance to the bourgeois scheme of life, the bourgeois
scheme of values. Many of them sneered at the profit
motive and at the element of personal performance in the
capitalist process. But so far as they did not embrace
straight socialism, they still had to pay respect to
saving--under penalty of losing caste in their own eyes
and ranging themselves with what Keynes so tellingly
called the economist's "underworld." But Keynes broke
their fetters: here, at last, was theoretical doctrine
that not only obliterated the personal element and was,
if not mechanistic itself, at least mechanizable, but
also smashed the pillar into dust; a doctrine that may
not actually say but can easily be made to say both that
who tries to save destroys real capital and that, via
saving, the unequal distribution of income is the ulti
mate cause of unemployment. This is what the Keynesian
Revolution amounts to.°°
The greatness of Schumpeter as a student and scholar of economic
theory and its history is accepted, but it is submitted that he
must have forgotten some of his history of economic thought as he
wrote the above statements.

For the doctrine that saving is es

sential to capital formation and capital formation is the sine
qua non of economic progress has been subjected to many attacks for
at least two hundred years.

One of the earliest and most devastating

blows against saving was delivered by Bernard de Mandeville in his

Schumpeter, "Keynes, the Economist," The New Economics,
P.

99.
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Fable of the Beea published in 1705.

And the underconsumptionists

from Lord Lauderdale and Malthus to John Hobson and H. Gordon Hayes
have engaged In spirited, and sometimes bitter, attacks on this doc
trine.

Keynes appeared about two centuries too late to be credited

with this "radical" move against economic orthodoxy.

To be sure,

Keynes lent prestige and respectability to this long fight against
the idea that "saving is a virtue and spending is a sin" and com
pletely endorsed the concept that "saving is a sin and spending is
a virtue," and that was perhaps an important contribution, but it
can hardly be classified as a revolution in economic theory.
himself took no credit for originality in all this.

Keynes

He frankly states

that his concepts regarding saving and spending had been living in a
furtive manner in the underworld of economics, espoused by such un
orthodox characters as Malthus, Hobson, Marx, and Gesell.
This study has demonstrated that there was no "Keynesian
Revolution" and that the idea system of Keynes cannot logically be
considered as a "New Economics."

How, then, can one account for the

place of the economics of Keynes in the history of economic theory?
It is quite simple.

First, Keynes accepted and utilized the major

parts of the new philosophy.

He recognized the evolutionary process

as applied to society and its institutions.
in terms of the "totality" of things.

He formulated his theory

And he looked at the capitalistic

economy from a more realistic point of view than had some of his pred
ecessors.

Second, Keynes took many of the unorthodox concepts which

had long been present in the "underworld" of economic theory and
molded them into a system.

This was a major contribution, but it

did not constitute a revolution.

These concepts all revolved around

the doctrine of effective demand, and it is this doctrine upon which
hangs the entire Keynesian idea system.

And third, the General Theory

appeared at an opportune time in the history of capitalism.
industrial nation was deep in the throes of a depression.

Every
The econom

ics of Keynes appeared to be able to point the way out, to relieve
human misery, to answer burning economic questions and resolve social
issues.
These three factors in combination created a bench-mark in the
history of economic theory, but the General Theory did not constitute
a break or create a new beginning in the history of economic thought.
It was simply an Important part in the evolution of economic theory.
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